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Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the identiﬁcation and estimation of mod-
els of labor supply. The focus is on the key issues that arise from unobserved
heterogeneity, nonparticipation and dynamics. We examine the simple ‘sta-
tic’ labor supply model with proportional taxes and highlight the problems
surrounding nonparticipation and missing wages. The diﬀerence in dif-
ferences approach to estimation and identiﬁcation is developed within the
context of the labour supply model. We also consider the impact of incor-
porating nonlinear taxation and welfare programme participation. Family
labor supply is looked at from botht e unitary and collective persepctives.
Finally we consider intertemporal models focusing on the diﬃculties that
arise with participation and heterogeneity.
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This chapter is concerned with the identiﬁcation and estimation of labor sup-
ply models. The speciﬁc a t i o na n de s t i m a t i o no fs u c hm o d e l sh a sa l r e a d yb e e nt h e
subject of numerous studies and surveys. So why this one? The overall objective
of this chapter is to consider models that allow policy evaluation and simula-
tion allowing for individual heterogeneity. Evaluation concerns the assessment
of reforms that have taken place. Policy simulation concerns the assessment of
proposed reforms. For the most part it is the latter that has been the central
concern of empirical researchers. That is to construct a model that can reliably
be used for the assessment of proposed reforms. Since many policy proposals
involve the reform of highly nonlinear budget constraints and impact decisions
that are discrete and cover the whole life-cycle, we argue that a fully speciﬁed
dynamic structural model is the ideal. In particular, it is of central importance to
consider how labour supply and savings decisions interact and how policy aﬀects
both labour supply decisions within a period as well as intertemporally. However,
this ideal has a number of practical and theoretical diﬃculties. In certain situa-
tions, the evaluation of existing reforms can be analyzed using much simpler and
potentially more robust techniques.
To best convey the set of issues surrounding estimation of labour supply mod-
els we start with the simplest static framework and build up to the more complete
dynamic models, adding important elements such as nonlinear budget sets on the
way. Thus, the layout of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents an assess-
ment of the estimation issues underlying the simple ‘static’ labor supply model
with proportional taxes and highlights the problems surrounding nonparticipa-
tion and missing wages. In section 3 we consider the natural experiment and
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approaches to estimation and evaluation of reforms, lay-
ing out the identifying assumptions underlying interpretation of the results. We
consider estimation of a simple discrete policy response parameter as well as the
estimation of income and substitution eﬀects. In section 4 we examine the impact
of incorporating nonlinear taxation and welfare programme participation. Section
5 considers some of the speciﬁc issues that relate to family labor supply, including
the development of the collective approach and welfare programme participation
as previously articulated. Section 6 discusses intertemporal labor supply models.
1This section reviews the various approaches taken to dynamic modeling and ex-
amines the diﬃculties that arise with participation and heterogeneity. Section 7
concludes the chapter.
2. Estimation and Identiﬁcation with Participation with Pro-
portional Taxes
We begin by considering the simple static model of hours and consumption
choices. We leave the discussion of nonlinear budget sets to section 4.
2.1. Static Speciﬁcations
2.1.1. The Allocation of Hours and Consumption
Utility is deﬁned over hours of work h and consumption c, both of which are
restricted to be non-negative and h is restricted to be below a maximal amount
of an available time endowment. Formally, this discussion is easily extended to
the case of family labor supply decisions where h is a vector of household labor
supplies. However, there are many speciﬁc issues relating to joint participation
decisions and to the allocation of resources within the family that are central to
any study of family labor supply; we leave our discussion of family labor supply
models to section 5. Equally, consumption decisions can be disaggregated. This
disaggregation is central to the analysis of nonseparability of goods and leisure.
We turn to this below.
If we let y represent the total unearned income available for consumption, and
w the real wage rate, then the optimal choices for c and h are given by the solution
to
max
c,h
{U(c,h)|c−wh = y;c≥0;h ≥ 0} (2.1)
where U(c,h) is a quasiconcave utility index deﬁned increasing in c and −h. The
resulting labor supply has the form
h = h(w,y). (2.2)
In the static model y is taken to be income from other sources. However it turns
o u tt h a tt h ep r e c i s ed e ﬁnition of y is crucial: If y is measured as the diﬀerence
2between total consumption expenditure and earnings, c−wh = y, it is consistent
both with intertemporal two-stage budgeting both in the absence of liquidity
constraints and with the presence of liquidity constraints that are unrelated to
labour supply. This is discussed in a subsection below.
The indirect utility representation of preferences is given by
V (w,y) ≡ U(wh(w,y)+y,h(w,y)) (2.3)
which is linear homogeneous, quasi-concave in p, w and y,d e c r e a s i n gi np and w
and increasing in y. The various representations of preferences (direct or indirect
utility) detailed below are going to be particularly useful in specifying empirical
models and deﬁning the likelihood function.
2.1.2. Two-Stage Budgeting Speciﬁcations and Within Period Alloca-
tions
Labor supply and consumption models are frequently analyzed in a two good
framework. Such modelling is less restrictive than it sounds because under Gor-
man’s (1959, 1968) two stage budgeting, this labor supply model can be seen as
the top stage where “full income” is shared between consumption and leisure and
then the consumption budget is split among goods. However, for such an inter-
pretation with all goods being represented by one or two price indices, we require
some conditions on preferences.
Suppose utility is deﬁned over hours of work h and a vector of goods q. Assume
the individual has a within period utility function of the form
υt = v(ct,h t,pt)=maxq,h {u(qt,h t)|p
0
tqt=ct} (2.4)
where pt is a vector of prices corresponding to the disaggregated commodity vector
qt.T h ef u n c t i o nυt is a conditional indirect utility function which is increasing in
total consumption expenditure ct, decreasing and concave in prices and decreasing
in hours of work ht.
We say that qt is weakly separable from ht if the marginal rate of substitution
between goods qt does not depend on ht. In this case the utility function can
be written as u(u1(qt),h t) where u1 is a sub-utility function. If in addition the
marginal utilities of qt and ht do not depend on each other then we say that the
3utility function is additively separable, in which case the utility function can be
written as u1(qt)+u2(ht). Blackorby, Primont and Russell (1978) have a detailed
analysis of the concepts of separability and Deaton (1978) analyses the empirical
implications of the additive separability assumption.
Gorman has shown that if a set of goods x1 is separable from goods x2 then it
is possible to express the demands for goods x1 simply as a function of the total
expenditure allocated to this group ( x1 ) and the prices of these goods alone (say
p1). In addition, if preferences can be expressed in the generalized Gorman polar
form, then it is possible to express the overall expenditure allocations to each
group as a function of the price indices for each group. This theorem can justify
considering the allocation of total expenditure to overall consumption and leisure
separately from the problem of how expenditure is allocated to goods. However,
it has to be borne in mind that the justiﬁcation which allows us to write labor
supply as a function of the real wage alone (rather than of all relative prices) does
imply restrictions on preferences.
These results oﬀer a justiﬁcation of the static model within an intertemporal
context since the concept of separability can extend both over goods and over
time.1 Typically we impose additive separability over time in which case the
marginal utility of consumption or hours of work in one period is unaﬀected by
consumption and hours in any other time period. Additive intertemporal sepa-
rability has the implication that we can use two stage budgeting to characterize
consumption choices: given the level of consumption and separability, the within
period demands for goods qt only depend on the prices of those goods and on
wages (if the goods are not separable from hours). The indirect utility function
deﬁned by (2.4) then becomes the criterion function for allocating consumption
(and hours) over the life-cycle.2
It is well known that taking a monotonic transformation of the utility function
does not change the observed within period allocations. In an intertemporal con-
text this issue acquires a special importance: taking a monotonic transformation
does not alter the way that consumption and hours are allocated within period,
1See Gorman (1959), MaCurdy (1983), Blundell and Walker (1986) and Arellano and Meghir
(1992)
2Utility (2.4) implicitly assumes separability over time thus ruling out habits and / or ad-
justments costs (see Hotz, Kydland and Sedlacek (1988) and Meghir and Weber (1996)).
4under intertemporal separability. However, it does potentially change the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between periods. Hence, as we will discuss further below,
estimating intertemporal preferences generally requires intertemporal data.
Noting that modeling the monotonic transformation is modeling intertemporal
preferences, we use the slightly more elaborate notation
υt = ψ[U(ct,h t|z1t),z 2t] (2.5)
where ψ[·] is a monotonic function of its ﬁrst argument u and where z1 and z2
are variables (observed or otherwise) that aﬀect preferences over consumption
and hours of work. In particular, z2t aﬀects intertemporal allocations but not
within period ones (unless it contains common elements with z1t). Our focus in
this section is on within period allocations. The discussion here should make it
clear that one can work with the utility function (2.1) to represent within period
allocations of consumption and hours of work consistent with life-cycle choices.
2.1.3. Empirical Labor Supply Speciﬁcations
Preferences can be represented by direct utility functions, indirect utility
functions or by the labor supply equation itself. In each case the function has
satisfy some basic properties to be consistent with theory. Here we brieﬂyr e v i e wo f
some standard speciﬁcations of the static labor supply model (2.2) and relate them
to their indirect utility function. Such speciﬁcations are usually chosen for ease
of estimation and here we simply consider the speciﬁcations and their underlying
model of preferences. With unobserved heterogeneity and nonparticipation it is
useful, if not essential, to have some relatively simple parametric speciﬁcation in
mind.
The linear labor supply model
h = α + βw+ γy (2.6)
has indirect utility
V (w,y)=e
γw(y +
β
γ
w −
β
γ2 +
α
γ
) with γ ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0. (2.7)
Although popular (see Hausman (1981,1985), for example), it is arguable that
this linear speciﬁcation allows too little curvature with wages.
5Alternative semilog speciﬁcations and their generalizations are also popular in
empirical work. For example, the semilog speciﬁcation
h = α + β lnw + γy (2.8)
with indirect utility
V (w,y)=
eγw
γ
(γy+α
β
γ
+β lnw)−
β
γ
Z
γy
eγy
γy
d(γy) with γ ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0. (2.9)
Moreover, the linearity of (2.8) in α and lnw makes it particularly amenable to an
empirical analysis with unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous wages and nonpar-
ticipation as discussed below. Consequently, this speciﬁcation is used extensively
in our discussion of estimation that follows.
Neither (2.6) nor (2.8) allow backward bending labor supply behavior although
it is easy to generalize (2.8) by including a quadratic term in lnw. Note that
imposing integrability conditions at zero hours for either (2.6) or (2.8) implies
positive wage and negative income parameters. A simple speciﬁcation that does
allow backward bending behavior, while retaining a three parameter linear in
variables form, is that used in Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1994)
h = α + β lnw + γ
y
w
(2.10)
with indirect utility
V (w,y)=
wβ+1
β +1
(
y
w
(1 + γ)
2 +β lnw +α −
β
1+γ
) with γ ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0. (2.11)
This form has similar properties to the MRS speciﬁcation of Heckman (1974).
Generalizations of the Linear Expenditure System or Stone-Geary preferences
are also attractive from certain points of view. For example suppose the indirect
utility function for individual i in period t takes the form
Vit =
∙
wH + y − a(w)
b(w)
¸
(2.12)
where H is the maximum amount of hours available to be allocated between hours
and leisure. This is the quasi-homothetic “Gorman polar form”. The linear expen-
diture system belongs to this class. However, there is no need to impose additive
6separability between consumption and hours of work as would be the case un-
der Stone-Geary/LES preferences. Indeed, such separability assumptions severely
constrain the time path of consumption and hours of work and can lead to the
impression that the life-cycle model is unable to explain a number of observed
phenomena, see Heckman (1974). In particular we may specify
a(w)=a0 + a1w +2 a2w
1
2 (2.13)
and
b(w)=w
β (2.14)
which is a Generalized Leontief model. Preferences are additive and reduce to
LES if a2 =0 .
The implied labor supply function using (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) can be derived
using Roy’s identity and takes the form
hit =( H − a1) − a2w
−1
2 −
β
w
(M − a0 + a1w +2 a2w
1
2) (2.15)
where M = wH + y. Unobserved heterogeneity can also easily be allowed for,
as well as measurement error in hours of work (but not in hourly wages) and or
consumption. For example, we can allow a1 to be heterogeneous across individuals
and time, i.e. a1 =¯ a1 + ε. Under the simplifying assumption that a1 is the only
source of heterogeneity the error term in the earnings equation now becomes ν =
−ε(1 + β).
2.2. Estimation of the Static Labor Supply model
The main estimation issue, ignoring problems related to participation and
nonlinear taxation (discussed below) is the endogeneity of wages w and unearned
income y. Wages may well be endogenous because unobservables aﬀecting prefer-
ences for work may well be correlated with unobservables aﬀecting productivity
and hence wages. Unearned income may be endogenous for a number of reasons:
If y represents asset income, then individuals who work harder (because of unob-
served preferences for work ) are also likely to have accumulated more assets.3
3If μ also represents income from spouses, positive assortative mating will imply that hard
working individuals will tend to marry. Hence unobserved preferences for work will correlate
with spousal income reﬂected in μ.
7Take as a simple example the semilog model of labor supply as above, i.e.
hi = α
0xi + β lnwi + γyi + ui (2.16)
The subscript i denotes an individual. The variables x denote observables which
determine preferences. We avoid using the log of y b e c a u s ei ti sc o n c e i v a b l et h a ti t
is zero and, in some cases, even negative. We add to this system a wage equation
lnwi = δ
0
1xi + δ
0
2zi + vi
and a reduce form equation for unearned income
yi = ζ
0
1xi + ζ
0
2zi + εi .
Identiﬁcation requires that the dimension of the variables excluded from the labor
supply equation, zi, is at least two. It also requires that the matrix [δ
0
2 ζ
0
2] has
rank 2. In this linear framework estimation is straightforward - Two stage least
squares is the obvious choice. However, we will see below that it is convenient to
estimate the three reduce forms ﬁrst and then impose the parametric restrictions
to recover the structural coeﬃcients using minimum distance. The reduced form
labor supply model is
hi =( α + βδ1 + γζ1)0xi +( βδ2 + γζ2)0zi + ui
Given estimates of all the reduced form coeﬃcients the restrictions can then be
imposed using minimum distance. Thus let
α1 =( α + βδ1 + γζ1)
α2 =( βδ2 + γζ2)
α3 =[ δ
0
1 δ
0
2 ζ
0
1 ζ
0
2 ]0
and let Ω represent the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of the three equa-
tion reduced form system. Finally let α(θ)=[ α1 α2 α3]0 where θ.represents the
set of parameters in the labor supply model, the wage equation and the unearned
income equation. Then the optimal minimum distance estimator is
ˆ θ =a r gm i n
θ
{(ˆ α − α(θ))
0Ω
−1(ˆ α − α(θ))
8The resulting estimator is eﬃcient, to the extent that the ﬁrst step estimator is
eﬃcient.
When the labor supply model is non linear this straightforward procedure is
no longer available. In this case an alternative approach is Maximum likelihood
or semi-parametric instrumental variables. Maximum likelihood will be discussed
below in the context of the labor supply model with corner solutions and nonlinear
taxation. Hence we avoid duplication by deferring discussion until then.
In the absence of censoring one can use non-parametric Instrumental variables
as in Newey and Powell (2003) and Daroles, Florens and Renault (2000). Consider
the case where the labor supply is an unknown function of w and y
hi = h(wi,y i)+ui
The object is to estimate the function h. Suppose we have a set of instruments z
(at least two if we are to treat both the wage and other income as endogenous). If
we assume that the error in the labor supply function satisﬁes the rank condition
E(ui|zi)=0 . In addition one needs a strong identiﬁcation assumption ensuring
that any function of w, y can be explained by the instruments z. Under these
conditions solving the moment condition
E(hi − h(wi,y i)|zi)=0
for the function h(wi,y i) provides a non-parametric estimator.
In the context of censoring due to non-participation a control function ap-
proach turns out to be more useful. However, it is important to note that the
assumptions underlying the control function are diﬀerent than those underlying
the IV approach above, unless the instruments are independent of the unobserv-
ables.4 A form of the control function approach relies on the assumption that
E(ui|z,x,w,y)=g(vi,ε i)
where vi and εi are the error terms from the wage and unearned income equations
respectively.5 With unknown h identiﬁcation also requires measurable separability
4Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2003).
5For a more general case with unknown h see Newey, Powell and Vella (1999) or Heckman,
Florens, Meghir and Vytlacil (2003) who derive conditions for identiﬁcation..
9which ensures that the functions g and h vary independently and is the equivalent
of the rank condition. In a parametric framework the requirements are less strin-
gent since we are restricting attention to speciﬁc functional forms. One approach
to estimation would be to take a series expansion of g. Alternatively we could use
some kernel estimator. The procedure works under a generalized rank condition;
however the important point to note is that even under non-linearity we do not
require explicit distributional assumptions, other than the restriction on the con-
ditional expectation of u.6 Nevertheless it should be noted that in practice it may
be diﬃcult to motivate the control function assumption, which contrasts with the
orthogonality conditions above that are often derived from economic theory.
2.3. The Censored Regression Model
Labor market participation raises two key questions for modelling labor sup-
ply. First, what market wage distribution, should be used for nonparticipants?
Second, are there features of the labor market that make labor supply behavior
on the extensive margin (participation) fundamentally diﬀerent from behavior on
the intensive margin (hours of work)? These questions are not wholly unrelated
since, without further restrictions on the distribution of oﬀered wages among non-
participants, it is diﬃcult to separately identify a process for nonparticipation and
for hours of work.
Among the most compelling reasons for separating these two margins is ﬁxed
costs of work - either monetary or time. We take up the issue of ﬁxed costs
in section 2.5, and begin by working through a model without ﬁxed costs. We
consider ﬁrst with semiparametric estimation in a model with missing wages.
Suppose individual heterogeneity in tastes for work is represented by the ran-
dom variable v. Observed hours of work (2.2) in the censored regression case can
be represented by
h =m a x {f(w,y,x,v),0}. (2.17)
where f(w,y,x,v) represents desired hours of work
f(w,y,x,v) ≡ h
∗. (2.18)
6Two functions g(e) and h(v) are measurably separable iﬀ whenever g(e) − h(v)=0a.s.
implies g(e) and h(v) are constant functions.
10and where y represents some measure of current period unearned income.
The censored labor supply model implies the reservation wage condition
h>0 ⇔ w>w
∗(y,x,v) (2.19)
where w∗ is deﬁned implicitly by
0=f(w
∗,y,x,v). (2.20)
The existence and uniqueness of the reservation wage in this simple world is
guaranteed by revealed preference arguments. Given the market wage w, (2.17)
also deﬁnes a threshold condition on the unobservable heterogeneity term v given
by
h>0 ⇔ v ≥ v
∗(w,y,x)
⇒ Pr(h>0) =
Z
v≥v∗
g(v)dv.
where g(v) is the density function for v.
To implement this censored regression speciﬁcation we deﬁne the index Ii as
an indicator variable that is unity if individual i participates7 and zero otherwise.
Observable hours of work then follow the rule
hi =
½
h∗
i if Ii =1
0 otherwise
¾
. (2.21)
That is
Ii =1 ⇐⇒ h
∗
i > 0 (2.22)
=1 {h
∗
i > 0}. (2.23)
This implies that participation in work follows a simple corner-solution framework
and is equivalent to assuming there are no ﬁxed costs.8
7By participation we mean participation in paid work.
8By contrast, the ﬁxed costs framework retains
Ii =1= ⇒ h∗
i > 0
but not the reverse. As Cogan (1980) shows, ﬁxed costs are equivalent to a positive reservation
hours of work. We elaborate on this in section 3.2 below.
11The log likelihood for an independently distributed random sample of n indi-
viduals in the censored model is given by
lnL(θ)=
n X
i=1
µ
Ii lng(ν;θ)+( 1− Ii)ln
Z
v≥v∗
g(v;θ)dv
¶
(2.24)
where θ are the unknown parameters of preferences and g is the distribution of v.
In a linear speciﬁcation with a normal iid assumption on v, this is equivalent to
the Tobit censored regression speciﬁcation.
The likelihood speciﬁcation (2.24) makes two implicit assumptions on the wage
distribution. First, that wages are observed for all individuals irrespective of their
labor market status. Second, that wages are exogenous for labor supply. Neither
of these are apriori reasonable.
2.4. Missing Wages
Wages are not observed if h =0 . Suppose the model for wages can be written
as
lnw = γ1x + γ2q + η (2.25)
where q are a set of variables that are exclusive to the determination of real
wages and where η is an iid error term with distribution gw(η). The likelihood
contribution for h =0becomes
h>0  0 = g(v)gw(η)
h =0  0 =
R ∞ R v∗
g(v)gw(η)dvdη
(2.26)
By writing the joint distribution of ν and η as a product of the two marginals
we have implicitly maintained that wages are exogenous for labor supply. This
implies that the density of wages can be estimated separately; In a labor supply
model linear in log wages this further implies that we can simply impute wages
for all non workers and estimate the model as if wages are observed (correcting
the standard errors of course for generated regressor bias) However, if we wish
relax this assumption and permit w to be endogenous in the hours equation, the
12sample likelihood becomes
lnL(φ)=
n X
i=1
µ
Ii lnghw(v,η)+( 1− Ii)ln
Z ∞Z v∗
ghw(v,η)dvdη
¶
(2.27)
where ghw(v,η;φ)is the joint distribution of ν and η.
The resulting estimator simpliﬁes enormously if we assume a parametric speci-
ﬁcation that permits an explicit reduced form for desired hours of work. A popular
example of such a speciﬁcation is the semi-log labor supply model to which we
now turn
2.4.1. A Semi-log Speciﬁcation
Suppose we write the optimal labor supply choice for individual i as
h
∗
i = β1 lnwi + β2yi + β3xi + vi (2.28)
where β1,β2 and β3 are unknown parameters of labor supply. labor supply and
wages are now completely described by the triangular system consisting of (2.25)
and the following reduced form for desired hours of work
h
∗
i =( β1γ1 + β3)xi + β1γ2qi + β2yi + β1ηi + vi (2.29)
= π1xi + π2qi + π3yi + ωi (2.30)
= πzi + ωi (2.31)
2.4.2. Semi-parametric Estimation
If it can be assumed that vi and ηi are distributed independently of the
explanatory variables x, q and y then semiparametric identiﬁcation and estimation
can take the following simple step wise procedure.
The π coeﬃcients in (2.31) can be estimated from a standard censored regres-
sion estimation procedure. If gω(ω) describes the density of ω then the sample
likelihood for a random sample of i =1 ,...,n i n d i v i d u a l si sg i v e nb y
L(π)=
n Y
i=1
{gω(ω|π))}
Ii
½
1 −
Z
−π0zi
gω(ω|π)dω
¾1−Ii
(2.32)
13which is equivalent to the sample likelihood for the Tobit model when ω is ho-
moscedastic normal. Root-n consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of
π can be derived under much weaker assumptions on gω, see Powell(1984, 1986b),
Horowitz (1986).
Given π, the conditional mean of (2.25) for participants can be used to esti-
mate the wage equation parameters. This is the Heckman (1976, 1979) selectivity
framework. Suppose we assume
E(ηi|Ii > 0) = λη(πzi) (2.33)
then the conditional mean of (2.25) given Ii > 0 is simply written
E(lnwi|z,Ii > 0) = γ1xi + γ2qi + λη(πzi) (2.34)
If a joint normal distribution is assumed for vi and ηi then estimation can follow
the two-step selectivity estimation approach developed by Heckman (1979). Al-
ternatively, a
√
N consistent and asymptotically normal semiparametric estimator
can be constructed.
To consider the semiparametric estimator notice that the conditional expecta-
tion of (2.34) for participants given πzi is
E(lnwi|πzi,I>0) = γ1E(xi|πzi)+γ2E(qi|πzi)+λη(πzi). (2.35)
Subtracting this from (2.34) eliminates the λη(πzi) term yielding
E(lnwi|z,Ii > 0) − E(lnwi|π
0zi,I>0) (2.36)
= δ
0(xi − E(xi|π
0zi)) + φ
0(qi − E(qi|π
0zi)).
The conditional expectation terms E(lnwi|πzi),E (xi|πzi) and E(qi|πzi) in
(2.36) can then be replaced by their unrestricted Nadaraya-Watson kernel regres-
sion estimators.9
The parameters of (2.34) can then be recovered by an instrumental variable
regression. Robinson (1988), suggests regressing lnw − d lnw
h
(πz) on x − b xh(πz)
9e.g.
\ E(qi|π0zi)=b qh(πz)=
b r(πz)
b f(πz)
14and q − b qh(πz) using I[b f(πz) >b N]x and I[b f(πz) >b N]q as the respective in-
strumental variables, where I[b f(lnx) >b N] is an indicator function that trims
out observations for which b f(lnx) <b N, for some sequence of trimming con-
stants bN which tend to zero with the sample size at some appropriate rate. An
alternative estimator, due to Powell (1987), is to use b f(πz).x and b f(πz).q as in-
struments. This eﬀectively removes the random denominators from the kernel
regression estimators.
Finally, given the γ1,γ2,π1,π2 and π3 parameters, the structural labor sup-
ply parameters β1,β2 and β3 can be recovered by minimum distance. In general,
these steps can be combined to improve eﬃciency. Provided a suitable instrumen-
tal variable is available, this procedure can also be extended to control for the
endogeneity of other income yi. We consider this in more detail below.
2.5. Fixed Costs
2.5.1. A Structural Model of Fixed Costs
Fixed costs imply that participation does not simply follow the corner solution
condition (2.22). Instead participation will depend on the determinants of ﬁxed
costs as well as the determinants of h∗
i. For example, suppose there is a ﬁxed
monetary cost of working S, this implies that non-labor income in the budget
constraint becomes
y − S if h>0
y if h =0
and the distribution of S is only partially observable. If we denote utility in work
at the optimal hours point by the indirect utility level: ν(w,y,v) and utility at
in which
b r(πz)=
1
n
X
i
Kh (πz − πzi)qi,
and
b f(πz)=
1
n
X
i
Kh (πz − πzi),
where Kh(·)=h−1k(·/h) for some symmetric kernel weight function k(.) which integrates to
one. The bandwidth h is assumed to satisfy h → 0 and nh →∞as n →∞ .U n d e rs t a n d a r d
conditions the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal, see Härdle (1990) and Härdle
and Linton (1994).
15h =0by the direct utility at h =0 : U(Y,0,v). The decision to work follows from
ν(w,y,v) ≥ U(Y,0,v).
Note that if S>S>> 0 then there will be a discontinuity in the hours distribution
at low wages which should reﬂect itself as a “hole” at the low end of the hours
distribution.10 This model is further developed in Section 4, here we analyse index
models empirical models that are motivated by the presence of ﬁxed costs of work.
Cogan (1981) deﬁnes reservation hours h0 such that
U
1(T − h0,y− S + wh0,x,v)=U
0(T,y) (2.37)
h0 = h0(y − S,w,x,v) ≥ 0
and the participation decision becomes
Pr (work) =P r ( h>h
0). (2.38)
For any v and η, nonparticipation will occur if ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently high
S>S ∗(v,η).
Suppose we continue to assume wage equation (2.25) and also assume the
speciﬁcation of ﬁxed costs to be
S = θ1x + θ2m + s (2.39)
where m are a set of variables exclusive to the determination of ﬁxed costs and s
represents unobserved heterogeneity in the distribution of ﬁx e dc o s t s .I nt e r m so f
the likelihood contributions we have ‘no work’ regime:
 0 =
Z ∞
−∞
Z v∗
−∞
Z ∞
S∗
g(v,η,s)dsdvdη (2.40)
work regime:
 1 =
Z ∞
v∗
Z S∗
0
g(ε,v,η,s)dsdv. (2.41)
10This may not be visible since heterogeneity in ﬁxed costs and in unobserved tastes may
imply a diﬀerent possition for the discontinuity for diﬀerent individuals, smoothinng out the
unconditional distribution. Hence looking for such “odd” features in the hours distributionn
may not be a very good empirical strategy for detecting ﬁxed costs. However such features can
be seen in the distribution of relatively homogenous groups, e.g. Single women with no children
or single men.
16Given some parametric speciﬁcation of direct (and indirect) utility, all the
structural parameters of ﬁxed costs, preferences and wage determination are iden-
tiﬁed from a likelihood based on the contributions (2.40) and (2.41).
Finally note that if we specify a model on the basis of the indirect utility or cost
function we may not have an analytical expression for the direct utility function.
Consequently this has to be obtained numerically. One way of doing this is to
ﬁnd the standard reservation wage when hours are zero and the ﬁxed costs have
not been incurred. Evaluating the indirect utility function at that reservation
wage and non-labor income then provides us with the utility value of not working.
Another important diﬃculty is then to derive the probability of participation given
that the direct utility function at zero hours of work will depend on unobserved
heterogeneity both directly and via the re s e r v a t i o nw a g e-h e n c ei ti sl i k e l yt ob e
a highly non-linear function of the underlying error term. In practice, as we argue
later, it may be easier to work with a direct utility speciﬁcation when we have to
deal with such non-convexities.
2.5.2. Semi-parametric Estimation in the Fixed Costs Model
Although the (semiparametric) censored regression approach to estimation of
the hours equation described above is no longer valid in this ﬁxed costs case, a
semiparametric procedure applied to hours of work among the participants can be
used as an approximation to the ﬁxed costs model. The optimal choice of hours
of work among those individuals who decide to join the labor market will have
the form
h
∗
i = β1 lnwi + β2(yi − Si)+β3xi + vi (2.42)
=( β1γ1 + β2θ1 + β3)xi + β1γ2qi + β2yi (2.43)
+β2θ2mi + β1ηi + β2si + vi (2.44)
= e π1xi + e π2qi + e π3yi + e π4mi + ui (2.45)
= e πe zi + ui (2.46)
where again the β1,β2 and β3 are unknown parameters of labor supply. labor
supply and wages are now completely described by the triangular system consisting
of (2.25) and (2.46).
17Assume that the participation condition (2.38) can be well approximated by
the discrete index model
Ii =1⇐⇒ φe zi + ei > 0 (2.47)
where e zi contain all the exogenous variables determining reservation hours, log
wages and desired hours of work. The term ei is a random unobservable whose
distribution Fe is normalized up to scale and assumed to be independent of e zi.
Parameters φ will be convolution of parameters of ﬁxed costs, the wage equation
and preferences. They can be identiﬁed through the condition
E(Ii =1 |e zi)=
Z
−φh zi
dFe(e). (2.48)
The φ coeﬃcients in (2.47) can be estimated up to scale from a standard binary
choice estimation procedure which replaces the censored regression rule (2.32) in
this ﬁxed costs model. The sample likelihood for a random sample of i =1 ,...,n
i n d i v i d u a l si sg i v e nb y
=(φ)=
n Y
i=1
½Z
−φh zi
dF(e)
¾Ii ½
1 −
Z
−φh zi
dF(e)
¾1−Ii
(2.49)
which is equivalent to the Probit likelihood when e is homoscedastic normal. √
N consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of φ up to scale can be
derived under much weaker index assumptions on f, see Klein and Spady(1993)
for example.
Given φ, the conditional mean of (2.25) for participants can be used to estimate
the wage and hours equation parameters. This is the Heckman (1976, 1979)
selectivity framework. Suppose we assume the single index framework
E(ηi|Ii > 0,e zi)=λη(φe zi) (2.50)
and
E(ui|Ii > 0,e zi)=λu(φe zi). (2.51)
then the conditional mean of (2.25) and (2.31) given Ii > 0 is simply written
E(lnwi|Ii > 0) = γ1xi + γ2qi + λη(φe zi) (2.52)
18and
E(hi|Ii > 0,e zi)=( β1γ1+β2θ1+β3)xi+β1γ2qi+β2yi+β2θ2mi+λu(φe zi). (2.53)
where e zi is taken to include all exogenous variables. If a joint normal distribution
is assumed for vi,η i and si then estimation can follow the two-step selectivity
estimation approach developed by Heckman (1979).
Notice that (2.52) and (2.53) together only identify γ1,γ 2,β 1 and β2, the
parameters of ﬁxed costs and β3 are not identiﬁed without more information on
ﬁxed costs. A
√
N consistent and asymptotically normal semiparametric estimator
of these parameters can be constructed from a natural extension of the procedures
described above for the censored labor supply model.
F o rp a r t i c i p a n t sw eh a v e
E(hi|φe zi,I > 0) = e π1E(xi|φe zi,I> 0) + e π2E(qi|φe zi,I> 0) (2.54)
+e π3E(yi|φe zi,I > 0) + e π4E(mi|φe zi,I> 0) + λu(φe zi). (2.55)
The nonparametric term describing the selection of participants can be eliminated
as in (2.36) and root-n estimation of the unknown index parameters can also follow
the same semiparametric techniques.
Finally, we should note that endogeneity of yi can be handled in a similar
fashion. Suppose a reduced form for y is given by
yi = ϑ
0di + ζi (2.56)
since yi is continuously observed for all individuals, ϑ can be estimated by least
squares. Now suppose we also assume that
E(ui|Ii > 0,y i,e zi)=δyζi + λu(φe zi). (2.57)
Then adding the estimated residual from the regression (2.56) into the selection
model (2.53) appropriately corrects for the endogeneity of yi. This is an impor-
tant consideration given the consumption based deﬁnition of yi in the life-cycle
consistent speciﬁcation.
193. Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences, Natural Experiments and Group-
ing Methods
One of the central issues in labour supply is the endogeneity of marginal (post-
tax) wages and other incomes. The work incentives facing individuals are usually
endogenous. Consider as an example a world with a progressive tax system, as will
be examined in detail in the next section. In this case individuals earning more
face a higher rate of tax and hence a lower marginal incentive to work. Now take
two individuals both of which have the same pre-tax wage but diﬀerent tastes for
work. The person working longer hours will earn more and will face a higher tax
rate, which translates to a lower post-tax marginal wage. In a simple regression
framework we would estimate a negative eﬀect of the wage on hours of work since
the person with higher hours (because of tastes) will be facing a lower wage.
This kind of endogeneity has prompted researchers to seek exogenous sources of
variation in policy that resemble experimental situations with a “treatment” group
aﬀected by the policy and a “control” or “comparison” group which is unaﬀected.
The impact of incentives is then estimated by comparing the change n hours
between the two groups before and after the policy is implemented.
Using this basic idea one can attempt to estimate a “causal” impact of the
policy on labour supply, ignoring any structural considerations. Alternatively one
can think of the policy changes as an attempt to obtain qausiexperimental condi-
tions for estimating the structural parameters themselves. The former approach
attempts to ignore the underlying theory and wishes to go straight to the eﬀects
of the particular policy. The latter is after structural parameters that can be
used for extrapolation to other policy situations, assuming the theory is a good
approximation of reality.
In the following sections we describe this approach to estimating the impact
of incentives on labour supply. We also discuss the validity of the approach under
diﬀerent circumstances. As one may expect, even the “atheoretical” approach
which seeks to estimate the impacts of policy without reference to a model does
implicitly make strong assumptions about behaviour and/or the environment, and
we discuss this. We also discuss conditions under which the quasi-experimental
approach, which is a form of Instrumental Variables, can provide estimates of
structural parameters. We go through the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator and
20a more general grouping estimator considering also the eﬀects of selection due to
nonparticipation.
3.1. Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences and Fixed Eﬀects Models
Suppose one is interested in estimating the inﬂuence of a policy instrument on
an outcome for a group, say outcome hit measuring hours of work or participation.
The group consists of individuals i =1 ,...,N, with these individuals observed over
a sample horizon t =1 ,2,... Suppose further that a policy instrument of interest
changes in a particular period t for only a segment of the individuals. Let δit
be a zero-one indicator that equals unity if the policy change was operative for
individual i in period t. Members of the group who experience the policy change
react according to a parameter γ. A framework for estimating expressed in terms
of a conventional ﬁxed-eﬀect model takes the form
hit = γδit + ηi + mt + εit (3.1)
where i is a time-invariant eﬀect unique to individual i, mt is a time eﬀect common
to all individuals in period t,a n dεit is an individual time-varying error distributed
independently across individuals and independently of all ηi and mt.
The least squares estimator of γ in (3.1), which regresses hit on δit and a set
of individual and time dummy variables, is precisely the diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimator for the impact of the reform. It can be given the interpretation of a
causal impact of the reform if E(εit|ηi,m t,δit)=0 . In a heterogeneous response
model
hit = γiδit + ηi + mt + εit (3.2)
the least squares dummy variable estimator recovers the average of the response
parameters γi for those aﬀected by the policy. Since the error term εit may be
correlated both over time and across individuals, this should be taken into account
when constructing standard errors.
Now suppose that the policy does not aﬀect everyone in a treatment group,
but that the chance of being aﬀected is higher among them (g = T),t h a ni ti s
among a control group (g = C). The error structure can be more general than
above. Consider a speciﬁcation in which
hit = γδit + uit. (3.3)
21where uit represents an individual level heterogeneity term which may be ﬁxed for
that individual over time or may vary over time. Moreover it may be correlated
across individuals and may have a cross section mean that is non zero. The
implicit macro component and the average group characteristics to which the
individual belongs may be correlated with δit. Suppose that limited time series
data is available across individuals, either in terms of repeated cross-sections or
as a panel data source. Under the following assumption, and the presumption
that the policy is introduced only for one group, the impact of the policy may be
identiﬁed by using two time periods of data, one before the reform and one after.
T h ea s s u m p t i o nw er e q u i r ei st h a t
A1 : E[uit|g,t]=a
g + mt (3.4)
which can be interpreted as saying that in the absence of the reform the changes
in group means are the same across the two groups. Then with two groups and
two time periods the slope coeﬃcient γ can be written as
γ =
∆E(hit | T,t) − ∆E(hit | C,t)
∆E(δit | T,t) − ∆E(δit | C,t)
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is the sample analog given by
b γ =
∆h
T
t − ∆h
C
t
∆Pr(δit =1| T,t) − ∆E(δit =1| C,t)
(3.5)
where the ‘bar’ denotes sample average, ∆ the ﬁrst diﬀerence and the superscript
the group for which ﬁrst diﬀerences are taken. b γ is consistent for γ. This estimator
is an instrumental variables estimator with excluded instruments the group time
interactions. If the eﬀect of the treatment is heterogeneous and if the policy does
not decrease the chance of obtaining the treatment δ for anyone (monotonicity)
then the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator above identiﬁes the impact of the policy
for those obtaining treatment as a result of the policy (Imbens and Angrist, 1994)
Assumption A1 is very strong indeed. Failure will result if there is a change
in group composition of unobservable individual eﬀects over time or if there is a
diﬀerential impact of macro shocks across groups. Again it will depend critically
o nt h ec h o i c eo fg r o u p sw h i c hi sak e yi s s u ei nt h i sf r a m e w o r k .A1 implies:
22(i) time invariant composition for each group
and
(ii) common time eﬀects across groups.
3.2. Estimating a Structural Parameter
Here we consider the use of this method in the estimation of a simple labor
supply model (ignoring income eﬀects for notational simplicity, we return to this
below)
hit = α + β lnwit + uit (3.6)
Again uit represents an individual level heterogeneity term which may be ﬁxed for
that individual over time or may vary over time. Moreover it may be correlated
across individuals and may have a cross section mean that is non zero. This
represents the impact of macro shocks to preferences on individual i’s labor supply.
Both the implicit macro component and the idiosyncratic heterogeneity may be
correlated with the log wage (lnwit).
Make the following assumptions
A1 : E[εit|g,t]=a
g + mt (3.7)
A2 :[ E[lnwit|g = T,t] − E[lnwit|g = C,t]]−[E[lnwit|g = T,t− 1] − E[lnwit|g = C,t − 1]] 6=0
(3.8)
Then with two groups and two time periods the slope coeﬃcient β can be written
as
β =
∆E(hit | T,t) − ∆E(hit | C,t)
∆E(lnwit | T,t) − ∆E(lnwit | C,t)
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is the sample analog given by
b β =
∆h
T
t − ∆h
C
t
∆lnw
T
it − ∆lnw
C
it
(3.9)
and is consistent for β.
Assumption A2 is simply analogous to a rank condition and should hold if the
groups are chosen to reﬂect some systematic reason for a diﬀerential growth in
lnwit across groups. The choice of groups in this diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach
23usually reﬂects some policy change which aﬀects the real wage. A tax change, for
example, that can be argued to be incident on individuals in one group i ∈ [
g = T] but not on individuals in another i ∈ [ g = C]. It is clear, however,
that the assumption A1 may be strong in some circumstances. However note the
big diﬀerence with the previous section. In the previous section the policy was
a s s u m e dt oh a v en oe ﬀect on wages of the treatment group relative to the control
group; this is the assumption implicit in the fact that we only need to condition
on time and group eﬀects. Here we are conditioning on wages and we are adding
the assumption from economic theory, that log wages and taxes share the same
coeﬃcient. Hence if the policy implicitly aﬀecting incentives, changes pre-tax
wages as well, this is allowed for; this in itself makes the assumptions underlying
the diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach more credible. (see more on this below).
This method has some attractive features. It allows for correlated heterogene-
ity and for general common time eﬀects. Although for many choices of grouping,
often precisely those associated with some policy reform, assumption A1 is likely
to be invalid, there are possible grouping procedures for estimating labor supply
models that are more convincing. This approach is also closely related to the
natural experiment or quasi-experimental estimators that typically employ before
and after comparisons relating directly to a policy reform.
Before moving on to consider these developments, we ﬁrst simply outline how
this approach can be extended to allow for many groups, for many time periods
(or many reforms), for participation and for the inclusion of income terms and
other regressors.
3.3. Grouping Estimators
Suppose individuals can be categorized in one of a ﬁnite number of groups g
each sampled for at least two time periods. For any variable xit, deﬁne Dgt
x as the
residual from the following regression
E(xit|Pit,g,t)=
G X
g=1
ζgdg +
T X
t=1
ξtdt + D
gt
x , (3.10)
where Pit indicates that the individual is observed working, that is Pit ≡ {Iit =1 }
and where dg and dt are time and group dummies respectively. Analogously with
24A1 and A2 we make assumptions
A1.1 E(uit|Pit,g,t)=ag + kmt (3.11)
A2.1 E[D
gt
w]
2 6=0 . (3.12)
Assumption A1.1 summarizes the exclusion restrictions for identiﬁcation; it states
that the unobserved diﬀerences in average labor supply across groups can be sum-
marized by a permanent group eﬀect ag and an additive time eﬀect mt .I no t h e r
words diﬀerences in average labor supply across groups, given the observables,
remain unchanged over time. It also says that any self selection into employment
(the conditioning on Pit) can be controlled for by group eﬀects and time eﬀects
additively. Assumption A2.1 is again equivalent to the rank condition for identi-
ﬁc a t i o n ;i ts t a t e st h a tw a g e sg r o wd i ﬀerentially across groups; this is because the
assumption requires that after we have taken away time and group eﬀects there
is still some variance of wages left. For example, if there is a tax reform between
two periods, aﬀe c t i n gt h ep o s tt a xw a g e so ft h et w og r o u p si nd i ﬀerent ways, and
assuming that tax incidence does not fully counteract the eﬀects of the reforms,
identiﬁcation of the wage elasticity will be guaranteed.
With these assumptions we can implement a generalized Wald estimator (see,
Heckman and Robb, 1985). Deﬁning the sample counterpart of Dgt
x as ˜ xgt, i.e. the
residual from regressing the time-group cell mean on time and group dummies,
we can write the estimator as
b β =
P
g
P
t
h
˜ hgt
ih
g lnwgt
i
ngt
P
g
P
t
³
g lnwgt
´2
ngt
(3.13)
where ngt is the number of observations in cell (g,t). The implementation of this
estimator is simple; group the data for workers by g and by time and regress by
weighted least squares the group average of hours of work on the group average of
the log wage, including a set of time dummies and group dummies. An alternative
that gives numerically identical results is as follows: regress using OLS the log
after-tax wage rate on time dummies interacted with the group dummies, over the
sample of workers only and compute the residual from this regression. Then use
the original data to regress hours of work on the individual wage, a set of time
25dummies and group dummies and the wage residual. The t-value on the coeﬃcient
of the latter is a test of exogeneity, once the standard errors have been corrected
for generated regressor bias and intra group dependence. It is also important to
allow for the possibility of serial correlation and correlation of idiosyncratic shocks
across individuals when computing the standard errors.
3.3.1. Controlling for Participation
A potential problem with the approach above is that it assumes that the
composition eﬀects from changes in participation can be fully accounted for by
the additive time and group eﬀects, ag + mt. First, changes in mt will cause
individuals to enter and leave the labor market. Second, with non-convexities, a
tax policy reform may lead to changes in participation. This will be particularly
true if ﬁxed costs are large relative to the non-taxable allowance. The presence
of composition eﬀects is equivalent to saying that E(uit|Pit,g,t) is some general
function of time and group and does not have the additive structure assumed in
A1.1.
To control for the possibility that E(uit|Pit,g,t) m a yv a r yo v e rt i m er e q u i r e s
structural restrictions. A parsimonious speciﬁcation is to make the assumption of
linear conditional expectation. For example, we may extend A1.1 and A2.1 by
assuming that
A1.2 E(uit|Pit,g,t)=ag + mt + δλgt (3.14)
A2.2 E[D
gtλ
w ]
2 6=0 . (3.15)
where λgt is the inverse Mills’ ratio evaluated at Φ−1(Lgt), Φ−1 being the inverse
function of the normal distribution and Lgt being the proportion of group g work-
ing in period t.11 Finally Dgtλ
w is deﬁned by the population regression
E(wit|Pit,g,t)=
G X
g=1
ζgdg +
T X
t=1
ξtdt + δwλgt + D
gtλ
x , (3.16)
Assumption A1.2 models the way that composition changes aﬀect diﬀerences in
the observed labor supplies across groups. It implies that
E(hit|Pit,g,t)=βE(lnwit|Pit,g,t)+ag + mt + δλgt (3.17)
11See Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974, 1979).
26where all expectations are over workers only. Assumption A2.2 states that wages
must vary diﬀerentially across groups over time over and above any observed
variation induced by changes in sample composition. We have also implicitly
assumed that E[D
gt
λ ]2 6=0 . If this is not the case, there is no selection bias on the
coeﬃcients of interest (here the wage eﬀect) because composition eﬀects can be
accounted for by the linear time and group eﬀects. In this case we can use (3.13).
We can now estimate the wage eﬀect using a generalization of (3.13), i.e.
b β =
P
g
P
t
h
˜ hgtλ
ih
g lnwgtλ
i
ngt
P
g
P
t
³
g lnwgtλ
´2
ngt
(3.18)
As before this estimator can be implemented using a residual addition technique.
We can add an estimate of λgt as well as the residual of the wage equation esti-
mated on the sample of workers (with no correction for sample selection bias as
implied by (3.17) to an OLS regression of individual hours on individual wages,
time dummies and group dummies.
To determine whether (3.18) or (3.13) should best be used we can test the
null hypothesis that E[D
gt
λ ]2 =0which implies that the group eﬀects ag and the
time eﬀects mt adequately control for any composition changes (given our choice
of groups). If we do not reject this we can use (3.13).
The assumption in A1.2 is worth some discussion. First note that where all
regressors are discrete and a full set of interactions are included in the selection
equation, use of the normal distribution to compute ˆ λgt imposes no restrictions.
However, the linear conditional expectation assumption implies that a term linear
in ˆ λgt is suﬃcient to control for selection eﬀects and is potentially restrictive.
Using the results in Lee (1984) in general we have that
E(uit|Pit,g,t)=ag + mt +
K X
k=1
δkλ
(k)
gt (3.19)
where λ
(k)
gt are generalized residuals of order k. The linearity reduces the number
of parameters to be estimated and hence the number of periods over which we
require exogenous variability in wages. If it is found that E[D
gt
λ ]2 6=0then one
can experiment by including higher order generalized residuals after checking that
they display suﬃcient independent variability.
273.3.2. Income Eﬀects
Income eﬀects are important for labor supply and we need to take them into
account for at least two reasons. First, the wage elasticity cannot in general
be interpreted as an uncompensated wage elasticity, unless we control for other
income. Second, income eﬀects are important if we wish to compute compensated
wage elasticities for the purpose of evaluating the welfare eﬀects of tax reforms. It
is straightforward to extend the estimator in (3.18) to allow for extra regressors,
such as other income. This involves regressing ˜ hgtλ on g lnwgtλ and e ygtλ where
y is household other income. The rank condition for identiﬁcation is now more
stringent: It requires that the covariance matrix V = Ezgtλz0
gtλ is full rank, where
zgt =[ Dgtλ
w ,D gtλ
y ]0.
This is equivalent to requiring that the matrix of coeﬃcients on the excluded
exogenous variables in the reduced forms of log wage and other income, after
taking into account of composition eﬀects, is rank 2. A necessary but not suﬃcient
condition for this to be true is that these coeﬃcients are non-zero in each of the
reduced forms - i.e. that E(Dgtλ
w )2 and E(Dgtλ
y )2 are non-zero. As before if we
accept the hypothesis that E(D
gt
λ )2 =0we need to consider whether the rank of
V ∗ = Ez∗
gtz∗0
gt is two, where z∗
gt =[ Dgt
w,D gt
y ]0. In this case we estimate the model
using the sample counterparts of z∗
gt as regressors.
3.4. The Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimator and Behavioral Responses
As we have seen the simplest implementation of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach simply includes a policy reform dummy. This avoids directly specifying
a structural model in the sense that the eﬀect of the policy is not tied to a wage
or income eﬀect. The idea is that the policy should be evaluated directly without
the intermediation of an economic model.
Suppose again there are simply two periods and two groups. Suppose the
policy reform is a tax change in which τ is the change in the marginal tax rate
for the treatment group. The natural experiments approaches simply includes a
policy dummy δ
g
t =1 {g = T,t= A} in the hours regression
hi = α + βδ
g
t + ζit. (3.20)
The quasi-experimental estimator in this case is just the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
28estimator applied to (3.20).
To interpret this estimator suppose the hours equation has the simple form
(3.6). Suppose that pre and post reform wages are deﬁned by:
Before Reform After Reform
i ⊂ Treated lnwiB ln((1 − τ)wiA)
i ⊂ Control lnwiB lnwiA
Assuming A1 and A2, taking group means we ﬁnd
h
g
t = α + β ln(1 − τ)δ
g
t + βlnw
g
t + a
g + mt (3.21)
If δ
g
t =1 {g = T,t = A} is all that is included in the regression then the diﬀerence
in diﬀerences estimator will only recover β if log wages have the group and common
time eﬀect form
lnw
g
t = e a
g + e mt. (3.22)
This seems a particularly strong assumption given empirical knowledge about the
diﬀerential trends in wage group across diﬀerent groups in the economy. Clearly,
the cost of including simply the policy reform dummy δ
g
t =1 {g = T,t= A} alone
is that the common time eﬀects and time invariant composition eﬀects assumptions
become even more diﬃcult to satisfy.
4. Estimation with Nonlinear Budget Constraints
A problem encountered in many analyses of consumption and labor supply
involves the presence of intricate nonlinearities in budget sets arising from wages
and prices that vary as a function of quantities. Tax and welfare programs con-
stitute a prominent source of such functional relationships in analyses of labor
supply, for these programs induce net wages to vary with the number of hours
worked even when the gross wages remain constant. Hedonic environments and
price schedules dependent upon quantities give rise to comparable sources of dis-
tortions in budget sets in many consumption settings.
To address the issues encountered with nonlinear budget sets, there has been
steady expansion in the use of sophisticated statistical models characterizing
distributions of discrete-continuous variables that jointly describe both interior
29choices and corner solutions in demand systems. These models oﬀer a natural
framework for capturing irregularities in budget constraints, including those in-
duced by the institutional features of tax and welfare programs.
This section brieﬂy describes approaches for estimating models incorporating
such features, keeping the context general enough to illustrate how these mod-
els can readily accommodate a wide variety of nonlinearities in price and wage
structures. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the methods imple-
mented to model budget constraints involving nonlinearities, and then goes on
to survey instrumental-variable procedures applied in the literature to estimate
behavioral relationships in the presence of such constraints. We summarize the
general approach for using maximum likelihood procedures to estimate the more
sophisticated variants of these models with either convex or nonconvex budget
sets. We provide simple illustrations of maximum likelihood methods to esti-
mate familiar speciﬁcations of labor supply with convex constraints. We outline
why the implementation of maximum likelihood procedures imposes interesting
and important restrictions on behavioral parameters in the presence of nonlinear
budget constraints. We then integrate the analysis of nonparticipation into our
analysis of non-linear budget constraints and discuss estimation when the avail-
ability of welfare programs aﬀect the shapes of budget sets, which induces not
only nonconvexities but also opportunities for participating in multiple programs.
Finally, we consider computational simpliﬁcations adopted in the literature to
render maximum likelihood estimation feasible.
4.1. Modeling Nonlinear Features of Budget Constraints
A general formulation for the economic problem considered in the subsequent
discussion speciﬁes an agent as solving the following optimization problem:
Max U (c,h,z,ν) subject to b (c,h,W,Y )=0 (4.1)
where U() delineates the utility function, c and h measure consumption and hours
of work, the quantities z and ν represent respectively the observed and unobserved
factors inﬂuencing choices beyond those incorporated in budget sets, and the func-
tion b() speciﬁes the budget constraint with W and Y designating the real gross
wage per hour and nonlabor income (note that we use upper case to distinguish
30from marginal wage and virtual nonlabor income). For the moment, we restrict
the economic framework to be static and the quantities c and h to be single goods
rather than multidimensional vectors. In many applications the budget function,
b,i sn o td i ﬀerentiable, and in some it is not even continuous.
For the familiar linear speciﬁcation of the budget constraint, b takes the form:
b (c,h,W,Y )=Wh+ Y − c. (4.2)
Solving (4.1) for this form of b yields the following labor supply and consumption
functions:
h =   (W,Y,Z,ν) (4.3)
c = c (W,Y,Z,ν),
which correspond to the standard demand functions for nonmarket time (i.e.,
leisure) and consumption. (The subsequent analysis often suppresses the Z argu-
ment in the functions U(),  () and c() to simplify notation.)
Another popular speciﬁcation of b() incorporates income or sales taxes in char-
acterizing choices, with the budget constraint written as some variant of
b (c,h,W,Y )=Wh+ Y − c − τ(Wh,Y) , (4.4)
where the function τ() gives the amount paid in taxes. This formulation for b
admits diﬀerent tax rates on earnings (Wh) and nonlabor income (Y ).I f t h e s e
income sources are instead taxed the same, then (4.4) further simpliﬁes to
b (c,h,W,Y )=Wh+ Y − c − τ(I) , (4.5)
where tax payments τ(I)=τ(I(h)) where I(h)=taxable income = Wh+Y −D
with D designating allowable deductions. Diﬀerent marginal tax rates in the
various income brackets combined with the existence of nonlabor income creates
inherent nonlinearities in budget sets
The literature relies on two approaches for modeling nonlinearities in budget
sets: piecewise-linear characterizations and smooth diﬀerentiable functions. To
illustrate these approaches, the subsequent discussion principally focuses on the
income-tax formulation of b given by (4.4) and (4.5) to illustrate central concepts.
314.1.1. Piecewise Linear Constraints
As a simple characterization of piecewise budget sets, Figure 4.1 shows a
hypothetical budget constraint for an individual faced with a typical progressive
income tax schedule deﬁned by a series of income brackets. In this diagram, h
denotes hours of work, and C measures total after-tax income or the consump-
tion of market goods. The budget constraint is composed of several segments
corresponding to the diﬀerent marginal tax rates that an individual faces. In par-
ticular, he faces a tax rate of t1 between ho hours and h2 hours (segment 1 of
his constraint) and tax rates of t3 and t5 respectively in the intervals (h2,h4)a n d
(h4,h6) (segments 3 and 5 in the ﬁgure). Thus, with the variable W denoting
the individual’s gross wage rate, the net wages associated with each segment are:
w1 =( 1−t1)W for segment 1; w3 =( 1−t3)W for segment 3; and w5 =( 1−t5)W
for segment 5. Also, each segment has associated with it a virtual income (i.e.,
income associated with a linear extrapolation of the budget constraint) calculated
as:
y1 = Y − τ(0,Y) ; (4.6)
yj = yj−2 + W(tj−2 − tj)hj−1 for j =3 ,5,... .
So, y3 = y1 +( w1 − w3)h2;and y5 = y3 +( w3 − w5)h4. Changes in tax brackets
create the kink points which are designated 0, 2, 4, and 6.
Figure 4.2 illustrates stylized features of a budget constraint modiﬁed to incor-
porate an earned income tax credit (EITC) in conjunction with an income tax12,
and Figure 4.3 shows a prototype budget set induced by a conventional welfare
program (or social security tax).13 In Figure 4.2, the EITC increases beneﬁts
12An earned income tax credit (EITC) constitutes a negative income tax scheme, which in-
duces two kinks in a person’s constraint in the simplest case: one where the proportional credit
reached its maximum (h2 in Figure 4.2), and one at the break even point where the credit was
fully taxed away (h4 in the ﬁgure). The tax rates associated with the ﬁrst two segments are tA,
which is negative, and tB, which is positive. Thereafter, the EITC imposed no further tax.
13A welfare program pays a family some level of beneﬁts at zero hours of work, and then
“taxes” this nonlabor income at some beneﬁt reduction rate until all beneﬁts are gone. Figure
4 . 3a s s u m e sap r o p o r t i o n a lb e n e ﬁt reduction rate applies on earnings until beneﬁts decline to
zero, after which the family pays normal income taxes whihc here too is assumed to be a
proportional rate. Thus, Figure 4.3 shows a constraint with a single interior kink (given by h1
in the ﬁgure) corresponding to the level of earning when welfare beneﬁts ﬁrst become zero. The
32until an individual reaches h1 hours of work, and then beneﬁts decline until hours
attain h2 when the regular income tax schedule applies. In Figure 4.3, welfare
beneﬁts start at y1 −y2 w h e naf a m i l yd o e sn o tw o r k ,t h e ys t e a d i l yd e c l i n ea st h e
family increases its hours of work until its earnings reach the value implied at h1
hours when the family becomes disqualiﬁed for welfare. Each of these low-income
support programs introduces regressive features in the overall tax schedule faced
by a family, which in turn induces nonconvex portions in the budget sets.
In real world applications of piecewise budget constraints, the combination of
various tax and public assistance programs faced by families implies budget sets
have two noteworthy features. First, the constraint faced by a typical individual
includes a large number of diﬀerent rates. Translated into the hours-consumption
space, this implies a large number of kink points in the budget constraint. Second,
for most individuals the tax schedule contains nonconvex portions, arising from
four potential sources. The ﬁrst arises from the EITC program, as illustrated
in Figure 4.2. A second source arises if a worker’s family participates in any
welfare program, within nonconvexities arise as beneﬁts are withdrawn as earnings
increase as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Third, social security taxes phase out after
a ﬁxed level of earnings, so they too induce a budget set similar in structure to
that given by Figure 4.3. Finally, the standard deduction present in most income
tax programs, wherein no taxes are paid on suﬃciently low levels of income,
creates yet another source of regressivity in the tax schedule and corresponding
nonconvexities in the budget constraint.
4.1.2. Constructing Diﬀerentiable Constraints
Several approaches exist for approximating the piecewise-linear tax schedules
by a diﬀerentiable function. A convenient method for constructing this function is
to ﬁt the marginal tax rate schedule—a step function—by a diﬀerentiable function.
This approximation must itself be easily integrable to obtain a simple closed form
for the tax function.
An elementary candidate for constructing a diﬀerentiable approximation that
can be made as close as one desires to the piecewise-linear tax schedule has been
tax rate on the segment leading up to that kink is tA, switching to tB on the second segment.
The Social Security systems induces a similar eﬀect on the budget constraint.
33applied in MaCurdy et al.(1990). To understand the nature of the approximation,
return to Figure 4.1. One can represent the underlying schedule as follows:
τe(Wh,Y)=t1 from I(h0) to I(h2) (4.7)
= t3 from I(h2) to I(h4)
= t5 above I(h4) ,
where τe(Wh,Y)=the marginal tax rate on earnings
I(h)=taxable income at h hours of work, and
ti = marginal tax rate, i = 1,3,5.
For expositional simplicity, suppose that t1 =0 . Consider the following approxi-
mation of this schedule:
b τe(Wh,Y)=t3 ((Φ1(I(h)) − Φ3(I(h)) + t5Φ3(I(h)) . (4.8)
This formulation for the marginal tax rate switches among three ﬂat lines at the
heights t1 (= 0), t3 and t5.T h e w e i g h t f u n c t i o n s Φi(I(h)) determine the rate at
which the shift occurs from one line to another, along with the points at which
t h es w i t c h e st a k ep l a c e . C a n d i d a t ew e i g h tf u n c t i o n sa r eg i v e nb yΦi(I(h)) =
the cumulative distribution function with mean yi and variance σ2
i, i =1 ,3.T h e
middle segment of the tax schedule has height t3 and runs from taxable income
I(h2) to I(h4). To capture this feature, parameterize Φ1(·) and Φ3(·) with means
y1 = I(h2) and y3 = I(h4), respectively, with both variances set small. The ﬁrst
distribution function, Φ1(·) takes a value close to zero for taxable income levels
below I(h2) and then switches quickly to take a value of one for higher values.
Similarly, Φ3(·) takes a value of zero until near I(h4) and one thereafter. The
diﬀerence between the two equals zero until I(h2),o n ef r o mI(h2) to I(h4) and
zero thereafter. Thus, the diﬀerence takes a value of one just over the range
where t3 is relevant. Notice that we can control when that value of one begins
and ends by adjusting the values y1 and y3. Also, one can control how quickly
this branch of the estimated schedule turns on and oﬀ by adjusting the variances
of the cumulative distribution functions, trading oﬀ a more gradual, smoother
transition against more precision. In general, adjusting the mean and variance
34parameters allows one to ﬁt each segment of a schedule virtually exactly, switch
quickly between segments, and still maintain diﬀerentiability at the switch points.
A generalization of this approximation takes the form
b τe(Wh,Y)=
X
i=1,3,...
[Φi−2(I(h)) − Φi(I(h))] ti(I(h)) (4.9)
where the functions ti(I(h)) permit tax schedules to be nonconstant functions of
taxable income within brackets. With the Φi denoting many cdfs associated with
conventional continuously distributed distributions, function (4.9) yields closed
form solutions when it is either integrated or diﬀerentiated.14 Integrating (4.9)
yields a formulation for the budget constraint b(c,h,W,Y ). The resulting ap-
proximation can be made to look arbitrarily close to the budget set boundary
drawn in Figures 4.1, 4.2 or 4.3, except that the kink points are rounded.
Formula (4.9) can be extended to approximate virtually any speciﬁcation of
b (c,h,W,Y ). One can readily allow for distinct relationships describing the
derivatives for each of the arguments of this function, and nonconvexities in budget
sets cause no particular problems.
4.2. Simple Characterizations of Labor Supply and Consumption with
Diﬀerentiable Constraints
A useful solution exists for the hours-of-work and consumption choices as-
sociated with utility maximization when budget constraints form a set with a
14Total taxes are given by: τ(I)=
R
τ0(I)dI. The following relations enable one to calculate
an explicit form for τ(X):
Z
ΦdI = IΦ + ϕ
Z
IΦdI =
1
2
I2Φ −
1
2
Φ +
1
2
Iϕ
Z
I2ΦdI =
1
3
I3Φ +
2
3
ϕ +
1
3
I2ϕ
Z
I3ΦdI =
1
4
I4Φ −
3
4
Φ +
3
4
IΦ +
1
4
I3ϕ
In this expression, Φ refers to any Φi’s, and ϕ designates the density function associated with
Φi.
35twice-diﬀerentiable boundary. Specify the marginal wage rate as:
ω = ω(h)=bh(c,h,W,Y )=bh (4.10)
and “virtual” income as:
y = y(h) which solves the equation b(hbh + y,h,W,Y)=0 . (4.11)
This solution for y satisﬁes:
y = y(h)=c − ωh .
For the familiar speciﬁcation found in analyses taxes and labor supply given by
b(c,h,W,Y )=Wh+ Y − c − τ(Wh+ Y ) with the function τ constituting the
amount paid in taxes at before-tax income Wh+Y , the expressions for marginal
wage and virtual income y simplify to:
ω = ω(h)=( 1− τ
0)W (4.12)
y = y(h)=Wh+ Y − ωh− τ = Y + τ
0Wh− τ
where τ and τ0 (the derivative of the tax function with respect to income) are
evaluated at income level I = I(h)=Y + Wh which directly depends on the
value of h.
Utility maximization implies solutions for hours of work and consumption that
obey the implicit equations:
h =   (ω,y,z,v)=  (ω(h),y(h),z,v) (4.13)
c = c (ω,y,z,v)=c (ω(h),y(h),z,v)
where   and c represent the same conventional forms for labor supply and con-
sumption demand functions given by (4.3). Figures 4.1 and 4.3 illustrate this
representation of the solution for optimal hours of work and consumption. The
characterization portrays an individual as facing a linear budget constraint in the
presence of nonlinear tax programs. This linear constraint is constructed in a way
to make it tangent to the actual nonlinear opportunity set at the optimal solution
for hours of work. The implied slope of this linearized constraint is ω(h) and the
corresponding value of virtual income is y(h).
36Relationships (4.11) constitute structural equations that determine hours of
work and consumption. By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to spec-
iﬁcation (4.11), we can solve this implicit equation for h in terms of W,Y ,a n d
other variables and parameters entering the functions b and U. This operation pro-
duces the labor supply and consumption functions applicable with general forms
of nonlinear budget sets.
4.3. Instrumental-Variable Estimation
The inclusion of taxes provide an additional reason for allowing for the endo-
geneity of (after tax) wages and other income. Writing the labor supply function
as
h =   (ω(h),y(h),z,υ)= 
∗(ω(h),y(h),z)+v . (4.14)
makes the point explicitly. The Instrumental variable approach described ear-
lier can be applied as well as the grouping methods (which of course is just an
application of IV). The implementation of IV procedures imposes no parametric
restrictions and it allows one to consider a wide variety of exogeneity assumptions.
The fact that the error term does not interact with the wage and other income is
critical for the interpretation of IV as identifying the structural parameters of the
model.
4.3.1. Including Measurement Error
In many data sets there are serious suspicions that hours of work and wages
are reported with error. This issue acquires added importance when we are dealing
with non-linear tax schedules since this creates a problem of observability of the
correct tax rate, which is the reason we introduce the issue here.
Suppose H denotes measured hours of work and that the function
H = H(h,ε) (4.15)
relates H to actual hours h a n dt oar a n d o m l yd i s t r i b u t e de r r o rε Typically,
analyses presume that the state h =0is observed without error.
Measurement errors in hours often induce errors in observed wage rates since
researchers construct wages by dividing total labor earnings, E, by hours worked
37in the period. Whereas W = E/h deﬁnes the true hourly wage rate, ˜ W = E/H
designates the data available on wages. Measured wages ˜ W are contaminated by
reporting errors even when E provides accurate quantities for each individual’s
total labor earnings and wages are indeed constant for hours worked over the
period. This formulation presumes a reciprocal relation in the measurement error
linking data on hours and wages. More generally, suppose ˜ W links to the true
wage rate according to the relationship
˜ W = ˜ W(W,h,ε) . (4.16)
In the reciprocal measurement error example, ˜ W = Wh / H(h,ε) where H(h,ε)
comes from (4.15).
The presence of measurement errors in hours typically invalidates use of non-
linear IV procedures to estimate the structural labor supply equation given by
(4.14). Expressing this equation in terms of H rather than h involves merely
substituting (4.15) into (4.14); and if measurement error also carries over to wages,
then substitutions must be made for wages as well. These replacements typically
result in a variant of structural equation (4.14) that cannot be transformed into a
form that is linear in disturbances. Measurement errors in hours invariably render
the marginal tax rate unobservable, which in turn makes both the marginal wage
(ω(h)) and virtual income (y(h)) also unobservable. Sophisticated adjustments
must be included to account for such factors. These complications motivate many
researchers to turn to maximum likelihood procedures to estimate hours-of-work
speciﬁcations as we do below. However with some additional assumptions IV
procedures are still possible, at least when the issue of censoring does not arise.
Suppose measurement error is of the multiplicative kind
H = H(h,ε)=he
ε with ˜ W = E/H, (4.17)
In the presence of such error, speciﬁcations can also be found that allow for use of
IV procedures to estimate substitution and income parameters. Incorporating the
multiplicative measurement error model (4.17) into the semilog functional form
of labor supply given in relation yields the empirical speciﬁcation:
H = u + Zγ + αlnω
m + βy+ u (4.18)
38where
lnω
m =l n ( E/H)+l n ( 1− τ
0)
e y = y − ασ
2
ε/2
u = ν + α(ε − E(ε)) + (H − h)=ν + α(ε − E(ε)) + h(e
ε − 1).
The disturbance u possesses a zero mean since E(eε)=1 . Virtual income y(h)
and the marginal tax rate τ0 are not contaminated by measurement error because
they are only functions of Y and hW = H ˜ W, quantities which are both perfectly
observed (by assumption). The variable lnωm represents the natural logarithm of
the after-tax wage rate evaluated at observed hours, which diﬀers from the actual
marginal wage due to the presence of reporting error in hours. Assuming the
error ε is distributed independently of all endogenous components determining h,
including the heterogeneity disturbance v, the instrumental variables X applica-
ble for estimation of the original speciﬁcation can also serve as the instrumental
variables in estimating the coeﬃcients of (4.18) by familiar IV methods.
4.3.2. Sources of Unobservables in Budget Sets
An important class of models not widely recognized in the literature involves
budget constraints that vary across individuals in ways that depend on unobserved
factors. The modiﬁcation required in the above analysis to account for such
factors replaces budget function b() appearing in (4.1) by:
b (c,h,W,Y,z,ξ)=0. (4.19)
The quantity z captures the inﬂuence of measured characteristics on budget sets.
Classic examples include family characteristics that alter the form of the tax func-
tion relevant for families. The error component ξ represents unobserved factors
shifting budget sets. Classic examples here include unmeasured components of
ﬁxed costs, prices, and elements determining tax obligations.
The presence of ξ in b() typically renders IV methods inappropriate for esti-
mating parameters of the labor supply function  . The usual problem comes about
s i n c es t r u c t u r a lv a r i a n t so f  cannot be found that are linear in disturbances, and
this is especially true when nonlinearities exist in tax schedules. When ξ appears
39as a component of b(), researchers typically rely on the maximum likelihood meth-
ods summarized in the subsequent discussion to conduct estimation of behavioral
models of hour of work and consumption.
4.3.3. Complications of IV Estimation with Piecewise-Linear Constraints
Naive application of instrumental-variable methods with piecewise-linear bud-
get constraints generally produces inconsistent estimates of behavioral parameters,
even ignoring the potential presence of measurement error. Section 4.6 below
presents the structural speciﬁcation—see (4.69)—implied for hours of work when
Figure 4.1 designates the budget set and everyone works. As noted in Section
4.1, this budget set is convex and consists of three segments. Inspection of
structural equation (4.69) reveals that the structural error is
P
j=1,2,3
djv where dj
represents an indicator variable signifying whether an individual selects segment
j =1 ,2,or 3. If the individual occupies any kink, then
P
j=1,2,3
djv =0 .S u p p o s e X
includes the set of instrumental variables presumed to satisfy E(ν|X)=0 .T h e
corresponding conditional expectation of the structural error implied by equation
(4.69) is
P
j=1,2,3
Pr(dj | X)E(v | dj =1 ,X). This expectation is typically not zero,
a condition required to implement IV techniques. To use IV procedures in the
estimation of equation (4.69) necessitates the inclusion of sample selection terms
adjusting for the nonzero expectation of
P
j=1,2,3
djv.
4.3.4. Non Participation and Missing Wages
In the earlier sections we discussed how the estimation approach needs to
be generalized so as to allow for non-participation and for missing wages, which
present further complications for estimation. We argued that standard Instru-
mental Variables are not appropriate in this context. We now turn to Maximum
likelihood estimation which we set up to deal with the problems introduced above,
namely non-linear taxes, measurement error, missing and/or endogenous wages
and other income and of course non-participation.
404.4. Maximum Likelihood Estimation: A General Representation
The instrumental variable estimator, developed in the last section, required
exclusion restrictions to consistently estimate the parameters of the labor-supply
and consumption models involving nonlinear budget sets. In contrast, Maximum
Likelihood estimation exploits the precise structure of the budget constraint and
need not rely on exclusion restrictions to identify parameters. Even though mar-
ginal wages and virtual incomes are endogenous, nonlinearities introduced through
distributional assumptions provide a valuable source of identiﬁcation. However,
exclusion restrictions are only avoided in this approach if gross wages and incomes
are assumed to be exogenous and in many applications of maximum likelihood re-
searchers also impose stringent distributional and independence assumptions on
sources of errors capturing heterogeneity and measurement error. Nonetheless, one
can entertain a wide array of nonlinearities in budget sets and decision processes,
along with rich speciﬁcations for heterogeneity and mismeasurement of variables.
The following discussion begins with a general presentation describing the
application of maximum likelihood methods in hours of work and consumption
analyses allowing for ﬂexible distributional assumptions and intricate forms of
nonlinearities in both preferences and budget constraints. This analysis draws
heavily upon Appendix A. Later subsections cover simple illustration of tech-
niques, many of which have been implemented in the empirical literature.
4.4.1. Dividing the Budget Constraint into Sets
Irrespective of whether one considers diﬀerentiable or piecewise-linear for-
mulations for budget constraints, the essential idea underlying development of
likelihood functions in the presence of nonlinear constraints involves deﬁn i n gas e t
of "states of the world". Each state designates a particular segment of the budget
set boundary, with states being mutually exclusive and states jointly covering all
parts of budget constraints. One interprets individuals as being endowed with
a set of attributes determining of their tastes, resources and constraints, with
these attributes viewed as random variables continuously distributed across the
population. Based on the realizations of these variables, an individual selects
consumption and hours of work to optimize utility.
Regarding the distribution of these variables in the previous discussion, sup-
41pose unobserved heterogeneity inﬂuencing preferences, ν, the unmeasured factors
determining wages, η, and the unobservables incorporating budget sets, ξ, possess
the following joint density:
ϕ (v,η,ξ) ≡ ϕ (v,η,ξ | X) for (v,η,ξ) ∈ Ω. (4.20)
When errors, ε, contaminate the measurement of hours, the relevant joint distri-
bution becomes:
ϕ (v,η,ξ,ε) ≡ ϕ (v,η,ξ,ε | X) for (v,η,ξ,ε) ∈ Ω (4.21)
Both these expressions admit conditioning on a set of exogenous variables X,
but the subsequent analysis suppresses X to simplify the notation. The set Ω
designates the domain of these random variables.
In this setting, n states of the world can occur. The discrete random variable
δi signiﬁes whether state i happens, with δi =1indicating realization of state i and
δi =0implying that some state other than i occurred. A state refers to locations
on boundaries of budget sets, to be explained further below. Consequently, the
value of δi depends on where (v,η,ξ) falls in its domain determined by the rule:
δi =
½
1
0
if (v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi
otherwise (4.22)
where the set Ωi constitutes that subset of the sample space Ω for which utility
maximization yields a solution for consumption and hours that lies within the
δi =1portion of the budget. The mutually exclusive and exhaustive feature of
the sets Ωi for i =1 ,...,n implies
n S
i=1
Ωi = Ω and Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅ for i 6= j.
A central requirement invoked in dividing a budget constraint into its various
sections involves ensuring that unique solutions exist for c and h for any (v,η,ξ) ∈
Ωi. Consumption and hours of work may take on discrete values when (v,η,ξ) ∈
Ωi. Alternatively, there may be a continuous mapping relating C and h to (v,η,ξ)
within the set Ωi, but inverses must exist for the consumption and labor supply
functions
h =   (ω,y,z,v)=  (ω(h),y(h),z,v)
c = c (ω,y,z,v)=c (ω(h),y(h),z,v)
42expressed in terms of components of v. (These functions correspond directly
to those in (4.13) except that marginal wage ω and virtual income y now are
functions of ξ, the unobservable components b.) Considering the labor supply
function  , this requirement implies existence of the inverse function
v = v
h (h,ω (h),y(h),z) ≡  
−1 (h,ω (h),y(h),z) (4.23)
for values of v within the set Ωi.I f v is in fact multi-dimensional (i.e., v0 is a
vector), then an inverse must exist of the form
v1 = v
h (h,ω (h),y(h),z,v
0
2) ≡  
−1 (h,ω (h),y(h),z,v 2) (4.24)
for some decomposition v0 =( v1,v 0
2).
Division of the budget constraint into the events δi =1for i =1 ,...,n gen-
erally creates two varieties of sets. First, diﬀerentiable segments of the budget
constraint over which consumption and hours vary continuously in response to
variation in preferences and constraint variables. Second, kink points at which
consumption and hours of work take ﬁxed discrete values implied by the location
of the kink.
4.4.2. Maximum Utility Determines Placement on Budget Constraint
The portion of a budget constraint selected by an individual depends on the
level of utility assigned to this state. The following discussion ﬁrst character-
izes maximum utility attainable on diﬀerentiable segments, and then considers
evaluations at kink points.
For the diﬀerentiable segments of the constraint, utility is determined by func-
tion
V = U (c (ω,y,z,ν), (ω,y,z,ν),z,ν) (4.25)
= U (c (ω(h,ξ),y(h,ξ),z,ν,ξ), (ω(h,ξ),y(h,ξ),z,ν,ξ),z,ν)
≡ V (ω(h,ξ),y(h,ξ),z,v)
= V (ω,y,z,v)
evaluated at optimal points in the speciﬁed set. The function V (W,Y,z,v) represents
the conventional indirect utility function associated with maximizing U (C,h,Z,ν)
43in (4.1) subject to the linear form of the budget constraint given by (4.2). Roy’s
Identity speciﬁes that the labor supply function   can be written as
  (ω,y,z,ν) ≡
Vω (ω,y,z,ν)
Vy (ω,y,z,ν)
(4.26)
with Vω and Vy denoting the partial derivatives of V . Suppose the interval
(¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1) identiﬁes the diﬀerential segment under consideration. The subse-
quent discussion refers to this segment as state i. Then the utility assigned to
state i corresponds to the maximum value of V achievable for hours falling in the
interval (¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1).
Diﬃculty in determining the achievable value of V depends on characteristics
of the budget function b(c,h,W,Y ). For the most general speciﬁcations of b,
inspection of relations (??) and (4.11) deﬁning ω and y reveals that each depends
on both c and h through the derivative bh. If utility maximization occurs at
an interior point of (¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1) given the realization of (v,η,ξ), then the implied
values of c and h solve the system
h =   (ω,y,z,υ) ∈ (¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1) (4.27)
b (c,h,W,Y,ξ)= 0.
Consequently, the maximum utility attainable on the interval (¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1) is V
(or U) evaluated at these solutions for c and h.D e ﬁne this maximum utility
as V(i),w h e r et h e(i) subscript on V signiﬁes utility assigned to state i.I f o n e
extends state i to include either of the exterior points ¯ hi−1or ¯ hi+1, and uniqueness
and diﬀerentiability continue to hold at these points, then the above procedure
still applies in assigning a value for V(i). The subsequent discussion ignores such
easily-handled extensions to simplify the exposition.
Use of indicator functions provides an expression for V(i). One can characterize
the set of values of C and h satisfying equations (4.27) as
{ (c,h) | I [ h =   (ω,y,z,υ) ∈ (¯ hi−1,¯ hi+1);b (c,h,W,Y )= 0]=1} , (4.28)
where I denotes the indicator function deﬁned by
I [ conditions ]=
½
1
0
if [ all conditions ] are true
if [ any condition ] is false .
44The indicator function I in (4.28) depends on satisfaction of 2 conditions. Using
I, a simple expression for the maximum utility attainable in state i is given by
V(i) = V (ω,y,z,v) ∗ I [ h =   (ω,y,z,υ) ∈ (hi−1,h i+1);b (c,h,W,Y )= 0] .
(4.29)
For values of v, η and ξ not yielding a solution in state i, V(i) =0 . It is possible
in this analysis for V(i) =0for all values of admissible values of (v,η,ξ) (i.e.,
Ωi = ∅). Throughout this discussion, we assume a utility function normalized so
that U (c,h,z,ν) > 0 for all admissible values of variables. So the event V(i) =0
always means that some state other than i has a higher assigned utility.
T h em o s tp o p u l a rs p e c i ﬁcations of the budget function b(c,h,W,Y ) have deriv-
atives bh that depend on h but not on c. Examples include those speciﬁcations
incorporating income or sales taxes given by (4.4). Under these circumstances,
the ﬁrst equation in (4.27) alone can be solved for h.T h u s , V(i) simpliﬁes to
V(i) = V (ω,y,z,v) ∗ I [ h =   (ω,y,z,υ) ∈ (hi−1,h i+1)] (4.30)
This expression serves as the principal formulation used in the subsequent discus-
sion.
The portion of a budget constraint selected by an individual depend on the
level of utility assigned to this state. At kink points, utility takes the value
V(i) = U ( ¯ Ci,¯ hi,z,ν) (4.31)
where ¯ Ci and ¯ hi designate the values of consumption and hours at the kink point
associated with state i.
An individual occupies that portion of the budget constraint corresponding to
state i if the assigned utility is highest for this state. According to (4.22), the
subspace of (v,η,ξ) yielding this realization is the set Ωi. Correspondingly, one
can represent Ωi as
Ωi = { (v,η,ξ) | V(i) >V (j) for all j 6= i } . (4.32)
Relationships (4.29) (or (4.30)) and (4.31) deﬁne V(i) depending on characteristics
of the state. For expositional simplicity without loss of generality, the subsequent
discussion ignores equalities V(i) = V(j) in deﬁning the sets Ωi since these events
are zero probability events.
454.4.3. Density Functions for Hours and Wages
The distribution of consumption and hours of work depends on where in-
dividuals locate on the budget constraints. The probability that an individual
makes selections falling within the state i portion of the budget equals:
P (δi =1 ) = P ((v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi ) (4.33)
=
Z
···
Z
Ωi
ϕ (v,η,ξ) dv dη dξ
≡
Z
Ωi
ϕ (v,η,ξ) dv dη dξ .
The notation
R
···
R
Ωi denotes integration over the set Ωi, which the third line
of this equation expresses in the shorthand notation
R
Ωi. The joint distribution
of the δi’s takes the form:
P (δ1,...,δm)=
Y
i∈M
[P(δi =1 ) ]
δi
where the set M refers to the set of all possible states i that comprise the entire
budget constraint. As noted previously, the events δi =1may refer to either
kinks or diﬀerentiable constraints.
When an optimum occurs at a kink point, the distribution of hours conditional
on this event is
P
¡
h = ¯ hi | δi =1
¢
=1 . (4.34)
This distribution is, of course, discrete.
On diﬀerentiable segments of the constraint, the distribution for hours is con-
tinuous. Performing a conventional change of variables yields the density
f (h,η,ξ)=
dvh
dh
ϕ
¡
v
h,η,ξ
¢
(4.35)
=
dvh
dh
ϕ
¡
v
h (h,ω,y,z),η,ξ
¢
where
v
h = v
h (h,ω (h),y(h),Z)= 
−1 (h,ω (h),y(h),z) (4.36)
46refers to the inverse of labor supply function (4.3), and the quantity
dvh
dh
=(
∂ 
∂ω
∂ω
∂h
−
∂ 
∂y
∂y
∂h
)(
∂ 
∂v
)
−1 (4.37)
represents the Jacobian associated with this inverse.15 The terms ∂ 
∂ω and ∂ 
∂y cor-
respond to the economic concepts of substitution and income eﬀects, and the
quantity ∂ 
∂v determines how unobserved components of preferences inﬂuence la-
bor supply. (In applying the change-of-variables formula, Jacobians must be con-
structed to be uniquely signed for densities to be properly deﬁned. This result
follows here because the selection of budget-set partitions ensures a unique solu-
tion exists for c and h for each partition combined with the innocuous assumption
that unobserved components enter preferences such that ∂ 
∂v > 0). For the re-
maining terms in (4.37), diﬀerentiation of the budget constraint implies:
∂w
∂h
= bhh (4.38)
and
∂y
∂h
= −
bh
bc
− bh − bhhh (4.39)
where the subscripts on the budget function b signify partial derivatives.16 As-
suming the popular tax form for the budget function given by (4.5), expressions
(4.38) and (4.39) simplify to
∂ω
∂h
=( 1− τ
0) W (4.40)
and
∂y
∂h
= τ
00 W
2 h (4.41)
15Derivation of this Jacobian follows from total diﬀerentiation of relation (4.4.x) with respect
to h—treating ν as a function of h—and solving for ∂ν
∂h.
16Derivation of the expression for
∂y
∂h follows from total diﬀerentiation of the relation (4.10)
deﬁning y which yields
bc
µ
bh + bhhh +
∂y
∂h
¶
+ bh =0
and solving this equation.
47where τ0 and τ00 denote the marginal tax rate and its derivative. Division of the
budget set into states ensures that inverse (4.36) and its Jacobian (4.37) exist in
the space deﬁned by each state.
The implied density of h conditional on δi is
f (h | δi =1 )=
R
Φi|h f (h,η,ξ) dη dξ
P (δi =1 )
for h ∈ Θi· h (4.42)
where the set Θi· h =( hi−1,h i+1) designates the domain of h given occurrence of
δi =1and the notation
R
Φi|hdenotes integration of (η,ξ) over the set
Φi|h = { (η,ξ): | I [ h =   (ω,y,z,v);( v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi ]=1} . (4.43)
The set Φi|h treats h as ﬁxed and, therefore, is a function of h.
Performing a further change of variables for wages yields the following joint
density for hours and wages
f (h,W,ξ)=
dηw
dW
f (h,η
w,ξ) (4.44)
=
dηw
dW
f (h,η
w (W,Q),ξ)
where
η
w = η
w (W,Q)=W
−1 (W,Q) (4.45)
denotes the inverse of wage function, and the quantity
dηw
dW
=[
∂W
∂η
]
−1 (4.46)
represents the Jacobian associated with this inverse. (For expositional conve-
nience, and without loss of generality, this analysis assumes that a monotonically
increasing relationship links W to η; so, (4.46) positive.)
The density of h and W conditional on δi is
f (h,W | δi =1 )=
R
Φi|h,W f (h,W,ξ) dξ
P (δi =1 )
for (h,W) ∈ Θi· h,W (4.47)
48where the notation
R
Φi|h,W denotes integration of ξ over the set
Φi|h,W = { (ξ) | I [ h =   (ω,y,z,υ);W = W(Q,η);( v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi ]=1} .
(4.48)
The set Φi|h,W is a function of h and W. One can express the set Θi· h,W appearing
in (4.47) as
Θi· h,W = { (h,W):ξ ∈ Φi|h,W } ,
which speciﬁes the domain of h and W assuming occupancy of the state i part of
the budget constraint.
If v is multi-dimensional as speciﬁed in labor supply function (4.13), then
(4.47) becomes
f (h,W | δi =1 )=
R
Φi|h,W f (h,v2,W,ξ) dv2 dξ
P (δi =1 )
for (h,W) ∈ Θi· h,W
(4.49)
where f (h,v2,W,ξ) has a form analogous to (4.44), and the notation R
Φi|h,W now denotes integration of (v2,ξ) over the set
Φi|h = { (v2,ξ):I [ h =   (ω,y,Z,v);W = W(Q,η);( v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi ]=1} .
The set Φi|h,W still remains a function of h and W .
Finally, when an individual selects an optimum at a kink point and h = ¯ h is
discrete, then the distribution of wages takes the form
f
¡¯ h,W | δi =1
¢
=
R
Φi|¯ h,W f (ν,W,ξ) dν dξ
P (δi =1 )
for W ∈ Θi· W (4.50)
where the density f (ν,W,ξ) is speciﬁed analogous to (4.44), and the set Φi|¯ h,W
is a function of ¯ h and W deﬁned by
Φi|¯ h,W = { (ν,ξ): h = ¯ hi ; W = W(Q,η)( v,η,ξ) ∈ Ωi } . (4.51)
The domain Θi· W of W in (4.50) corresponds to that part of the overall range
of W consistent with being at kink ¯ hi.
494.4.4. Likelihood Functions for Hours and Wages
Appendix A presents the results required to develop a complete speciﬁcation
of the joint likelihood function for hours (h )a n dw a g e s( W). Suppose the state
δ0 =1refers to an individual choosing not to work; the states δi =1for i ∈ Mc
designate those circumstances when the person works and selects optimums on
diﬀerentiable segments of budget constraints; and the states δi =1for i ∈ Md
denote those events when an individual chooses hours located at a kink point.
Hours (h) are continuously distributed for states in the set i ∈ Mc,a n dh is
discretely distributed in the no-work state and for states in the set i ∈ Md.H o u r s
possess a combined continuous/discrete distribution. Knowledge of the value of h
entirely determines the values of δ0,...,δn where n+1designates the total number
of states.
Formula (A.26) of Appendix A implies that the following speciﬁcation delimits
the joint likelihood function of (h,W):
L(h,W)=L(h,W,δ0,...,δn)= [ P ((v,η,ξ) ∈ Ω0 )]
δ0 ∗ (4.52)
Y
i ∈ Mc
"Z
Φi|h,W
f (h,v2,W ,ξ) dv2 dξ
#δi
∗
Y
i ∈ Md
"Z
Φi|¯ h,W
f (ν,W,ξ) dν dξ
#δi
.
The ﬁrst line of this expression delineates the probability of not working; the
second line—comprised of the numerators of (4.49)—designates the densities of
(h,W) unconditional on δi =1 ; and the third line—encompassing the numera-
tors of (4.50)—demarcates the probability that h = ¯ hi combined with the density
of W unconditional on δi =1 .
4.4.5. Density Functions Accounting for Measurement Error
With measurement error contaminating hours of work, h is no longer ob-
served and one instead has data on measured hours H speciﬁed by relation (4.15).
Without loss of generality, suppose (4.15) constitutes a monotically increasing re-
lationship that links H to the measurement error component ε. The joint density
50function (4.21) relates the distribution of ε to the distributions of the structural
errors ν, η,a n dξ.
On diﬀerentiable segments of the budget constraint, the density function for
true hours and wages is f (h,W,ξ,ε) which has a form entirely analogous to (4.44).
Performing a conventional change of variables using relationship (??)y i e l d st h e
density
f (h,W,ξ,H)=
∂εH
∂H
f
¡
h,W,ξ,ε
H¢
(4.53)
=
∂εH
∂H
f
¡
h,W,ξ,ε
H (H,h)
¢
where
ε
H = ε
H (H,h)=H
−1 (H,h) (4.54)
refers to the inverse of measurement error function (4.15), and the quantity
∂εH
∂H
=[
∂H
∂h
]
−1 (4.55)
designates the Jacobian associated with this inverse. The corresponding density
of H and W conditional on δi =1is
f (H,W | δi =1 )=
R
Θi· h
R
Φi|h, ˜ W f (h,W,ξ,H) dξ dh
P (δi =1 )
for (H,W) ∈ Θi· H,W
(4.56)
where
R
Θi· h denotes integration over the set Θi· h which corresponds to the domain
of h conditional on δi =1 .
When wages are also measured with error through mismeasurement of hours
as characterized by relation (4.16), then (4.53) is replaced by
f
³
h, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
= f
³
h, ˜ W
−1( ˜ W,h,H),ξ,H
´
(4.57)
where
W = ˜ W
−1
³
˜ W,h,ε
H (H,h)
´
≡ ˜ W
−1
³
˜ W,h,H
´
51refers to the inverse of measurement error function (4.16). The corresponding
density of H and ˜ W conditional on δi =1becomes
f
³
H, ˜ W | δi =1
´
=
R
Θi· h
R
Φi|h,W f
³
h, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
dξ dh
P (δi =1 )
for (H, ˜ W) ∈ Θi· H, ˜ W
(4.58)
No change of variables occurs in deriving this expression since ˜ W is fully known
given values for h,W and H.
A similar situation applies to incorporating measurement error when an in-
dividual selects an optimum at a kink point of the budget set. Conditional on
realization of the state δi =1 ,t h ev a l u eo fε is known since one sees H and h = ¯ hi
with probability one. Deﬁning the f (ν,W,ξ,ε) as the generalization of the joint
density function appearing in (4.50) incorporating measurement error, then sub-
stitution of the inverse functions ˜ W−1( ˜ W,¯ hi,H) and εH ¡
H,¯ hi
¢
introduced above
into this joint density yields
f
³
ν, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
= f
³
ν, ˜ W
−1( ˜ W,¯ hi,H),ξ,ε
H ¡
H,¯ hi
¢´
. (4.59)
Following the steps above, one can readily verify that the density of (H, ˜ W) con-
ditional on δi =1takes the form
f
³
H, ˜ W | δi =1
´
=
R
Φi|¯ h, ˜ W f
³
ν, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
dν dξ
P (δi =1 )
for ˜ W ∈ Θi· ˜ W. (4.60)
Clearly, both speciﬁcations (4.59) and (4.60) depend directly on ¯ hi, but as in
representation of other speciﬁcations the only arguments included in the function
are those variables which are random in the state; ¯ hi is ﬁxed and known given
δi =1 .
4.4.6. Likelihood Functions for Measured Hours and Wages
Formulating the likelihood function for (H, ˜ W) is complicated by the fact that
a researcher does not observe precisely which portion of the budget constraint an
individual selects since this decision reveals h and this quantity is unknown. Thus,
when a person works, one cannot distinguish which individual state i occurs. On
52the other hand, a researcher does observe when a person does not work. Expressed
in terms of the endogenous dummy variables δi, these circumstances imply that
the data reveal the event δo =1 but not the individual events δi =1 for
i ∈ M = Mc ∪ Md. Instead, one merely observes whether δ1 ≡
P
i∈M δi =1 or
δ1 =0 .
A p pe a l i n gt of o r m u l a( ??) of Appendix A, the following speciﬁcation represents
the joint likelihood function of (h,W):
L
³
H, ˜ W
´
=[ P ((v,η,ξ) ∈ Ω0 )]
δ0 ∗
"
X
i∈Mt
Z
Θi
"Z
Φi|h,W
f
³
h,v2, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
dv2 dξ
#
dh +
X
i∈Mt
Z
Φi|¯ h,W
f
³
ν, ˜ W,ξ,H
´
The ﬁrst line of this expression delineates the probability of not working; and the
second line designates the density of (H, ˜ W) unconditional on δ1. Accordingly,
both H and ˜ W are continuously distributed throughout the range on H>0.
4.5. Maximum Likelihood: Convex Diﬀerentiable Constraints with Full
Participation
Developing speciﬁcations for likelihood functions when budget sets are convex
and have diﬀerentiable boundaries is straightforward, especially assuming labor
force participation is not a factor for the population under investigation. The
following discussion presents two examples of such speciﬁcations to illustrate ele-
mentary versions of the general formulas presented above.
4.5.1. Speciﬁcations for Linear Parameterizations of Labor Supply
Derivation of likelihood functions assuming a linear speciﬁcation for hours of
work when (4.5) describes the budget constraint—wherein tax payments depend
only on a single taxable income quantity—follows directly from the previous results.
Assuming no measurement error (i.e., H = h), a change in variables from the
heterogeneity error ν to actual hours h using relation (??) yields the likelihood
function for h:
fh(h)=
dν
dh
ϕν (h − yν − zγ − αω − βy) (4.62)
53where ϕv (v) denotes the density of the heterogeneity component ν,a n dt h eJ a -
cobian term is
dν
dh
=1+( α − βh)W
2∂τ0
∂I
. (4.63)
This Jacobian term is restricted to be non-negative over the admissible range.
Maximizing (4.62) yields maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters of the
labor supply function,  , which provide the information needed to infer the work
disincentive eﬀects of taxation.
If hours are indeed contaminated by additive measurement error, then the
likelihood function for observed hours H = h + ε is given by:
fH(H)=
Z maxhours
0
ϕε(H − h)ϕh(h)dh (4.64)
where ϕε (ε) denotes the density of the heterogeneity component ε. This expres-
sion resembles relation (4.62) except that integration occurs over hours to account
for the existence of reporting error, and H replaces actual hours h in the Jacobian
term in (4.63).
4.5.2. Speciﬁcations for Multiplicative Measurement Error
Now consider maximum-likelihood estimation of the semilog speciﬁcation of
labor supply. Suppose the heterogeneity-error-component ν in structural labor-
supply equation and the disturbance ε in the measurement-error equation for
hours of work possess the joint distribution ϕνε(ν,ε),w h e r eϕνε designates a den-
sity function. For the moment, suppose (ν,ε) are independently distributed of
the gross wage and other income. Using relations (4.35) and (4.44) to perform
a standard change in variables from the errors ν and ε to the variables h and
H produces the likelihood function needed to compute maximum-likelihood esti-
mates. The transformation from (ν,ε) to (h, H) is monotonic for a wide range of
functional forms for   as long as the underlying preferences satisfy quasiconcavity
and budget sets are convex.
Without measurement error, the likelihood function for hours of work, h,t a k e s
the form
fh(h)=
dν
dh
ϕν (h − y − zγ − αlnW − αln(1 − τ
0) − βy) (4.65)
54where ϕν is the marginal density for ν, and the Jacobian term is
dν
dh
=1+
µµ
α
W(1 − τ0)
− βh
¶
W
2∂τ0
∂I
¶
(4.66)
which is required to be non-negative. In these expressions, the derivative τ0 is
evaluated at I = Wh+ Y − τ(Wh+ Y ).
With multiplicative measurement error, the likelihood function for observed
hours H becomes
L =
Z maxwage
0
Z maxhours
0
dν
dh
fνεw (h−y −zγ −αlnω −βy,lnH −lnh,W) dh dW
(4.67)
where integration occurs over the hourly wage, which is unobserved, using the
joint density fνεw (ν,ε,W). The non-negativity of the Jacobian term clearly
places restrictions on the behavioral parameters and we discuss these restrictions
further below.
4.6. Maximum Likelihood: Convex Piecewise-Linear Constraints with
Full Participation
The majority of empirical labor-supply studies incorporating taxes treat the
tax schedule as a series of brackets implying a piecewise-linear budget set. With
such a tax function, the familiar change-in-variables techniques implemented in
conventional maximum likelihood do not apply due to the nonexistence of the Ja-
cobian over measurable segments of the sample space arising from nondiﬀerentia-
bility of functional relationships characterizing hours-of-work choices. Moreover,
a piecewise-linear budget set creates endogenous variables (hours and after-tax
wages) that are both discrete and continuous in character. Section 4.4 covers
speciﬁcations for likelihood functions for such endogenous variables.
4.6.1. Characterization of Labor Supply with Piecewise-Linear Con-
straints
To illustrate the derivation of an estimable labor supply model using the
piecewise-linear approach assuming the linear structural speciﬁcation for hours
of work, consider the simple case of a budget set with only three segments as
55presented in Figure 4.1. (To simplify the exposition here, we number the kink
points as 0,1,2, and 3 rather than as 0, 2, 4, and 6 .) The preceding discussion
deﬁnes the variables yj, ωj and hj appearing in this ﬁgure. To locate the kinks
and slopes of the budget constraint for an individual, a researcher must know
the individual’s level of non-labor income, gross wage rate, hours of work, and
the structure of the tax system. The hours of work at which kinks occur are
given by hj =( Ij − Y + D)/W,w h e r eY and D, respectively, represent taxable
non-labor income and deductions, and Ij i st h em a x i m u mt a x a b l ei n c o m ef o r
segment j. The slope of each segment is given by the marginal wage rate for that
segment: ωj = W(1 − tj),w h e r ej denotes the segment, tj signiﬁes the marginal
tax rate for that segment, and W is the gross wage rate per hour. Finally, the
non-labor income at zero hours of work - the intercept of the budget line - is
y1 = Y − τ(Y − D),w h e r eτ(·) is the tax function evaluated at the individual’s
taxable income at zero earnings. Given this intercept value, virtual incomes or the
intercepts associated with successive budget segments are computed by repeated
application of the formula: yj = yj−1 +( ωj−1 − ωj)hj−1.
Given a convex budget constraint, an individual’s optimization problem amounts
to maximizing U(C,h) subject to
C = y1 if h =0
= ω1h + y1 if h0 <h≤ h1
= ω2h + y2 if h1 <h≤ h2
= ω3h + y3 if h2 <h≤ h3
= ω3h3 + y3 if h = h3
(4.68)
The solution of this maximization problem decomposes into two steps. First,
determine the choice of h conditional on locating on a particular segment or a
kink. This step yields the solution:
h =0 if h =0 (lower limit)
=  (ω1,y 1,ν) if 0 <h<h1 (segment 1)
= h1 if h = h1 (kink 1)
=  (ω2,y 2,ν) if h1 <h<h2 (segment 2)
= h2 if h = h2 (kink 2)
=  (ω3,y 3,ν) if h2 <h<h3 (segment 3)
= h3 if h = h3 (kink 3 = upper limit)
(4.69)
56Second, determine the segment or the kink on which the person locates. The
following relations characterize this solution: choose:
0 if  (ω1,y 1,ν) ≤ 0
(Segment 1) if h0 <  (ω1,y 1,ν) < h1
(Kink 1) if  (ω2,y 2,ν) ≤ h1 <  (ω1,y 1,ν)
(Segment 2) if h1 <  (ω2,y 2,ν) < h2
(Kink 2) if  (ω3,y 3,ν) ≤ h2 <  (ω2,y 2,ν)
(Segment 3) if h2 <  (ω3,y 3,ν) < h3
(Kink 3) if  (ω3,y 3,ν) ≥ h3
(4.70)
Combined, these two steps imply the values of h and C that represent the utility-
maximizing solution for labor supply and consumption.
All studies implementing the piecewise-linear approach assume the existence
of measurement error in hours of work. With the linear measurement error model
given by (4.16), observed hours H = h + ε. As long as the measurement error
component ε is continuously distributed, so is H. In contrast to information on h,
knowledge of H suﬃces neither to allocate individuals to the correct branch of the
budget constraint nor to identify the marginal tax rate faced by individuals, other
than at zero hours of work. The state of the world an individual occupies can no
longer be directly observed, and one confronts a discrete-data version of an errors-
in-variables problem. The interpretation of measurement error maintained in this
analysis is that ε represents reporting error that contaminates the observation on
h for persons who work.17
With measurement error, the linear speciﬁcation of   given by (??)w i t hb hj ≡
17Note that expected hours of work, in this convex piece-wise linear case, is additive in each
hours choice weighted by the probability of each segment or kink. Each term in this sum being
at most a function of two marginal wages and two virtual incomes. Blomquist and Newey (1997)
exploit this observation to develop a semi-parametric estimator for hours of work imposing the
additivity through a series estimator.
57μ+αωj + yj +Zγ implies the following stochastic speciﬁcation for labor supply:
b h1 + ν + ε if 0 < b h1 + ν ≤ h1 (segment 1)
h1 + ε if b h2 + ν<h1 < b h1 + ν (kink 1)
H = b h2 + ν + ε if h1 < b h2 + ν ≤ h2 (segment 2)
h2 + ε if b h3 + ν<h2 < b h2 + ν (kink 2)
b h3 + ν + ε if h2 < b h3 + ν ≤ h3 (segment 3)
h3 + ε if b h3 + ν ≥ h3 (upper limit)
(4.71)
This represents a sophisticated variant of an econometric model that combines
discrete and continuous choice elements.
4.6.2. Likelihood Function with Measurement Error When All Work
The log-likelihood function for this model is given by
P
i lnfH(H),w h e r ei
indexes observations. Deﬁning νj = hj−1 −b hj and vj = hj −b hj,t h ec o m p o n e n t s
fH (H) are given by
fH(H)=
3 P
j=1
vj Z
νj
ϕ
2 (H −b hj,ν) dν ( s e g m e n t s1 ,2 ,3 ) ( 4 . 7 2 )
+
2 P
j=1
νj+1 Z
vj
ϕ1 (H − hj,ν) dν (kinks 1, 2)
+
∞ Z
v3
ϕ1 (H − h3,ν) dν (upper limit)
where ϕ1(·,·) and ϕ2(·,·) are the bivariate density functions of (ε,ν) and (ε +
ν,ν), respectively. Maximizing the log-likelihood function produces estimates of
the coeﬃcients of the labor supply function  . These estimates provide the
information used to infer both substitution and income responses, which in turn
provide the basis for calculating the work disincentive eﬀe c t so fi n c o m et a x a t i o n .
4.6.3. Shortcomings of Conventional Piecewise-Linear Analyses
The piecewise-linear approach for estimating the work disincentive eﬀects of
taxes oﬀers both advantages and disadvantages relative to other methods. Con-
58cerning the attractive features of this approach, piecewise-linear analyses recognize
that institutional features of tax systems induce budget sets with linear segments
and kinks. This is important if one believes that a smooth tax function does not
provide a reasonably accurate description of the tax schedule. The piecewise-linear
approach admits randomness in hours of work arising from both measurement
error and variation in individual preferences and it explicitly accounts for endo-
geneity of the marginal tax rate in estimation, but so do the instrumental-variable
and diﬀerentiable likelihood methods discussed above. As we will see below, the
piecewise-linear approach more readily incorporates ﬁxed costs of holding a job,
regressive features of the tax code, and multiple program participation than other
procedures due to the discrete-continuous character of hours-of-work choices in-
duced in these environments. These features of the piecewise-linear method make
it a vital approach in empirical analyses of labor supply.
On the other hand, the following shortcomings of the piecewise-linear proce-
dure raise serious doubts about the reliability of its estimates of work disincentive
eﬀects. First, the piecewise-linear methodology assumes that both the econometri-
cian and each individual in the sample have perfect knowledge of the entire budget
constraint that is relevant for the worker in question. Errors are permitted neither
in perceptions nor in measuring budget constraints. Taken literally, this means
that: all income and wage variables used to compute each sample member’s taxes
are observed perfectly by the econometrician; individuals making labor supply
choices know these variables exactly prior to deciding on hours of work; each in-
dividual and the econometrician know when the taxpayer will itemize deductions
and the amount of these itemizations; and each taxpayer’s understanding of the
tax system is equivalent to that of the econometrician (e.g., the operation of such
features as earned-income credits). Clearly, given virtual certainty that most of
these assumptions are violated in empirical analyses of labor supply, the estimates
produced by methods relying on these assumptions must be interpreted very cau-
tiously. The diﬀerentiable-likelihood methods rely on the same assumptions. The
instrumental-variable methods do not, so they are likely to be more robust.
Second, measurement error plays an artiﬁcial role in econometric models based
on the piecewise-linear approach. Its presence is needed to avoid implausible pre-
dictions of the model. The statistical framework induced by the piecewise-linear
approach implies that bunching in hours of work should occur at kink points if
59hours precisely measure h. However, for the vast majority of data sources cur-
rently used in the literature, only a trivial number of individuals, if indeed any
at all, report hours of work at interior kink points. Unless one presumes that
the data on hours do not directly represent h, such evidence provides the basis
for immediately rejecting the distributional implications of the above speciﬁca-
tions. Considering, for example, the labor-supply characterization proposed in
equation (4.69), almost any test of the distributional assumptions implied by this
speciﬁcation would be readily rejected because observed hours would take the
values h0,h1,h2 and h3 with only a trivial or zero probability. Instead, observed
hours essentially look as if they are distributed according to a continuous distri-
bution. When a continuously-distributed measurement error ε is added to the
model, observed hours H are continuously distributed. This provides an essen-
tial reason for introducing measurement error in the data, for without it, the
piecewise-linear structure provides a framework that is grossly inconsistent with
the data. Of course, several sound reasons exist for admitting measurement er-
ror in a labor supply model, including the widespread suspicion that reporting
error contaminates data on hours of work. However, measurement error in hours
of work implies measurement error in wages, since they are typically computed
as average hourly earnings. Current applications of the piecewise-linear analy-
sis mistakenly ignore this by assuming perfectly measured budget constraints.18
The unnatural role played by measurement error raises questions about the cred-
ibility of ﬁndings derived from the piecewise-linear approach. In contrast to the
piecewise-linear approach, it is not essential to introduce measurement error in
either the diﬀerentiable-likelihood or the instrumental-variable approach because
hours in the distribution of h are continuous without measurement error.
Third, existing research implementing the piecewise-linear methodology relies
on very strong exogeneity assumptions. Other than hours of work, all variables
involved in the calculation of taxes are presumed to be exogenous determinants of
labor supply behavior, both from a statistical and from an economic perspective.
These variables include gross wages, the various components of non-labor income,
and deductions. In light of the evidence supporting the view that wages and
income are endogenous variables in labor supply analyses, particularly in the case
18It is possible to argue that this error does not result in measurement error in the hourly
wage, if the measurement error is interpreted as an “optimization” error.
60of wages, suspicions arise regarding the dependability of estimated substitution
and income eﬀects based on procedures that ignore such possibilities. Most of
the exogeneity assumptions are also maintained in the diﬀerentiable-likelihood
approach, but are easily relaxed when applying instrumental-variable procedures
(given the availability of a suﬃcient number of other instrumental variables).
Fourth, some concerns about the reliability of estimates produced by the
piecewise-linear approach ensue due to the static behavioral framework maintained
in the formulation of empirical relations. Piecewise-linear studies invariably rely
on the textbook one-period model of labor supply as a description of hours-of-
work choices, and impose it to estimate parameters. Existing implementations
of the diﬀerentiable-likelihood approach suﬀe rf r o mt h es a m ep r o b l e m .E v e r y o n e
acknowledges that individuals are not simply myopic optimizers; they transfer
income across periods to achieve consumption plans that are infeasible without
savings. A serious question arises concerning the relevance of such considerations
in estimating substitution and income eﬀects used to predict responses to tax
policy.
4.7. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Imposes Restrictions on Behav-
ioral Responses
The implementation of maximum likelihood procedures imposes interesting
and important restrictions on behavioral parameters in the presence of non-linear
budget constraints. These restrictions come about in deﬁning the statistical model
to be coherent, requiring probabilities to fall in the [0,1] interval and densities to
be nonnegative.
4.7.1. Restrictions Imposed Under Piecewise-Linear Constraints
The econometric model produced by the piece-wise linear formulation given
by (4.72) implicitly imposes parametric restrictions that constraint the signs of es-
timated substitution and income eﬀects. As developed in MaCurdy et al. (1990),
particular inequality restrictions must hold in the application of estimation pro-
cedures with piecewise-linear budget constraints for likelihood functions to be
deﬁned (i.e., to ensure that the components of these functions are non-negative).
More speciﬁcally, in applications of such procedures, the Slutsky condition must
61be locally satisﬁed at all interior kink points of budget sets that represent feasible
options for any individual in the sample such that the compensated substitution
eﬀect must be positive. For the linear speciﬁcation of the labor supply function
considered in the preceding discussion, the speciﬁc inequality constraints imposed
are
α − βhjk ≥ 0, ∀ j,k (4.73)
where the quantities hjk represent the hours-of-work values that correspond to
interior kink points j on a sample member k’s budget set. Because many values
of hjk exist in most analyses of piecewise-linear constraints, fulﬁllment of relations
(4.73) essentially require global satisfaction of the Slutsky condition by the labor
supply function. Such a requirement, in essence, globally dictates that the uncom-
pensated substitution eﬀect of a wage change on hours of work must be positive
for the labor supply speciﬁcation considered in the preceding discussion, and the
income eﬀect for hours of work must be negative. The imposition of these restric-
tions, especially for men, is highly suspect given the available evidence from other
studies. These restrictions carry over to more general labor supply functions.
4.7.2. Restrictions Imposed Under Diﬀerentiable Constraints
Maximum likelihood estimation with diﬀerentiable constraints induces com-
parable restrictions. Consider, for example, likelihood function (4.62). For this
speciﬁcation to be a properly-deﬁned likelihood function, the Jacobian dν
dh must
be non-negative. Violation of this condition implies that the density function for
h is negative, which obviously cannot occur. Non-negativity of dν
dh translates into
the property
∂ 
∂w
−
∂ 
∂y
h ≥−
µ
∂τ
∂I
W
2
¶−1
≤ 0, (4.74)
where   refers to the labor supply function. The left-hand side of this inequality is
the Slutsky term. This inequality result does not require compensated substitution
eﬀects to be positive as quasi-concave preferences mandate, only that these eﬀects
cannot become too negative.
Maximumlikelihood procedures yield nonsensical results unless equation (4.74)
holds. Without measurement error, estimated parameter values cannot imply
a violation of equation (4.74) at any of the data combinations (h,w(h),y(h))
62actually observed in the sample. If a violation occurs, then the evaluation of
(4.62) for the observation associated with this combination would result in a non-
positive value which causes the overall log likelihood function to approach minus
inﬁnity which clearly cannot represent a maximum.
With measurement error, maximum likelihood estimation applied to function
(4.64) ensures that a weighted average of density functions appearing in (4.64)
holds, with weighting occurring over all combinations of hours, marginal wages,
and virtual income lying in the feasible range of the budget constraint of any indi-
vidual included in the sample. Since maximum likelihood procedures assume the
validity of such restrictions when calculating estimates of the coeﬃcients of  ,t h e
resulting estimated labor supply function can be expected to exhibit compensated
substitution eﬀects that obey inequality (4.74.) over a very wide range of hours,
wages, and incomes.19
4.8. Maximum Likelihood: Accounting for Participation and Missing
Wages
As mentioned in previous sections, some applications of the piecewise-linear
approach incorporate ﬁxed costs to working - costs such as transportation that
must be paid for any amount of work but which may vary across individuals.
This signiﬁcantly complicates the analysis because the optimized level of work
under the budget constraint while working may not represent the optimal choice
overall; one must explicitly consider the option of not working and thus avoiding
the ﬁxed cost. For any level of ﬁxed costs, a minimum number of hours worked is
implied creating an attainable range in the observable hours of work distribution;
individuals will not work unless the gain is large enough to overcome the ﬁxed
costs. In essence, these complications arise because the budget constraint is not
convex, invalidating simple maximization procedures.
19It is, of course, computationally feasible to use (4.5.3) in estimation and not require fh
to be deﬁned over the entire range of its support. Computationally one merely requires fh to
be non-negative over a suﬃciently large region to ensure (4.5.3) > 0. Of course, not requiring
fh ≥ 0 over its relevant range produces a nonsensical statistical model.
634.8.1. Fixed Costs of Working
If an individual must pay ﬁxed monetary costs, F, to work, then non-labor
income, Y , in the above budget constraints is replaced by
Y − F, if h>0, (4.75)
Y, if h =0 .
F is partially unobservable and, thus, modelled as a stochastic element, varying
across individuals. Hence, we see that the budget constraint discontinuously jumps
down by F when the individual chooses to work.
To solve for the optimum when faced with this budget constraint, two regimes
must explicitly be considered: working and not working. Estimation proceeds
by ﬁnding the maximum utility under each regime and then comparing these to
determine which option is chosen. In neither regime, the utility function U(C,h,ν)
- where we explicitly note the unobserved component, ν - is maximized subject to
optimization problem (4.1) with (4.4) modiﬁed by (4.75).
In the no-work regime, the solution is simple. We know h is 0, so utility is
given by U(Y − τ(Y − D),0,ν).
The solution in the work regime closely follows the solution presented in Section
4.6. Again utilizing the labor supply function,  (ω,y,ν) yields the solution for h
given in (4.69), where the virtual income y now subtracts ﬁxed costs F. However,
to compute maximum utility in this regime requires associating a utility level with
each possible hours choice. Utility along any segment, j, is given by the indirect
utility function, V (ωj,y j,ν). At kinks, the direct utility function must be used,
so the utility at kink j is given by U(ωjhj +yj,hj,ν). Hence, utilizing exactly the
same solution procedure exploited in Section 4.6, we can deﬁne maximized utility
when working, V ∗:
−∞  1 ≤ 0
V (ω1,y 1,ν)0 <  1 < h1
U(ω1h1 + y1,h1,ν)  2 < h1 ≤  1
V ∗ (w,y,v)= V (ω2,y 2,ν) h1 <  2 < h2
U(ω2h2 + y2,h2,ν)  3 < h2 ≤  2
V (ω3,y 3,ν) h2 <  3 < h3
U(ω3hm + y3,hm,ν)  3 ≥ hm
(4.76)
64where
 j ≡  (ωj,y j,ν) ≡
Vω(ωj,y j,ν)
Vy(ωj,y j,ν)
(4.77)
with Vω and Vy denoting the partial derivatives of V ; relation (4.77) is, of course,
Roy’s identity deﬁning the labor supply function,  , evaluated at wage and income
levels ωj and yj.T h e u s e o f −∞ for h =0simply indicates that h =0is not
included in this regime and, thus, selecting it indicates that the no-work regime
is preferred. Given functional forms for V and U, ﬁnding V ∗ is straightforward.
Given maximized utility under each regime, the ﬁnal step in the solution is to
compare the two regimes. An individual chooses to work at the hours speciﬁed
by the solution in (4.69) if
V
∗(ω,y,ν) ≥ U(Y − τ(Y − D),0,ν) (4.78)
and chooses not to work otherwise. For any level of ν, treating equation (4.78) as
an equality implies a critical level of ﬁxed costs, F ∗(ν) above which the individual
will choose not to work; F enters this relation through the virtual income variable
y. Because desired hours of work increase with ν, this critical value will generally
be increasing in ν - greater propensity to work implies that higher ﬁxed costs are
required to prefer the no-work option. If restrictions are placed on the support
of F,s u c ha sF>F , there will be values of ν low enough to rule out the work
regime, thus implying a hole at the low end of the h distribution.
As a ﬁnal step before deriving the likelihood function, note that in the no-work
regime, gross wage, W, is not observed and, thus, the budget constraint cannot
be derived. Hence, W must be endogenized. Such a step amounts to modeling
the oﬀered gross wage rate as being generated by a variant of equation (??)w h i c h
presumes that W is randomly distributed across the population depending on
measured characteristics Q and unobservable components η. To simplify the
discussion below, we assume that the linear variant of speciﬁcation (??) (i.e.,
W = W∗(Q)+η) generates W.
4.8.2. Likelihood Function Incorporating Fixed Costs
To derive the likelihood function, ﬁrst consider the likelihood contribution
of an individual who does not work. We assume this no-work decision can be
65observed, so there is no measurement error. In the no-work case, one of two
situations applies: (i) ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently high with F>F ∗ ≡ F∗(ν,η)
for any given ν and η, or (ii) if this ﬁxed-cost threshold falls below the lowest
admissible value for F (i.e. F∗ ≤ F), then desired hours are suﬃciently low with
ν<ν ∗ ≡ ν∗(η) for any η.20 The probability of this event is
L0 =
∞ Z
−∞
ν∗ Z
−∞
∞ Z
F∗
ϕνηF (ν,η,F) dF dη dν (4.79)
where ϕνηF is joint density of (ν,η,F).
For the work regime, the likelihood contribution looks very much like that
d e r i v e di ns p e c i ﬁcation (4.72), as we continue to assume the linear hours of work
function and the form of measurement error assumed there. The only changes are
the addition of terms for δ and F (accounting for the fact that F<F ∗(ν))a n d
the removal of the term for the lower limit which is no longer part of that regime
and is now perfectly observable. Using ϕ1 and ϕ2 to denote the distribution of
(ε,ν,η,F) and (ε + ν,ν,η,F) yields:
L1 =
3 P
j=1
νj Z
νj
F∗ Z
0
ϕ2 (H −b hj,ν,W− W
∗(Q),F) dF dν (4.80)
+
2 P
j=1
νj+1 Z
νj
F∗ Z
0
ϕ1(H − hj,ν,W− W
∗(Q),F) dF dν
+
∞ Z
ν3
F∗ Z
0
ϕ1 (H − h3,ν,W− W
∗(Q),F) dF dν
where
νj solves the equation  (ωj,y j,νj)=hj−1 (4.81)
νj solves the equation  (ωj,y j,νj)=hj.
20The critical value υ* solves relation (4.8.4) treated as an equality with virtual income y
evaluated at F .
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The likelihood function for an individual is given by
L =( L1)
δE(L0)
1−δE (4.82)
where δE =1if the individual works and =0otherwise. Estimation proceeds
by maximizing the sum of log likelihoods across individuals, as always. This
is quite complex in this case, requiring knowledge of both the direct utility U
and the indirect utility, V , and also requiring comparisons across regimes for all
individuals and all parameter values.
4.9. Welfare Participation: Maximum Likelihood with NonConvex Con-
straints
A common source of non-linearity in budget constraints involves participation
in welfare programs. To illustrate this situation, consider the simplest case in
which the only taxes faced by an individual result from beneﬁtr e d u c t i o no na
single welfare program. Figure 4.3 presents this scenario. Under most welfare
programs, individuals face very high eﬀective tax rates when they initially work
due to large reductions in their beneﬁts occurring when earnings increase. Once
beneﬁts reach 0, the tax rate drops to a lower level, creating a non-convex kink
in the budget constraint. This non-convexity invalidates the simple procedures
exploited in Section 4.6 implemented to divide sample spaces into locations on
budget sets.
4.9.1. Simple Nonconvex Constraints with No Welfare Stigma
Following the picture portrayed in Figure 4.3, an individual maximizes U(c,h,ν)
subject to the budget constraint
c = Wh+ Y + b(I(h)), (4.83)
where beneﬁt sa r eg i v e nb yt h es i m p l eb e n e ﬁts c h e d u l e :
B(I(h)) =
½
G − ρWh, if G − ρWh > 0,
0 otherwise. (4.84)
67G gives the guarantee amount which is reduced at the beneﬁt reduction rate ρ
as the earnings, Wh, increase. This implies a kink point at h1 = G/ρW where
beneﬁts reach 0 and, thus, the marginal wage rises to W. So, the individual faces
two segments: segment 1 has h<h1 with net wage ω1 =( 1− ρ)W and virtual
income y1 = Y +G; and segment 2 has h>h1 with net wage ω2 = W and virtual
income y2 = Y .21
Because the budget constraint is non-convex, the solution cannot be character-
ized simply by ﬁnding a tangency with the budget constraint as it was in Section
4.6. Multiple tangencies are possible and these must be directly compared to de-
termine the optimum. Hence, one requires the regime shift approach summarized
in Section 4.4.
Consider ﬁrst the regime in which positive beneﬁts are received; that is, h<h1.
Maximization, given the eﬀective wage and income, on this linear segment follows
the approach of Section 4.4. We can characterize the optimal choice according to
the function  (ω1,y 1,ν). Denotes the value of ν which implies  (ω1,y 1,ν)=0as
ν0. Then the optimal hours choice along that segment is given by
h =  1 =  (ω1,y 1,ν),ν > ν 0,h =0 ,ν ≤ ν0. (4.85)
The optimized value on this segment (including the zero work option), ac-
counting for the fact that h>h1 is not allowed, is given by
V
∗
1 (ω1,y 1,ν)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
V (ω1,y 1,ν), 0 <  1 ≤ h1
U(y1,0,ν),  1 ≤ 0
−∞,  1 > h1,
(4.86)
where equation (4.85) deﬁnes  1.
Next, consider the regime without beneﬁts, that is with h ≥ h1.A g a i n t h e
optimal choice, given the wage and income, on this segment is given by the labor
supply function  2 =  (ω2,y 2,ν). The optimized value, accounting for the fact
that h<h1 is not admissible, is given by22
V
∗
2 (ω2,y 2,ν)=
½
V (ω2,y 2,ν),  2 ≥ h1,
−∞,  2 < h1.
(4.87)
21We ignore any upper bound on hours worked for simplicity.
22In the following formulation, we implicitly assume that the event  2 ≥ H occurs with zero
probability.
68Hence, the individual selects regime 1, with welfare receipt, if V ∗
1 >V∗
2 ,a n d
regime 2 otherwise. Since work propensity increases with ν, this can be charac-
terized by a cutoﬀ value, ν∗,d e ﬁned by
V
∗
1 (ω1,y 1,ν
∗)=V
∗
2 (ω2,y 2,ν
∗). (4.88)
For values of ν above ν∗, regime 2 is chosen; and for values below ν∗, regime 1 is
realized.
We can deﬁne three sets, Ω0, Ω1, and Ω2, such that for ν ∈ Ω0 the individual
chooses not to work, for ν ∈ Ω1 the individual locates on segment 1 receiving
beneﬁts with positive hours of work, and for ν ∈ Ω2 the individual locates on
segment 2. We must consider two cases to deﬁne these sets exactly. First, suppose
ν∗ >ν 0.T h e nw eh a v e
Ω0 = {ν | ν ≤ ν0} (4.89)
Ω1 = {ν | ν0 <ν≤ ν
∗}
Ω2 = {ν | ν>ν
∗}
Alternatively, if ν∗ ≤ ν0, then the switch to regime 2 occurs before positive hours
a r ew o r k e di nr e g i m e1 ,t h a ti s
Ω0 = {ν | ν ≤ ν
∗} (4.90)
Ω1 = ∅
Ω2 = {ν | ν>ν
∗} .
Hence, for certain individuals and parameter values, no value of ν exists such that
they will locate on segment 1 with positive hours of work.
To characterize the likelihood function we again need a functional form for the
gross wage of the form W = W(Z)+η. W ei g n o r em e a s u r e m e n te r r o rh e r ef o r
simplicity, and because there is no problem with individuals failing to locate at the
kink in this non-convex case. Deﬁne δB =1if the individual receives beneﬁts, and
δE =1is the individual works, both 0 otherwise. The likelihood function is given
69as follows, incorporating ϕην (η,υ) and the general inverse function ν = ν(h):
δB =1 ,δ E =1 , L11 =
∂ν
∂h
ϕνη(ν(h),W− W(Z)) I(ν ∈ Ω1), (4.91)
δB =0 ,δ E =1 , L01 =
∂ν
∂h
ϕνη(ν(h),W− W(Z)) I(ν ∈ Ω2),
δB =1 ,δ E =0 , L10 =
Z
Ω0
ϕνη(ν,η)dνdη.
where I(·) represents an indicator function equal to 1 if the condition in the
parentheses is true. Because the value of ν implied by the hours choice may
be inconsistent with the value implied by the regime choice, it is possible to
have “holes” in the hours distribution around the kink point. For example, an
individual on segment 1 must have ν ≤ ν∗. If his hours choice is too close to
the kink, this may imply a value of ν>ν ∗ and thus an observation with zero
likelihood.
The overall likelihood function is given by
l =( L11)
(δB)(δE) (L01)
(1−δB)(δE) (L10)
(δB)(1−δE). (4.92)
Estimation proceeds by maximizing the sum of log likelihoods across individuals,
as always. This is quite complex in this case, requiring knowledge of both the
direct utility U and the indirect utility, V , and also requiring comparisons across
regimes for all individuals and all parameter values.
4.9.2. Welfare Stigma Implies Selection of Budget Constraint
The above analysis assumes that all individuals eligible for welfare are on wel-
fare. Individuals working less than h0 but failing to receive welfare are operating
below the implied budget constraint, a possibility not permitted in the analysis.
Yet, many individuals are in exactly this situation. This is generally explained by
assuming the existence of some utility loss or stigma associated with welfare.
To capture welfare stigma the utility function is modiﬁed to take the form
U = U(c,h,ν) − δB ζ, (4.93)
70where ζ is the level of welfare stigma which is greater than 0 and varies across
individuals.23 Two unobserved components now enter preferences, ν and ζ. Such
cases were considered in the general analysis of Section 4.4. In terms of the
notation of this preceding section, in relationship (4.49) ν corresponds to ν1 and
ζ corresponds to ν2.
With this modiﬁcation we again consider the welfare and non-welfare regimes.
S i n c et h ew e l f a r es t i g m at e r md o e sn o ta ﬀect the marginal decisions, given that
the individual is on welfare, the discussion of hours of work presented above for
regime 1 is still valid. The optimal utility is now given by
V
∗(ω1,y 1,ν)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
V1(ω1,y 1,ν) − ζ, 0 <  1 ≤ h1,
U(y1,0,ν) − ζ,  1 ≤ 0,
−∞,  1 > h1.
(4.94)
The analysis for regime 2 is altered in this case, because an individual can be
observed not receiving welfare for any value of h - that is, given welfare stigma,
it is possible to observe an individual with h<h1,b u tδB =0 . So regime 2 is
now deﬁned solely by δB =0 . Optimal hours of work, given ω2 and y2,a r eg i v e n
by  (ω2,y 2,ν).D e ﬁning the value of ν for which  (ω2,y 2,ν)=0as ν+, hours of
work under this regime are now given by
h =  2 =  (ω2,y 2,ν),ν > ν
+, (4.95)
h =0 ,ν ≤ ν
+.
Optimized utility is now
V
∗
2 (ω2,y 2,ν)=
½
V (ω2,y 2,ν),  2 > 0
U(y2,0,ν),  2 ≤ 0. (4.96)
Choice of regime still proceeds by comparing V ∗
1 and V ∗
2 , as done in relationship
(4.88). For any ν in the sets Ω0 or Ω1 deﬁned by expressions (4.89) or (4.90),
there is now some critical level of ζ
∗ = ζ
∗(ν), which depends on ν,s u c ht h a t
regime 2 is chosen when ζ>ζ
∗; regime 1 is chosen otherwise.
23This additive form is used for simplicity. More general forms can be used, but change none
of the substantive points presented here.
71Given this characterization, we can derive the likelihood function for each
combination of δB and δE, using the joint densities ϕνζη (ν,ζ,η) and ϕνη (ν,η):
δB =1 ,δ E =1 , L11 = ∂ν
∂h
R ζ∗
0 ϕνζη(ν(h),ζ,W− W(z)) I(ν ∈ Ω1) dζ
δB =0 ,δ E =1 , L01 = ∂ν
∂hϕνη(ν(h),W− W∗(Z)) I(ν ∈ Ω1)
+ ∂ν
∂h
R ∞
ζ∗ ϕνζη(ν(h),ζW− W∗(Z)) I(ν ∈ Ω1) dζ
δB =1 ,δ E =0 , L10 =
R ∞
−∞
R
Ω0
R ζ∗
0 ϕνζη(ν,ζ,η) dζ dν dη
δB =0 ,δ E =0 , L00 =
R ∞
−∞
R ν∗
−∞
R ζ∗
0 ϕνζη(ν,ζη) dζ dν dη .
(4.97)
Estimation proceeds as in the non-stigma case by selecting the appropriate
likelihood branch for each individual and then maximizing the sum of the log
likelihoods.
As with the ﬁxed cost case, the likelihood function is complex even in this
extremely simpliﬁed welfare case. For each possible set of parameter values, the
maximum must be computed for each regime and then compared to compute
ζ
∗. Adding the tax codes, with their implied kinks, increases computational
complexity. As a result, the literature has adopted a simplifying methodology
which we present in Section 4.10 below.
4.9.3. Multiple Program Participation
In principle, the extension to the case of multiple program participation is
straightforward. For simplicity, we consider a case in which the individual can
choose between participating in no welfare programs, participating in welfare pro-
gram 1, participating only in program 2, or participating in both welfare programs
1 and 2. We extend the utility function as follows:
U = U(c,h,ν) − δ1ζ − δ2χ (4.98)
where δ1 =1if the individual participates in program 1, and δ2 =1if the
individual participates in program 2.24 Beneﬁts from program j, Bj(I(h)),a r e
given:
Bj(I(h)) =
½
Gj − ρjWh, if Gj − ρjWh>0,
0, otherwise. (4.99)
24The use of two additive errors is a simplifying assumption which ensures that the stigma
from both programs is higher than stigma from program 1 alone.
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B1(I(h))+B2(I(h)) =
½
G1 + G2 − ρ1Wh− ρ2Wh= G − ρWh, if G − ρWh > 0,
0 otherwise,
(4.100)
where G = G1+G2 and ρ = ρ1+ρ2. In general, the beneﬁt functions for programs
1 and 2 will have diﬀerent breakeven points, implying the values of hours deﬁning
kinks (h1 in Figure 4.3) will not be the same.
This formulation expands the model considered in Sections 4.6 and 4.9.2. To
adapt this earlier model, one must designate three distinct regimes in place of
regime 1 speciﬁed above: regime 1a indicating an individual participates only in
program 1, regime 1b signifying this person collects beneﬁts only from welfare pro-
gram 2, and regime 1c designating participation in both programs. Optimal hours
and utility for participation in a regime are given by (4.85), (4.86), (4.94), (4.95),
and (4.96), with net wages and virtual income in these formulations speciﬁed as
ωj = W(1 − ρj) and yj = Y + Gj,w i t hj =1 a, 1b,o r1c. In particular, relations
analogous to (4.85) and (4.86) deﬁne the labor supply and utility functions for
each of the new regimes for the “on-welfare” segments associated with relevant
combination of welfare programs. Relations (4.95) and (4.96) still deﬁne the labor
supply and utility functions for the non-welfare regime. The set of relations deﬁne
thresholds for ν demarcating the regions of unobserved tastes determining when
ap e r s o nw o r k s( ν0 in (4.85) and ν+ in (4.95)). Maximization again requires se-
lection of a regime. Relations analogous to (4.94) and (4.96) characterize utilities
corresponding to the various regimes. Conditional on values ν,t h e s er e l a t i o n s
in turn imply thresholds for the stigma errors ζ, χ,a n dζ + χ that determine
individuals’ welfare participation. The likelihood function for this model takes
a form similar to equation (4.97), with more branches appearing in the function
reﬂecting the additional regimes analyzed in this formulation.
Again, note the complexity of these extremely simpliﬁed welfare cases, even
these involve signiﬁcantly ﬁnancial burden. For each possible set of parameter
values, one must compute the maximum for each regime, account for the beneﬁt
structure, and then compare these to compute the error ranges for the likelihood
function. When the individual is unemployed, one must perform these calcula-
t i o n sf o ra l lp o s s i b l ew a g ev a l u e sa n da l lv a l u e so fν consistent with the no-work
decision. Adding the tax code, with its implied kinks, increases computational dif-
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number of dimensions over which one must calculate integrals, requiring sophisti-
cated numerical procedures and considerable computer resources. As a result, the
literature has adopted simplifying methodologies, a topic to which we now turn.
4.10. Computational Simpliﬁcation by Making Hours Choices Discrete
To make estimation problems manageable, a popular method is to presume
that consumers face only a limited set of hours choices. For example, a worker
may choose only full-time work, part-time work, or no work, with each of these
options implying a prescribed number of hours. Formally, this is done by assuming
that unobservable tastes components, ν, possess a discrete distribution, usually
characterized as a multinomial distribution conditional on covariates. Combined
with a 0/1 welfare decision, this ﬁnite set of hours choices yields a relatively small
set of discrete states, say a set of S states, over which the utility function must
be maximized.
Given a speciﬁcf o r mf o rt h ep r e f e r e n c ef u n c t i o n ,u t i l i t yc a nb er e a d i l ye v a l -
uated at each of the hours choices and the maximum can be determined. Given
an assumed joint distribution for unobservable taste components, ν, for the error
component determining wages, η, and for welfare stigma, ζ, one can compute a
probability that a family selects alternative j. This in turn deﬁnes a sample log
likelihood of the form
L =
P
j ∈ S
dj lnP(j | X,θ) (4.101)
where dj is an indicator for whether individual i chooses alternative j, X is a
vector of observable characteristics, and P(j|X,θ) is the probability of choos-
ing alternative j with θ the set of unknown parameters. Such formulations are
substantially less complicated than the speciﬁcations considered above because
one avoids the intricate process of calculating thresholds and dealing with com-
bined continuous-discrete endogenous variables; only discrete choices are allowed
for here.
This formulation requires each individual to be placed into a limited set of
preassigned work states, even though observed hours worked take many more val-
ues, making hours look as if they were continuously distributed. To overcome this
74issue, analyses applying this approach necessarily introduce measurement error
in hours of work to admit hours to deviate from the discrete values assumed for
the choice set. Hence, conditional on ν,e a c ha l t e r n a t i v ej contributes some posi-
tive probability P(j|X,θ,ν) which now depends on the value of the unobservable
measurement error variables.
We illustrate this approach by considering the linear measurement error model
given by (4.16) where the reporting error ε ∼ ϕε,w i t hε and ν independent. Fur-
ther, as typically assumed, we specify that hours are not subject to measurement
error in no-work states. The likelihood function for hours now takes the form
L =
Ã
P
j ∈ S0
dj lnP(j|X,θ)
!1−δE Ã
P
j ∈ S1
dj ln(ϕε(H − hj) P(j|X,θ))
!δE
(4.102)
where δE denotes a 0/1 variable with 1 indicating that the individual works, S0
designates the set of all states associated with the individual not working, the set
S1 includes all states in which the individual works, and hj denotes the admissible
values of true hours. Earnings depend on the values of hj and wages. In (4.102),
observed hours (H) are continuously distributed among workers.
5. Family Labor Supply
The study of family labor supply is motivated by a need to understand how
a couple responds to tax and welfare beneﬁt incentives when the beneﬁtr u l e s
create links in the incentive structure as well as the need to understand how
welfare is distributed within the household, so as to design the targeting of beneﬁts
appropriately. Indeed the structure of family labour supply has changed quite
substantially and this may be partly due to changes in the beneﬁts t r u c t u r ea s
well as a re sult of changes in relative wages. For example, in the UK there has
been a large increase in the participation rate of married women and a decrease
in the participation of men. These changes have been accompanied by an increase
in the number of families where no one works. This is perhaps predictable given
the structure of the beneﬁt system. However the design of income maintenance
programs that target the right households and oﬀer the right incentive system is
of course important and crucially relies our knowing the way that family labor
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The basic family labor supply model for a married couple is the unitary model
where the household is seen as maximizing one (household) utility function whose
arguments are male and female labor supply and consumption. Applying demand
analysis one can derive the implications of changes in wages and unearned income
on behavior. Since taxes can be viewed as changes in wages and unearned income,
such models can be used to simulate the labor market eﬀects of changes in the tax
system or welfare beneﬁts. However in this model intra-household distribution
has little meaning and of course the model has nothing to say about this. In
addition it is unclear how the household utility function can come about from the
interaction of two individuals with incentives that are not necessarily perfectly
aligned. This has led to the recognition that even when dealing with households
we need to account for individuals within households and we need to model the
way they share resources. This leads to potentially richer models of behavior that
are capable of explaining much more than the standard household model.
In the sections that follow we outline the two models and some of their impli-
cations in greater detail.
5.1. The Standard ‘Unitary’ Family Labor Supply Model
Consider the family labor supply and consumption problem
maxU(c,h1,h 2,x)
st c = y + w1h1 + w2h2
where U is a strictly quasiconcave function of consumption C and the two labor
supplies hi. The budget constraint equates household consumption to total income,
consisting of unearned income (y)a n dt h et w oe a r n i n g s( wihi), T being total
time available for market work and wi the two wages. In addition to the budget
constraint, leisure cannot exceed T and hence labor supply must be positive or
zero (hi). This is a standard demand analysis problem with the complication that
there may be corner solutions and wages being individual speciﬁca r en o to b s e r v e d
when the individual is working.
The ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution simply state that the marginal
rate of substitution between the two leisures will equal the ratio of wages
76Uh1
Uh2
= w1
w2 (5.1)
An implication of this model is that behavior is neutral to within household
lump sum redistributions of income. Thus paying a beneﬁtt ot h em a l eo rt h e
female will have exactly the same eﬀect, so long as it does not distort wages. This
is often termed the income pooling hypothesis and we revisit the issue when we
discuss the collective model. Here it suﬃces to note that the symmetry condition
and the income pooling hypothesis are properties of the unitary model and may
not be satisﬁed in the collective one.
5.1.1. Nonparticipation
In this subsection we show how to deal with non-participation and missing
wages in the family labour context. The issues are very similar to those already
discussed in the single person labour supply model.
The ﬁrst issue to be addressed is allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the
parameters of the utility function. Typically this can be addressed in a number
of ways. One way would be to assume that the marginal rate of substitution for
each of the two leisures with consumption included a multiplicative error term (see
Heckman, 1974 for example). In this case we could write the ﬁrst order conditions
as
log
³
−
Uh1
UC
´
=l o g( w1)+ε1
log
³
−
Uh2
UC
´
=l o g( w2)+ε2
(5.2)
We can also assume a (bivariate) density for the wage rates, say f(w1,w 2|z) where
z are the observable characteristics that drive wages and ε1 and ε2 will be taken
to be independent of them. Typically one would assume a distribution function
for ε =[ ε1, ε2]0, for example N(0,Ω).
The functions 5.2 together with the distributional assumption for the unob-
served heterogeneity deﬁne the distribution of hours of work. Hence the likelihood
contribution for a couple where both are participating is simply the joint density
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 (h1,h 2,w 1,w 2)=
| J | g
³
log
³
−
Uh1
UC
´
− log(w1),log
³
Uh2
UC
´
− log(w2)|w1,w 2,x
´
× f(w1,w 2|z)
J = ∂ε
∂h0 [Jacobian]
where x are observables aﬀecting individual preferences and h =[ h1 h2]0.W h e n
one or both partners are not working, hours of work are censored and the respective
wage is unobserved. Take as an example the case where one of the two is not
working (say 1). In this case note that ε1 < log
³
−
Uh1
UC
´
− log(w1), where −
Uh1
UC
is the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at hours h1 =0 . The likelihood
contribution must be written taking this censoring into account. We will write
this in terms of the joint density of hours and wages given above. Thus the
likelihood contribution for this case is
 (h1 =0 ,h 2,w 1,w 2)=
R
w1
R
h1≤0  (h1,h 2,w 1,w 2)dh1dw1
The integration with respect to the wage takes place over the entire range of
wages. The contributions to the likelihood for the case of the other partner not
working or both not working can similarly be derived. The sample likelihood
is then the product of all contributions. In a similar fashion one can construct
the likelihood contribution for the case where neither member of the household is
working. The sample likelihood is then the product of the contributions for each
observation. This is th basic likelihood structure. We next discuss issues relating
to introducing taxation in this framework.
5.2. Discrete Hours of Work and Program Participation
It is straightforward to allow for proportionate taxes, or even piece-wise linear
taxes, so long as these lead to a budget constraint that is convex and so long as
the endogeneity of the tax rate is taken into account. However, most welfare
programs are designed is such a way that they deﬁne a non-convex budget set:
Implicit marginal tax rates are higher at low hours of work, where increases in
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individual pays the usual taxes. As we showed earlier, this is a complex problem
itself and in the family labor supply context even more so because the beneﬁts
may be interdependent.
To simplify the problem it has now become almost standard to discretize hours
of work. Then the problem of utility maximization becomes one of choosing
packages of consumption and earnings - consumption is deﬁned by the earnings
of the individual, the tax system and the beneﬁt system. Within this context
we can also account for ﬁxed costs of work (another non-convexity) and for the
decision to participate (or not) in a welfare program. (Hoynes (1996) and Keane
and Moﬃtt (1998))
We start with a utility function deﬁned over hours of work H1 and H2 and we
discretize the distribution of hours. For example hours can take the discrete values
H ={0,20,40}. Suppose we write family utility at hours H1 = hi,H 2 = hj where
hi and hj are the ith and jth point of the discrete hours distribution respectively.
Uhihj = U(H1 = hi,H 2 = hj,c,ε) − ηPB + uhihj
where PB is a 0-1 program participation dummy. The term ηPB reﬂects the
utility costs of program participation such as “stigma”. This may be randomly
distributed over the population. The term ε reﬂects unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences and the term uhihj hours speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. Given the
associated wage the discrete hours imply a corresponding set of earnings for each
individual.
The budget constraint incorporates all relevant aspects of the tax and beneﬁt
system to deﬁne the resulting level of consumption.
c = w1H1 + w2H2 + y − T(y,w1H1,w 2H2)+B(y,w1H1,w 2H2)PB
where
T -t a x f u n c t i o n
B -p r o g r a m b e n e ﬁtf u n c t i o n
The likelihood is derived taking into account program participation. First note
that the observation on whether an individual is participating in welfare programs
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also that for any given η the utility function and the budget constraint deﬁne
whether the person will be a participant or not. At each observation we can
derive the probability that the chosen point pr(Uhihj >U hkhs,∀ k 6= ia n ds6=
j|w1,w 2,η,ε) is optimal, conditional on η and the heterogeneity terms ε. If the
person is eligible for a welfare program at the observed point and he does actually
participate (i.e. receives beneﬁts) then the range in which η lies is deﬁned by the
fact that the utility gain from participating is higher than the cost η. For the non-
participants η lies in the complement of this set. This allows us to integrate out
η over the relevant range. When the person is ineligible at the observed point no
information is available for η and we integrate over its entire range. In this case as
we move over diﬀerent values of η the probabilities change not only because of the
direct eﬀect of η through the utility function but also because it induces diﬀerent
potential participation decisions at each discrete hours points, thus changing both
optimal hours and consumption. Thus consider the likelihood contribution for a
couple where both work and participate in a welfare program - (in work beneﬁts).
This will take the form
nR
η Q
R
ε pr(Uhihj >U hkhs,∀k 6= ia n ds6= j|w1,w 2,η,ε)dεdη
o
f(w1,w 2|z)
where Q is the set of η such that program participation is optimal at the point of
observation. The form of the probability is deﬁned by uhihj. Imposing a logistic is
not restrictive if we allow for unobserved heterogeneity through the ε (Manski and
McFadden, 1981). The contribution to the likelihood for a non-worker must also
t a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ef a c tt h a tt h ew a g ew i l ln o tb eo b s e r v e di nt h a tc a s e .T h i s
is done as before by integrating over all possible wages. Of course the practical
diﬃculty is that the probability of participation is a complicated function of the
wage rate through the formulae of the tax and welfare beneﬁts y s t e m .
The models estimated in this way have the great attraction that they allow us
to simulate policies allowing for possible changes in the take-up of means tested
beneﬁts. To the extent that there is suﬃcient genuine exogenous variation in the
data allowing us to identify the factors that determine take up these can be very
useful for the ex ante evaluation of welfare policies.
805.3. Collective Models of Family Labor Supply
The family labour supply model presented above treats the household as a
single optimising decision unit, and has nothing to say about within household
allocations. It also imposes stronger restrictions than necessary, such as symmetry.
An alternative approach, the Collective model, looks upon the household as a set
of individuals with their own preferences, whoa have to decide how to share the
overall set of resources available to them. Within this framework we can have
private goods (enjoyed by the members separately), public goods and household
production. The main empirical issue is that of identiﬁcation: What can we
learn about individual preferences and the sharing rule when we observe aggregate
household consumption. This has led to a number of important theoretical results
by Chiappori (1988, 1992) recently extended by Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and
Meghir (2006) to allow for corner solutions and to discuss identiﬁcation in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
The framework we describe here is the collective model with two household
members and no public goods or household production.25 Each member supplies
labor hi (i = m,f) and consumes a private good (Ci). A critical assumption in
the collective approach as introduced by Chiappori is that the household only
takes Pareto-eﬃcient decisions. That is, for any set of male and female wages and
unearned income (wf,w m,y), there exist some level of male utility ¯ um(wf,w m,y)
such that labor supply and consumption for each household member (hi,Ci) is a
solution to the program :
max
hf,hm,Cf,Cm U
f [1 − h
f,C
f] (5.3)
U
m[1 − h
m,C
m] ≥ ¯ u
m(wf,w m,y)
C = wf.h
f + wm.h
m + y
0 ≤ h
i ≤ 1,i = m,f
where the labor supply has been normalized to lie between 0 and 1. The function
¯ um(wf,w m,y) deﬁnes the level of utility that member m can command when the
25Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) further extend the model to discuss identiﬁcation
conditions with public goods.
81relevant exogenous variables take the values wf,w m,y.Underlying the determina-
tion of ¯ um is some allocation mechanism (such as a bargaining model) that leads
to Pareto eﬃcient allocations. The nice thing about the collective approach is that
there is no need to be explicit about such a mechanism; identiﬁcation does not
rely on speciﬁc assumptions about the precise way that couples share resources.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tp r e f e r e n c e sa r es u c ht h a tt h e r ea r en e v e ra n yc o r n e rs o l u -
tions. It is assumed that we observe aggregate household consumption C = Cm+
Cf and that we know the locus of labor supplies as a function of (wf,w m,y).Then
Chiappori (1988) proves the following:
Proposition 5.1. (Chiappori 1988) Assume that hm and hf are twice diﬀeren-
tiable functions of wages and non labor income. Generically, the observation of
hm and hf allows to recover individual preferences and individual consumptions
of the private good up to an additive constant.
There are two critical issues to be resolved following this proposition: One is
what happens with corner solutions and with discrete labor supply. The other is
what happens with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, i.e. when we do not
know the exact loci hm and hf.
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2006) set up a framework where the
male decision is discrete (work or not) and the female is continuous - however she
can choose not to work. The framework underlying the proposition above exploits
the fact that the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and labor
supply for each agent will be equalized within the household, under eﬃciency.
This result cannot help when one of the labor supplies is discrete. Deﬁne the
participation frontier to be the set of male and female wages and unearned income
y so that member m is indiﬀerent between working and on working. Blundell et
al (2006) then exploit the following implication of eﬃciency:
Deﬁnition and Lemma DI (double indiﬀerence): The participation fron-
tier L is such that member m is indiﬀerent between participating or not. Pareto
eﬃciency then implies that f is indiﬀerent as well about whether m participates
or not.
Technically, this amounts to assuming that in the program above, ¯ um is a
continuous function of both wages and non labor income. This will imply that
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not working. This continuity assumption restricts the set of possible behavior and
plays a key role for identiﬁcation. We will not go through the technical details,
all of which are available in the paper referenced above. However, identiﬁcation
of preferences and the consumption sharing rule (up to an additive constant)
follows from the assumption that all goods are private (no public goods and no
household production) as well as from the assumption above. Blundell, Chiappori
and Meghir (2005) discuss results in the presence of public goods. The essence of
the results there is that full identiﬁcation of preferences over private and public
goods and the sharing rule follows when preferences over private consumption and
labor supply are weakly separable from the public good. In any case it is shown
that some aspects of the public good must be observable.
T h en e x ti m p o r t a n to b s t a c l ef o ri d e n t i ﬁcation here is unobserved heterogene-
i t y .T h er e s u l t so u t l i n e da b o v er e l a t et ot h ec a s ew h e r ew ek n o wt h el o c u so ft h e
observable endogenous variables (labor supplies, the public good etc.) as functions
of wages and unearned income. However for empirical purposes we need to estab-
lish identiﬁcation in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. This
is generally complicated by the fact that any unobserved components aﬀecting in-
dividual preferences are likely to aﬀect the sharing rule. Since this can take any
form (more or less) we may well end up with error terms that are non-separable,
which of course may lead to lack of identiﬁcation in general. Identiﬁcation prob-
lems are compounded by the speciﬁc context of labor supply where wages are only
observed for workers. Blundell et al. (2006) have established identiﬁcation in the
special case where the labor supplies and the sharing rule are linear in log wages
and all have additive unobservables. Even in this case the proof is not trivial
because they do not rely on distributional assumptions. One conclusion of this
s t u d yi st h a ti d e n t i ﬁcation in more complex preference structures will have to be
established on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, the dividends of such an exer-
cise are probably very high. Blundell et al (2006) reject the unitary model, while
the collective model is not rejected and gives interesting insights into the way
that resources are split up within the household. Further empirical work needs
to include public goods and household production. This will allow an extension
of this analysis to households with children. Finally, this framework needs to be
extended to deal explicitly with the issues of taxation and means tested beneﬁts,
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6. Intertemporal Models of labor Supply
The models discussed up to now focused on the work decision within a period.
The lifecycle and dynamic issues have not been addressed. However, studying
dynamics is of critical importance because of the numerous intertemporal depen-
dencies in labor supply their implications and for the design of policy.
The most obvious intertemporal dependence comes through borrowing and
saving. In this framework the credit market is used to shift labor income across
periods of the life-cycle so that labor supply can be concentrated in periods when
the relative beneﬁt of supplying labor is highest or costs are lowest. This allows a
reduction in labor supply during college, during childbirth and during retirement
while consumption can be maintained at a level consistent with expectations and
overall uncertainty. An additional reason for changes in labor supply over the
life-cycle is the precautionary motive, which implies more labor supply when one
is young and less when one is older and some of the uncertainty has been resolved
(Low 1999)
However, intertemporal dependence may be more direct. Labor supply prefer-
ences may depend on past actions (habit formation); current work may improve
future wages through learning by doing; current work may increase a future pen-
sion entitlement. Since a rational individual will take into account the impact of
current actions on future budgets or preferences, the standard static labor sup-
ply model does not tell the complete story and may in fact be misleading. With
intertemporal dependencies the individual may ﬁnd it rational to work in circum-
stances where the static model would exclude such a possibility. For example, it
may still be worth working when welfare beneﬁts are reduced one for one with
earnings, because work oﬀers future returns in the form of higher wages.
The recent intertemporal labor supply literature has developed along two lines.
This is reﬂected in these two intertemporal aspects on labor supply - through credit
markets and saving, and through intertemporal non-separabilities. In the former
case applications exploit the continuity of consumption and saving to derive Euler
equation conditions for intertemporal labor supply. In the later case the focus is
more on participation and intertemporal nonseprabilities, largely ignoring savings
84decisions.
This classiﬁcation of approaches is necessarily too restrictive. There are in-
tertemporal substitution applications that allow nonseparability over time, but
these are few and typically do not account for ﬁxed costs and nonparticipation.
Also there are examples of dynamic programing models that account for savings
decisions but to date these have been quite rare and based on very speciﬁca s -
sumptions concerning preferences and markets.
This section presents dynamic models of labor supply and consumption and
discusses their estimation. We start by presenting the standard dynamic frame-
work, followed by the empirical models of MaCurdy (1981) and Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980). We then discuss issues to do with intertemporal non-separability,
unobserved heterogeneity in the context of incomplete insurance markets. We con-
clude with the presentation of a framework in which all these aspects are taken
into account in a theoretically coherent fashion.
6.1. Intertemporal Labor Supply with Saving
As we have mentioned in section 2, the ‘static’ labor supply model can be
made consistent with an additively separable life cycle model under uncertainty
using the two-stage budgeting framework. However, this does not recover all of
the parameters necessary for intertemporal analysis and for that we need to look
directly at the ﬁrst order conditions for intertemporal optimization. Before moving
to consider the problems of unobserved heterogeneity in the context of uncertainty
and with the possibility of corner solutions we consider a simpler model.
Using the framework of Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981)
we discuss estimation of lifecycle labor supply models in a complete markets set-
ting, i.e. with no uninsurable uncertainty and no aggregate shocks. We start by
expositing the case of no corner solutions, where all individuals work. We then al-
low for non-participation. Next we introduce uncertainty, ﬁrst by considering the
no corners case and later allowing for corners as well. Finally we discuss the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity in models with uncertainty and corner solutions and
present an estimation framework based on the complete dynamic programming
characterisation of the problem..
856.1.1. The Life-Cycle Model
Before discussing the identiﬁcation and estimation issues in the dynamic mod-
els of labor supply and consumption we present the standard life-cycle model.
The individual maximizes expected life-time utility subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. We assume that future wage rates, prices and interest rates are
uncertain and that labor market risk is uninsurable. Deﬁne At to be the assets,
denominated in the same units as consumption. Letting it denote the nominal
interest rate and pt the price level, we deﬁne the real rate of return on assets to
be 1+rt =
pt
pt+1(1 + it). Thus rt is to be taken as uncertain in period t. The real
wage rate is denoted by wt.
Denote by Et the expectations operator with respect to the distribution of
uncertain future variables conditional on information in period t. These include
interest rates, wages, the price level, possible preference shocks and other vari-
ables which aﬀect choices either through their impact on expectations or directly.
Denote the collection of such state variables by St. The state variables contain all
the information that is needed to summarize the individual’s position at any point
in time. Thus, conditional on the state variables the past otherwise is irrelevant.
We can also think of the taste shifter variables z1t and z2t as being uncertain in
future periods, in which case expectations are taken with respect to their distri-
bution as well. We abstract from issues relating to uncertain date of death and
the presence or absence of perfect annuity markets. Hence we take the personal
discount factor β to be constant over time as a simplifying assumption.
We can write the intertemporal optimization problem as
V0 =m a x
ht,ct
(
E0
T X
t=0
β
tψ[U(ct,h t|z1t),z 2t] |
T X
t=0
1
Qt
s=0(1 + rs)
(ct − wtht) ≥ 0
)
where the second part in the expression is the intertemporal budget constraint.
The way it is written implies that the individual can borrow and lend freely at a
market rate of interest rt.
The additive structure of this problem is viewed from the perspective of period
0. However, since there exists uninsurable uncertainty the individual will replan
in each period as news arrives. In this context and since the problem is recursive
86(trivially since it is additive over time) it is more convenient to use the Bellman
equation formulation
Vt(At|St)=maxht,ct {ψ[U(ct,h t|z1t),z 2t]+EtβVt+1(At+1|St+1)} (6.1)
where Vt(At|St) is the optimum value function given information up to period t
and St are relevant state variables which help predict future uncertain income,
interest rates and characteristics.
In the absence of credit market restrictions the intertemporal budget constraint
implies that
At+1 =( 1+rt)(At + wtht − ct)
with the terminal value of assets ﬁxed at some value (say zero).26 This implies
that the revenues and expenditures need to balance over the entire lifecycle but
not necessarily at any point in time.
The ﬁrst order conditions for labor supply and consumption can be written as
−u0
h ≥ λtwt ht ≥ 0
u0
c ≥ λt ct ≥ 0
Usually an Inada condition is imposed which ensures that optimal consumption
will always be strictly positive. However, optimal labor supply may be zero which
leads to a corner solution.
For individuals with an interior solution the optimal allocation between con-
sumption and hours of work within a period, equates the marginal rate of substi-
tution to the real wage rate. The important point is that even in this dynamic
context the marginal rate if substitution is the ratio of within period marginal
utilities. Thus consumption and labor supply satisfy
∩
u0
h
u0
c
= wt (6.2)
where u0
x is the marginal utility of x. T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n tt on o t ei st h a tt h ew i t h i n
period marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours of work does
26We abstract from issues relating to portfolio choices and rt is the return to the market
portfolio.
87not depend directly on any expectations about the future, nor does it depend
on interest rates. Crucially, it does not depend on the monotonic transformation
of the utility function ψ. This is important because it implies that in general we
can not estimate the parameters governing intertemporal allocations just by using
within period ones. Condition 6.2 is the basis of the life-cycle consistent ‘static’
labor supply model of the earlier sections.
We can apply the envelope condition for assets on (6.1) to characterise the link
between decisions over time . This gives
V
0
t = Et
©
β(1 + rt)V
0
t+1
ª
Since the ﬁrst order conditions also imply that
ψ
0
tU
0
ct = Et
©
β(1 + rt)V
0
t+1
ª
and
ψ
0
tU
0
ht = −Et
©
β(1 + rt)wtV
0
t+1
ª
we can characterize the intertemporal rates of substitution for consumption and
hours of work for interior solutions as
ψ
0
tU
0
ct = Et
©
β(1 + rt)ψ
0
t+1U
0
ct+1
ª
(6.3)
ψ
0
tU
0
ht = Et
½
β(1 + rt)
wt
wt+1
ψ
0
t+1U
0
ht+1
¾
(6.4)
The object of the exercise is to estimate the parameters of ψ[U(ct,h t|z1),z 2]
from observations of consumption and labor supply over time. It turns out that
we need to use two of the three conditions (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4). At this point note
that the variables in z1 aﬀect both the within period marginal rate of substitution
and intertemporal allocations. The z2 variables only aﬀect directly intertemporal
allocations because they cancel out of the monotonic transformation. Of course
they do aﬀect within period allocations indirectly and in a full solution the con-
sumption and labor supply functions will depend on all variables aﬀecting tastes,
expectations and the budget.
886.1.2. A simpliﬁcation: A model with full participation
Before complicating the matters with non-participation we consider the esti-
mation problem in a simpler model presented by MaCurdy (1981) where every-
body works. The utility speciﬁcation he used does not allow for corner solutions
and takes the form
Ut = BtC
γ
t − AtH
α 0 <γ<1,α > 1 (6.5)
where Ht corresponds to hours of work (rather than leisure) and Ct to consump-
tion. The range of parameters ensures positive marginal utility of consumption,
negative marginal utility of hours of work and concavity in both arguments. Ap-
plying exactly the same analysis as above the implied intertemporal Frisch labor
supply becomes
logHt = A
∗
t +l o gλ +
1
α − 1
lnwt +
ρ − r
α − 1
t (6.6)
where the use of log hours of work presumes that all individuals work and hence
H>0. In (6.6) λ is the shadow value of the lifetime budget constraint and t
is the age of the individual. Finally A∗
t reﬂects preferences and is deﬁned by
A∗
t = − 1
α−1 logAt.
This equation is the Frisch labor supply equation. The important insight is
that under certainty (complete markets - no aggregate shocks) all relevant future
variables, such as wages are summarized by the ﬁxed eﬀect λ.S o t h i s e q u a t i o n
has a simple message: Hours of work are higher at the points of the lifecycle when
wages are high ( 1
α−1 > 0). Moreover if the personal discount rate is lower than
the interest rate, hours of work decline over the lifecycle. Finally, hours of work
will vary over the life-cycle with A∗
t, which could be a function of demographic
composition or other taste shifter variables.
Specifying A∗
t = γ0xt +η1 +ut we obtain an econometric equation of the form
logHt = γ
0xt +
1
α − 1
lnwt +
ρ − r
α − 1
t +
∙
1
α − 1
logλ + η1
¸
+ ut (6.7)
where
£
1
α−1 logλ + η1
¤
is a ﬁxed unobservable individual eﬀect consisting of the
marginal utility of wealth and of a permanent unobserved preference component.
89ut is an idiosyncratic shock to individual preference. For simplicity we take this
as serially uncorrelated.
As it is, this equation presents a problem for estimation to the extent that
the ﬁxed unobservable eﬀect (or the idiosyncratic shock ut) is correlated with
the hourly wage rate wt. Because λ is a function of all wages over the life-cycle
and because wages are highly persistent it is not tenable to assume that the ﬁxed
unobservable is not correlated with wages. The simplest case here is to assume that
all right hand side variables, including wages are strictly exogenous, namely that
E(ut|xs, logws∀s =1 ,...,T)=0in which case the model can be estimated using
within groups: variables are transformed into deviations from their individual
speciﬁc time-mean and OLS is applied on
] logHt = γ
0˜ xt +
1
α − 1
g lnwt +
ρ − r
α − 1
e t +˜ ut (6.8)
where ˜ zt = zt − ¯ z represents the deviation of an individual speciﬁcv a r i a b l ef r o m
the time mean for this individual. the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator (i.e. ∆zt = zt −
zt−1). This model is estimable using panel data with a relatively small number
of repeated observations for each of many individuals.27 Here Ordinary Least
Squares on the transformed model is consistent and fully eﬃcient.
This empirical strategy is sensitive to measurement error for the right hand
side variables. Suppose that log wages are measured with additive and serially
uncorrelated (classical) measurement error. In this case the strict exogeneity as-
sumption is violated and 6.7 cannot be estimated by within groups. An alternative
approach in this case would be to take ﬁrst diﬀerences, thus eliminating the ﬁxed
eﬀect and then using instrumental variables to estimate the parameters based on
the transformed equation. The instruments would have to be dated t-2 or earlier
because the error in the ﬁrst diﬀerence equation will have an MA(1) structure.
Thus, under the assumptions made, valid instruments would be hours and wages
lagged at least two periods. However, these instruments will only be valid if they
are able to explain future growth in wages (∆logwt); hence this rank condition
needs to be tested (see Steiger and Stock (1998), for example).
27FIxed T and large N asymptotics
906.1.3. The Heckman and MaCurdy Study
The MaCurdy (1981) paper set out the ﬁrst clear analysis of issues to do with
estimating intertemporal labour supply relationships. However the approach did
not deal with corner solutions, which is particularly relevant for women. The ﬁrst
attempt to do so in the context of a life-cycle model of labor supply and consump-
tion is the paper by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980). In this model women are
endowed with an explicitly additive utility function for leisure L and consumption
C in period t,o ft h ef o r m :
Ut = At
Lα
t − 1
α
+ Bt
C
γ
t − 1
γ
α,γ < 1 (6.9)
Consumers are assumed to maximise life-cycle utility
Vt =
T X
t=1
β
tUt
subject to the lifetime budget constraint
T X
t=1
1
(1 + r)t [wtht − ct] ≥ 0
where ht = L − Lt, L being maximal time available for work and where wt is the
hourly wage rate. Note that now utility depends on leisure and is well deﬁned at
t h ep o i n tw h e r eh o u r sa r ez e r os i n c et h e r eo n eo b t a i n sm a x i m u ml e i s u r e .
Optimization is assumed to take place under perfect foresight. Solving for the
ﬁrst order conditions we obtain the following equation for leisure
= A∗
t + 1
α−1lnwt +
ρ−r
a−1t + λ
∗ when the woman works
lnLt
= lnLo t h e r w i s e
(6.10)
where
λ
∗ =
1
α − 1
lnλ and A
∗
t = −
1
α − 1
lnAt (6.11)
and where we have approximated ln
1+ρ
1+r ≈ ρ − r. As before in (6.11) λ is the
shadow value of the lifetime budget constraint and t is the age of the individual
which again is a ﬁxed eﬀect because of the complete markets assumption.
91Estimation with non-participation To estimate the model, Heckman and
MaCurdy specify Bt = γ0xt+η1+u1t where u1t is normally distributed and where
η1 is a ﬁxed eﬀect reﬂecting permanent unobserved diﬀerences in tastes across
individuals.
Given λ
∗,η 1 and wages wt this gives rise to a Tobit model, with censoring
whenever the interior solution requires more hours of leisure than are available
(Lt > ¯ L).T h e r ea r et w om a i nd i ﬃculties with this however. First, hourly wage
rates are not observed for non-workers. Second, λ
∗ and η1 are unobserved and
cannot be diﬀerenced out in a conventional manner since the Tobit model is es-
sentially nonlinear. Finally, a problem addressed only indirectly before (through
the treatment of measurement error) is that of the endogeneity of wages. To solve
these problems and to take into account that wages may be endogenous we may
specify a wage equation of the form
lnwt = z
0
tβ2 + η2 + u2t
with η2 being an unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect reﬂecting permanent productivity char-
acteristics of the individual and u2t being normally distributed. Endogeneity may
arise if either the ﬁxed eﬀects in the wage and labor supply equations are corre-
lated or if the idiosyncratic components are correlated (or both). In the former
case (correlated ﬁxed eﬀects) treating the problem of ﬁxed eﬀects will also solve
the endogeneity problem. In this sense we can think of wages as being endogenous
in the case where we dealt with no corner solutions.
To proceed we can use the approach described earlier in the context of the
static labor supply models. The wage equation is substituted into the structural
labor supply equation and the conditions for an interior solution or otherwise is
given in terms of the reduced form, i.e. not conditional on the wage rate. Hence
we get
= γ0xt + 1
α−1z0
tβ2 +
ρ−r
a−1t + f + υt when
lnLt υt <l n L − (γ0xt + 1
α−1z0
tβ2 +
ρ−r
a−1t + f)
= lnLo t h e r w i s e
where f = λ
∗ + η1 + η2,υ= u1t + u2t. This gives rise to a Tobit model for
the reduced form parameters. However, two important diﬃculties need to be
92addressed. The ﬁrst relates to estimating this reduced form. The second to
recovering the structural parameters characterising labour supply.
The reduced form labour supply includes a ﬁxed eﬀect f. In a linear model
and with strict exogeneity the within groups estimator is consistent and eﬃcient.
The model here is nonlinear because of censoring. Heckman and MaCurdy (1980)
treated them as parameters to be estimated. Formally speaking, when the model
is nonlinear, this estimator is not consistent as the number of individuals N grows,
w h i l et h en u m b e ro ft i m ep e r i o d sp e ri n d i v i d u a lT remains ﬁxed. This is because
the number of (incidental) parameters grows with the sample size. In practice the
estimator is likely to work well with strictly exogenous regressors for moderate to
large T. Heckman and MaCurdy provide Monte Carlo evidence showing that in
their context the bias involved when using this approach is likely to be minimal
for moderate T. However, this is not a general result and it depends very much
on the model, the data and the number of time periods available. For example
with lagged endogenous variables the biases could be substantial. Such lagged
endogenous variables could appear in time non-separable models and in models
with incomplete insurance markets as we will see subsequently. Thus the complete
markets assumption turns out to be particularly powerful as far as identiﬁcation
is concerned.
An alternative approach is to use a semi-parametric LAD estimator introduced
by Honore (1992). This estimator, relies on symmetry of the diﬀerence of the errors
(uit−uit−1) conditional on the sum of the errors (uit+uit−1) and on the regressors,
which is weaker than the assumption of normality combined with iid errors.
We have described how the reduced form labour supply equation can be esti-
mated. This does not provide the parameters of the structural model because they
are a function of the parameters of the wage equation. The next step is to recover
the structural parameters. The diﬃculty here is that we ﬁrst need to identify the
parameters of the wage equation. This is not a simple problem because wages
are observed for workers only, who are endogenously selected. In addition both
the selection mechanism and probably the wage equation depend on ﬁxed eﬀects.
Before we discuss estimation ﬁrst we need to ensure that the parameters are iden-
tiﬁed. A necessary condition is that the wage equation includes variables that are
excluded from the structural labour supply equation. Under normality no further
restrictions are required. However, if one applies a semi-parametric estimation
93framework, that relaxes the normality assumption one also requires variables in-
cluded in the labour supply equation that are excluded from the wage equation.
One approach to completing estimation is to apply the Kyriazidou (1997) esti-
mator to the wage equation. This controls for selection allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects
in both the wage and the participation equations. Once the parameters of the
wage equation have been recovered, one can use minimum distance to back out
the parameters of the labour supply equation, which were estimated as above.
An alternative approach, and one followed by Heckman and MaCurdy is to
use maximum likelihood treating the ﬁxed eﬀects as parameters to be estimated
jointly (as discussed above). We turn to this approach now.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation The ﬁrst step is to specify the joint
distribution of hours of work and wages, conditional on the observables and the
ﬁx e du n o b s e r v e de ﬀects. This is denoted by
ghw(h,w|z,f,η)=gh(h|x,f,w)gw(w|z,η1) (6.12)
where z are the observed variables in the wage equation, which include all those in
the labor supply equation (x) and more for identiﬁcation purposes. In the above
gh(h|x,f,w) is the conditional density of hours of work given wages, x, and f and
gw(w|z,η1) is the conditional distribution of wages given z and η1. Thus the model
likelihood is bivariate with the wage equation estimated at the same time.
The likelihood has the general form
L =
Y
workers
gh(h|x,f,w)gw(w|z,η1).
Y
non−workers
Z
h<0
Z
w
gh(h|x,f,w)gw(w|z,η1)dwdh (6.13)
The ﬁrst part of the likelihood relates to workers, where both wages and hours are
jointly observed. The second part of the likelihood refers to non-workers where
a l lw ek n o wi st h a td e s i r e dh o u r sa r en e g a t i v e .H e n c ew ei n t e g r a t eo v e rh<0 and
over the entire support of the wage distribution, since for any wage rate there is
ac o n ﬁguration of unobservables that would make the person a non-participant
- being a non-worker conveys no information about wages. This likelihood can
94recover the parameters in the reduced form labor supply equation and in the wage
equation.
As mentioned above, to identify the structural parameters of labor supply and
the wage equation it is necessary to impose exclusion restrictions or some other
form of parametric restrictions. Moreover, note that any variables that are ﬁxed
cannot be used for identiﬁcation since they will be absorbed by the ﬁxed eﬀect.
Heckman and MaCurdy exclude education/age interactions and aggregate unem-
ployment from the labor supply equations and husband’s labor market behavior
from the wage equation. The former restriction eﬀectively implies that diﬀerences
in tastes across education groups vis a vis labor supply do not change with age.
Consequently any change in observed behavior across education groups at diﬀer-
e n ta g e si sa t t r i b u t e dt oe d u c a t i o ns p e c i ﬁc changes is individual productivity and
hence to wages. The business cycle indicator (the unemployment rate) serves to
identify wages for the non-workers through the aggregate price of human capi-
tal. Note however, that given the functional form assumptions the model is then
overidentiﬁed.
The Heckman and MaCurdy model presented above oﬀers a way of handling
unobserved heterogeneity and corner solutions and even allows for persistent het-
erogeneity and endogenous wages. These properties have been delivered at a cost.
Preferences between consumption and female hours are explicitly additively sepa-
rable and no uncertainty is allowed for. The explicit additivity implies that, given
consumption data, all parameters could be identiﬁed in principle using just within
period allocations. This is worrying since it implies that intertemporal allocations
are tied to the way that resources are allocated within period - an implication
that does not come from economic theory. However, this assumption is testable
since we can compare the estimates obtained from data on within period and data
on intertemporal allocations. Finally, the perfect foresight assumption which is
equivalent to complete markets with no aggregate shocks is also strong given the
available evidence.
However, easy as it may be to criticize such an approach, it turns out that it
is very hard to generalize. In what follows we discuss how the existing literature
has attempted to build on this and what are the successes and shortcomings of
these attempts. We start by describing an estimation strategy for a model of con-
sumption and labor supply with corner solutions but with no explicit treatment of
95unobserved heterogeneity. As we argue below, an explicit treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity places extensive requirements on data and an approach based on the
complete solution of the life-cycle model, rather than on Euler equations.
6.1.4. Estimating the intertemporal substitution elasticity and other
preference parameters under uncertainty
We now consider explicitly estimation in the presence of uninsurable uncer-
tainty. Estimation will be based on two marginal conditions: One deﬁnes the
within period allocations and the other the intertemporal allocation. Combining
these two conditions in a suitable way can allow us to identify all parameters while
accounting for corner solutions.
We start by characterizing within period preferences using the indirect utility
function and appealing to two-stage budgeting. The within period indirect utility
function is deﬁned by
ψ[vt(w,y)|zt]=m a x
h,c
{ψ[Ut(h,c)|zt]|ct = wth + yt} (6.14)
where the variables zt are shown explicitly to emphasize that intertemporal al-
locations will typically depend on taste shifter variables. As explained earlier in
the chapter, the variable yt reﬂects net saving or dissaving. Because ct is realized
consumption and wtht are actual earnings this amount (yt) will only equal un-
earned income (e.g. from transfers or income from investments) if there is neither
borrowing nor saving by the individual. Based on Roy’s identity it is possible to
derive the implied within period (or Marshallian) labor supply function, i.e.
h(w,y)=
∂v/∂w
∂v/∂y
(6.15)
This labor supply function is conditional on yt which reﬂects intertemporal deci-
sions.
The labor supply function originating from (6.15) can be estimated using the
methods described in earlier sections. The estimation of the within period labor
supply function allows us to estimate all the parameters characterizing within
period preferences, i.e. the function vt(w,y) in (6.14) but not the parameters of
the function ψ. The latter aﬀects intertemporal allocations only.
96Thus we now need data on intertemporal allocations to estimate the para-
meters implicit in the monotonic transformation ψ, which characterizes savings
behavior and intertemporal substitution in labor supply.
Consider again the Euler equation in an environment with uninsurable risk.
This equates the marginal utility of consumption today with the expected mar-
ginal utility of consumption tomorrow
ψ
0
tv
0
yt = Et
©
β(1 + rt)ψ
0
t+1v
0
yt+1
ª
.
The term v0
yt = ∂v
∂y is the marginal utility of money, and ψ
0
t =
∂ψ[vt(w,y)|zt]
∂vt reﬂects
the monotonic transformation of the utility function, which determines the in-
tertemporal substitution. The marginal utility of money v0
yt can be estimated at
a ﬁrst step based on observations relating to within period allocations. We de-
note the estimated quantity by ˆ v0
yt. The next step is to parameterize the function
ψ which can then be estimated using the Euler condition. To write the Euler
condition based on the indirect utility function we can use the envelope theorem
to see that U0
ct = v0
yt where U0
ct is the marginal utility of consumption which ap-
pears in the Euler condition 6.3.Based on this we can estimate the parameters
characterizing ψ
0
t using the following equation
ψ
0
tb v
0
yt = β(1 + rt)ψ
0
t+1b v
0
yt+1 + uit+1 + εit (6.16)
where εit represents the estimation error due to the fact we are replacing v0
yt with
its estimated value. Under the hypothesis of rational expectations any variable
dated t or earlier will be orthogonal to uit+1. This observation can serve as a basis
for estimation using GMM (see Hansen, 1982 and Hansen and Singleton, 1983).
Asymptotically εit will become irrelevant if the ﬁrst step estimator is consistent,
but can have serious implications in small samples.
With uninsurable uncertainty and in the presence of aggregate shocks it is
imperative to estimate 6.16 using long enough time series. The innovation to
the marginal utility of wealth uit+1 reﬂects uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and
aggregate uncertainty. As Altug and Miller (1990 and 1998) have shown, the
moment conditions do not hold in the cross section. In fact, the conditional
expectation E(uit+1|t,zit)=m(zit) where zit represents the vector of instruments.
Consequently with idiosyncratic uninsurable risk and aggregate uncertainty the
97model is not identiﬁable using methods that rely on ﬁxed T; we require methods
that rely on large T asymptotics and in practice we need long enough time series
of data that allows the aggregate shocks to average out. The suitable time series
dimension depends on the variance of such shocks, with longer series required the
higher the variance. However, we do not require to observe the same individual
for a large number of time periods; just that the data covers long T.28 Moreover,
aggregate shocks cannot be accounted for using time dummies as emphasized by
Altug and Miller (1990) unless there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Linearising the Euler equation A simpler way to go about estimation
is to loglinearise 6.16.
−∆ln ˆ v
0
iyt+1 +l o g ( 1+rt)=dit + ∆lnψ
0
t+1 + εit (6.17)
where dit = log
£
Et
©
β(1 + rt)ψ
0
t+1b v0
yt+1
ª¤
− Etlog
£
β(1 + rt)ψ
0
t+1b v0
yt+1
¤
.In the sim-
plest case where the discounted marginal utility of consumption muit+1 = β(1 +
rt)ψ
0
t+1b v0
yt+1 is a log-normal random variable dit will be proportional to its variance
conditional on information in period t, i.e. dit = Va r t {muit+1}
2. It is precisely
this point that gives rise to the identiﬁcation issue since the conditional variance
will depend on variables relevant for predicting future income or wage realiza-
tions. However, if we are willing to restrict what the conditional variance depends
on (and hence the stochastic process governing wages), this linearization oﬀers a
great simpliﬁcation and often makes it easier to deal with measurement error in
the underlying variables forming the marginal utility. Under non-normality dit
will also depend on higher order moments of the marginal utility of consumption
muit+1.
Log linearization has been widely used in the empirical analysis of consump-
tion. However, identiﬁcation in this case, requires more restrictions than those
implied by the theory. Its usage has been controversial (see Carroll, 1997 and Lud-
vigson and Paxson, 2001) precisely because the basic exclusion restrictions used
for identiﬁcation in 6.16 may no longer be valid in 6.17. Implicitly linearization
imposes restrictions on expectation formation and on the underlying process of
uncertainty. Attanasio and Low (2002) examine these issues using Monte Carlo
28Meghir and Weber (1996) discuss this point in relation to estimating Euler equations.
98analysis in a wide variety of settings and conclude that in practice linearization is
unlikely to bias the results in a serious way.
Accounting for corner solutions with no ﬁxed costs When hours
of work are at a corner solution the Euler condition 6.16 does not hold when
evaluated at market prices. However, we can use the results of Heckman (1974)
and Neary and Roberts (1980) to keep the Euler equation representation evaluated
at shadow prices. Here we assume that there are no ﬁxed costs of work and no
search frictions and consequently that participation decision is fully characterized
by the standard reservation wage condition (Heckman, 1974). In particular non-
workers have a negative desired labor supply at the market wage corresponding to
their skills, while workers have a positive desired labor supply, which is observed.
It is easy to show that the intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions still hold, so long
as we evaluate the indirect utility function at the shadow (reservation) wage wR
it
deﬁned by
h(w
R
it,y it)=0 (6.18)
Estimating the ‘static’ within period labor supply function as described in earlier
sections allows us to obtain a labor supply model that can then be solved for the
reservation wage as in 6.18. In the next step the consumption Euler equation
can be estimated using observed market wages for workers and shadow wages for
non-workers.
An Example Consider the labor supply model
hit = α(zit)+β lnwit + γ
yit
wit
(6.19)
where zit are preference shifters such as household characteristics. This corre-
sponds to a particular form of the indirect utility function presented in an earlier
section. The term y is deﬁned by y = c − wh, where w is the after tax wage and
c is total household (non-durable) consumption, and hence is endogenous. The
utility index can be computed by using the formula in 2.7. This gives the value
of ˆ νt,from which b v0
yt can be calculated. For workers the relevant wage will be the
observed wage. For non-workers the relevant wage at which to evaluate within
period utility is the reservation wage which is given by the positive solution for w
99in equation 6.19 when h =0 , for given y. T h i sh a st ob es o l v e df o rn u m e r i c a l l yi n
this example. Using the reservation wage, is equivalent to computing the direct
utility function when hours are zero. This calculation is only valid if there are no
ﬁxed costs of work.
In the next step we can specify the part of the utility function that is not re-
vealed by within period choices. This is the monotonic transformation. One simple
possibility would be to use a linear transformation; for example ψ[vt(wit,y it)|zit]=
a(zit)v(cit,h it), which would be interpretable as saying that characteristics zit
aﬀect the discount rate. A more general alternative would be to allow char-
acteristics to also aﬀect the intertemporal substitution elasticity; for example
ψ[vt(wit,y)|zit]=
a(zit)
1+ρ(zit)vit(wit,y it)1+ρ(zit), f o rs o m en e g a t i v ev a l u e df u n c t i o nρ(zit).
The fact that all or some of the characteristics z aﬀect within period allocations
does not imply that they will not also aﬀect risk aversion or the way the future is
discounted.
To obtain an example speciﬁcation let a(zit)=1and ρ(zit)= ρ0+ρ1fsit where
fsit is family size for household i in period t. Using the utility function 2.7 term
ˆ v0
yt =( 1+ˆ γ)2 w
ˆ β
ˆ β+1 w h i c hc a nb ee v a l u a t e da tt h ee s t i m a t e dp a r a m e t e r s . I nt h i s
case the Euler equation for consumption over time will take the form
ˆ v
0
iytˆ v
ρ0+ρ1fsit
it = Et
n
β(1 + rt)ˆ v
0
iyt+1ˆ v
ρ0+ρ1fsit
it+1
o
. (6.20)
This can be estimated using non-linear GMM treating the estimated marginal
utility of money ˆ v0
iyt and the within period utility index ˆ vt as known (see Hansen
(1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1983)). The fact that the expression depends
on estimated parameters does not aﬀect consistency because as the sample size
goes to inﬁnity the parameters estimated on the ﬁrst stage converge to the true
values. Inference however requires us to correct the standard errors for the fact
that we are relying on pre-estimated parameters.
The linearized version of the Euler equation here takes the form
−∆log ˆ v
0
iyt+1 − log(1 + rt)=dit +l o gβ + ρo∆log ˆ vit+1 + ρ
0
1∆logfsitˆ vit+1 + εit
which, given the assumptions implied by the log-linearisation can be estimated by
linear GMM.
100Testing for liquidity Constraints One key issue for the interpretation
of intertemporal behaviour is the extent to which individuals are liquidity con-
strained which is deﬁned as being able to borrow and save freely at a constant
interest rate. It has been observed from very early on that consumption seems
to track income, which is a fact often cited as evidence for liquidity constraints.
However, this phenomenon can be explained within the model we have presented.
First, Heckman (1974) has argued that such income tracking can be induced
by non-separabilty of consumption and labor supply: If consumption and leisure
are strong enough substitutes, higher amounts of consumption will be related to
higher levels of labor supply and hence higher income.
Second, family size and demographics, which aﬀect consumption and labor
supply allocations, evolve very much alongside income over the life-cycle, with
family size growing when income grows most and declining when income declines
(probably endogenously see Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994). By allowing
f o rt h i si no u rm o d e lw eh a v ee ﬀectively accounted for another reason for tracking.
Finally, the evolution of the conditional variance of the marginal utility dit
also leads to consumption growth. This variance is likely to decline over the
lifecycle as uncertainty is revealed. This is particularly true if shocks to wages
are permanent or highly persistent. Thus a high dit when young and a lower dit
when old will imply rapid consumption growth early on declining later, much like
the evolution of income over the lifecycle (Carroll and Samwick (1998), Attanasio,
Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999)
The empirical challenge is to ﬁnd sources of predictable income growth not
already included in the model to account for preferences (e.g. non-separability)
and to test the hypothesis that they do not aﬀect consumption growth. Browning
and Collado (2001) use the powerful idea of predictable changes in income due
to pre-announced and regular seasonal bonuses in Spain and establish that con-
sumption growth is not sensitive to these totally predictable changes in income.
H o w e v e rw ea r en o ta l w a y sa sf o r t u n a t ea st h a ta n dw en e e dt ou s eo t h e rp e r h a p s
less compelling sources of predictable growth. One possibility is to include labor
income growth. This is a useful source of variation for two reasons: Conditional
on the wage rate labor income would have variability because hours of work may
change in a predictable way for other exogenous reasons. Second hours should
not enter the Euler equation once we also include wages. Nevertheless it is still
101an issue of what the exogenous source of hours would be that has not to do with
preferences or changes in wages. Another possibility is to use predictable changes
in other income. The problem is that income from investments etc. are likely to
be positive only for the wealthier individuals who are unlikely to want to borrow
anyway.
Tests of liquidity constraints ﬁnd no evidence of their importance once non-
separabilities and demographics are allowed for. This should not be interpreted
as saying that anyone can borrow any amount they wish at a ﬁxed rate; after all
the lack of complete markets is now generally accepted with moral hazard as its
most probable source. However it may well mean that the lack of perfect credit
markets is not important because individuals do not wish to borrow much against
future income growth anyway when they would most need it (i.e. when young)
because of uncertainty.
6.2. Further Issues in the Speciﬁcation and Estimation of Dynamic
Models of labor Supply and Consumption
The model we have presented up to now in the context of intertemporal
optimisation lacks a number of potentially important features. These include un-
observed preference heterogeneity, ﬁxed costs of work and non-separability over
time. We now discuss these issues in turn and we complete our chapter by pre-
senting the estimation of a model containing potentially all these features.
6.2.1. Unobserved heterogeneity
Allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity seems like a natural step
in constructing realistic models. Thus for example, both MaCurdy (1981) and
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) recognise this and include ﬁxed eﬀects in their
models. They recognise that preference heterogeneity could be persistent and
may well be correlated with wages. The question is how to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in a model without complete markets. The key diﬃculty stems from
t h ef a c tt h a ti ti sn o tpo s s i b l et os pe c i f yam od e lw h e r ebo t ht h eE u l e re q u a t i o na n d
the within period condition have additive errors without restricting the structure
of intertemporal preferences. Inevitably a model with unrestricted intertemporal
preferences and unobserved heterogeneity will be non-separable in unobservables.
102Standard orthogonality conditions do not suﬃce for identiﬁcation in this case.
In the HM study the errors are eﬀectively non-separable because of the corner
solutions. However, the complete markets assumption meant that a ﬁxed eﬀects
Tobit estimator worked well even with moderate T.
There is a developing literature on the identiﬁcation and estimation of mod-
els with nonseparable errors and endogenous regressors (e.g. Florens, Heckman,
Meghir and Vytlacil, 2006, Imbens and Newey 2003, Blundell and Powell, 2003),
which provide alternative identifying conditions in this case. Even if one is to
impose these stronger assumptions there remains the problem of ﬁnding suitable
instruments, which are an ingredient of all such methods. The problem is particu-
larly acute if unobserved heterogeneity is serially correlated , since the instruments
are likely to be predetermined decisions. These diﬃculties will lead us to an esti-
mation method based on a complete solution of the dynamic programming model.
6.2.2. Estimating the intertemporal substitution model with ﬁxed costs
of work
Fixed costs of work or other non-convexities in the budget constraint pose a
very serious challenge to the empirical analysis, even within a static framework. In
this context the labor supply function is discontinuous at low hourly wage rates.
Moreover as Cogan (1981) pointed out the standard reservation wage which sets
labor supply to zero does not generate a participation condition. Generally the
participation and hours margins are explained by diﬀerent models, which could
be the result of the existence of ﬁxed costs of work or of search frictions. The
separation between the intensive and extensive margins (hours of work) requires
extra identifying assumptions.
Within an intertemporal context ﬁxed costs pose additional diﬃculties for
modelling the participation decision: This involves a comparison between the
lifecycle utility of work and non-work, which requires solving the life-cycle model
conditional on the person working and conditional on the person not working.
Such a solution allows one to evaluate the current and future welfare consequences
of the two decisions.
In the presence of ﬁxed costs we can follow two empirical strategies. The ﬁrst
is a partial one and seeks to estimate the subset of parameters that are identiﬁable
103if one keeps labor supply behaviour ﬁxed. As such it cannot be informative for
policy questions whose answer relies on the quantiﬁcation of the complete labor
supply and consumption response. However, it oﬀers a way of testing some aspects
of the life-cycle model in a relatively general setting and may be a ﬁrst step in a
stepwise approach for identifying the complete set of preferences.
The second approach speciﬁes a complete structural model of labor supply and
participation and uses methods from dynamic discrete choice to estimate labor
supply responses. Before moving to a discussion of the full solution approach we
brieﬂy outline the conditional approach.
6.2.3. The Conditional Euler Equation for Consumption
Consider the deﬁnition of the indirect utility function within period, based
on a vector of goods qt and prices pt conditional on labor supply behavior ht
υt = ψ[v(ct|pt,h t),h t]=maxq {ψ[u(qt|ht),h t]|p
0
tqt= ct} (6.21)
We can then base the analysis of the intertemporal allocations on the utility index
υt = ψ[v(ct|pt,h t),h t]. As in the case of the joint labor supply and consumption
model presented earlier, all parameters implicit in v(ct|pt,h t) can be estimated us-
ing a conditional (on ht) within period demand system (see Browning and Meghir,
1991). This will on ht if and only if the goods q are nonseparable from ht. Under
weak separability ht will not aﬀect demands directly. However, the intertemporal
allocations can still depend on ht without this having any implications for the
structure of the within period marginal rate of substitution functions between
goods. This point has been noted now in several papers, all of which have demon-
strated its empirical importance.29
The estimation approach is broadly similar to the one described above so we
do not go over it again in detail. Once the within period demand system char-
acterizing the conditional choice of qt has been estimated, we can construct the
utility index v(ct|pt,h t). The Euler equation for ct can then be used to estimate
the parameters of the function ψ up to an explicitly additive function of ht. In
29Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1996) and Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994), Meghir and
Weber (1996) all strongly reject the hypothesis that intertemporal allocations do not depend
directly on observed labour supply.
104general, the Euler equation as well as the demand system will be a function of h.
This can include both hours of work as a continuous variable and indicators of
whether the person is working or not, or other functions of h that are considered
relevant. The crucial point to recognize however, is that labor supply is endoge-
nous both for within period and for intertemporal allocations. Thus estimation
requires suitable instruments. One possibility is to use lags in labor supply for
this purpose. In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity the approach is valid.
However, if persistent preference shocks have been ignored this approach could
lead to inconsistent parameter estimates.
The conditional Euler equation for consumption provides a very powerful ve-
hicle for testing the lifecycle model in relation to consumption behavior and for
estimating some of the parameters in a way that is robust to the speciﬁcm o d e lo f
labour supply. In principle, hours of work can be determined in a number of ways,
which we do not have to specify, subject to the proviso that we can specify instru-
ments that can “predict” labour supply. However, from a policy perspective, the
conditional Euler equation for consumption is of limited interest because it does
not provide the full set of parameters required to answer even a simple partial
equilibrium question. Thus a complete analysis of intertemporal labor supply and
consumption needs to address directly estimation of a model for the determination
of hours of work.
6.2.4. Intertemporal non-separability
A ﬁnal issue is whether preferences should be taken as separable over time.
It is well documented that labor supply behaviour is very persistent which may
be interpreted as being due to non-separability, although the source of persistence
could well be unobserved heterogeneity. Another source of non-separability can
be the structure of the intertemporal budget constraint since current behaviour
may aﬀect eligibility for welfare programs. Finally, if wages depend on past work
experience, current work aﬀects future earning prospects, which also leads to
intertemporal non-separability. These issues are considered in the next section.
1056.3. Dynamic Discrete Choice Models and Intertemporal Non-Separability
To address many of the issues presented above in a coherent and uniﬁed way
we need to consider a complete model of lifecycle labor supply and consumption.
This can be very complex and demanding on data. Thus in our presentation we
start with a simpliﬁed model along these lines which ignores the savings decision
but oﬀe r saw a yf o r w a r do nt h ei s s u eo fﬁxed costs and non-separability. We
subsequently build on this to present a more complete model that includes savings.
One of the ﬁrst attempts to model the dynamics of participation decisions
when choices are discrete is given by Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). Their model
concerns the labor supply of women. Husband’s income is taken as exogenous.
The within period utility function, which is non-separable in consumption ct and
participation pt takes the form
Ut = ct + a1pt + a2ctpt + a3ptKt−1 + Σ
J
j=1a4jNtjpt + a5ptS (6.22)
where Kt−1 is the number of periods worked in the past; depending on the sign
of a3 this may turn out to reinforce work habits or not. The law of motion of
Kt is simply Kt = Kt−1 + pt. Finally, S represents years of schooling and Ntj
represents the number of children in age group j. This utility function in itself
gives rise to intertemporal dependencies since current participation aﬀects future
preferences and a forward looking individual will take this into account when
making participation decisions. Further dynamics are induced by the budget
constraint. This takes the form
y
w
t pt + y
h
t = ct + Σ
J
j=1κjNtjpt + bpt (6.23)
where κj are costs relating to children in the jth age group and b is a ﬁxed cost
of work and yh
t is husbands income, which is taken to be an exogenous stochastic
process, aﬀecting female utility only through total resources. The female wage
yw
t , depends on past work decisions
lny
w
t = β1 + β2Kt−1 + β3K
2
t−1 + β4S + εt (6.24)
where εt is an independently and identically distributed normal shock to wages.
Hence the implied dynamics in this model are quite intricate: Past work deci-
sions produce human capital and enhance earnings potential. This should lead to
106increases in participation. On the other hand, past work decisions change prefer-
ences, either dampening down or reinforcing the eﬀects due to enhanced human
capital.
At this stage the only source of stochastic variation is the iid shock to wages
εt.This formulation has the undesirable feature that the minimum observed wage
is a consistent estimator for the reservation wage; this is because preferences are
homogeneous in the population. To overcome this problem Eckstein and Wolpin
allow observed wages to be measured with error, which turns out to be particularly
important empirically. Thus observed wages satisfy
lny
w∗
t = lny
w
t + ut (6.25)
Eckstein and Wolpin assume that ut is normally distributed.
In such dynamic discrete choice models estimation is complicated by the fact
that participation in this period confers beneﬁt/costs in future period. Thus
the future impact of current choices needs to be computed explicitly in order to
compute the probability of participation. Eckstein and Wolpin follow a maximum
likelihood approach where the parameters of the participation decision, of wages
and of the measurement error process are estimated simultaneously.
Their estimation approach can be described as follows: An individual partic-
ipates if the utility from doing so is higher than the utility from not working.
To illustrate the approach we simplify further their model by assuming additive
separability between consumption and participation. In this case the husband’s
income will not aﬀect female labor supply. For notational simplicity we also
drop the schooling (S) and household composition terms ( Ntj). In this simpliﬁed
framework, utility when participating can be written as
V
(1)
t = yw
t + yh
t − b + a1 + a3Kt−1 + δEVt+1(Kt−1 +1 )
= exp
¡
β1 + β2Kt−1 + β3K2
t−1 + β4S + εt
¢
+ yh
t − b + a1 + a3Kt−1 + δEVt+1(Kt−1 +1 )
(6.26)
while the utility from nonparticipation is given by
V
(0)
t = y
h
t + δEVt+1(Kt−1) (6.27)
107where δ is the personal discount factor. Note that when the woman participates in
this period, human capital increases by one and does not increase otherwise. This
is what gives rise to the diﬀerence in the future values associated with the current
actions. In the expressions above the expectation is taken over the uncertain
realizations of εt (and of the husband’s income). This expectation is conditional
on information known in period t. However, since the shock is iid conditional and
unconditional expectations coincide.
A participation rule can be derived now from these two expressions written
in terms of thresholds for the unobserved shock εt. Workers are individuals with
wage shocks such that30
εt > ln[b − a1 − a3Kt−1 + δ(EVt+1(Kt−1) − EVt+1(Kt−1 + 1))]
−(β1 + β2Kt−1 + β3K2
t−1 + β4S)
or
εt > ε∗
t(Kt−1)
(6.28)
Given a distributional assumption on εt this leads to a probability of participation.
Note however, that the expression in 6.28 depends on the future expected gain
from working. Hence to estimate the model this gain needs to be computed. This
is achieved by backwards induction.
For a given set of parameters of the utility function and the distribution of the
unobservable εt the value of participation and non participation is constructed in a
terminal period, given all possible values of the state variables (in this case K). For
each K we then compute EVT(K)=E
h
max(V
(1)
T ,V
(0)
T )
i
where the expectation
is over the realizations εT. Computing the value in period T is very simple since
the problem is essentially static then.
The only way by which past decisions aﬀect the future is through the state
variable K. Hence the future gain from working this period when the current
experience stock is K is simply EVT(K +1 )− EVT(K). Whether this is positive
or negative will depend on the eﬀect of an extra unit of human capital on wages
a n do np r e f e r e n c e s .G i v e nt h et e r m i n a lv a l u ef u n c t i o nw ec a nn o wc o m p u t et h e
30In our simpliﬁed model the husbands income plays no role in the wife’s decision. This is not
a feature of the Eckstein and Wolpin model but a result of our simpliﬁed exposition in which
we have assumed additive separability.
108values in period T−1 for all possible K accumulated by period T−1 and so on until
we reach period t. This computation is a simple recursion. The procedure requires
one to specify a terminal period (age) T. I ta l s or e q u i r eu st ob es p e c i ﬁca b o u t
what happens beyond that period. In models that require backwards induction
it is often necessary to parameterize separately a terminal value function. In
Eckstein and Wolpin the value beyond the last decision period T is assumed to
be zero.
Given a way to compute EVt+1(Kt−1)−EVt+1(Kt−1+1)we can now easily con-
struct the likelihood function. For non-workers this is simply Pr(εt <ε ∗
t(Kt−1)) =
Φ(ε∗
t(Kt−1)) where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. For workers
the contribution to the likelihood function is the joint density of wages (driven
by the sum of the shock εt and the measurement error ut) and the probability
that εt >ε ∗
t(Kt−1). Hence estimation proceeds as follows: For an initial set of
parameters the future gains from work are computed. Then the observed event
is computed and the likelihood function is constructed for each observation. A
Newton type algorithm can then be used to update the parameters. The value
functions need to be recomputed at each iteration when updated parameters are
available - this is what makes dynamic discrete choice computationally burden-
some.
Estimation of this model requires observations on Kt−1 and the choice pt as
well as wages. In general retrospective information on periods worked can be
used, although entire work histories constructed over time as event unfold would
reduce the chance of measurement error. Administrative data has now become
available which improves the data situation substantially (see Adda, Dustmann,
Meghir and Robin, 2006).
The dynamic discrete choice model described above is a coherent and power-
ful way of modelling the dynamics of participation and the evolution in wages.
However, it does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity and thus all dependence
on the past is in eﬀect assumed to be pure state dependence.
The model by Eckstein and Wolpin is a prototype on which other researchers
have built, drawing also from the experience gained in the analysis of discrete
choice in other ﬁelds or in labor supply (Rust, 1987 Pakes 1986, Hotz and Miller
1988, Berkovec and Stern 1991). One of the most important subsequent contri-
butions in the ﬁeld of labor supply is the paper by Rust and Phellan (1997). The
109crucial aspect of this paper is that it models explicitly the relationship between
work and future social security entitlements, thus building a model that can be
used to evaluate the impact of policy reforms. An important feature, which com-
plicates the model and makes it much harder to implement is that the individual’s
choice depends on a large number of state variables that evolve stochastically. In
the Eckstein and Wolpin prototypical model there was basically only one state
variable: the number of periods worked in the past. Here the state space includes
health status, own earnings, spouse’s earnings and social security income. Some
of these variables are aﬀected by past decisions. Hence the intertemporal non-
separabilities in this model are primarily induced by the structure of the budget
set: Current work decisions aﬀect both future earnings and future social security
receipts.
The principle of estimating such a model does not diﬀer fundamentally from
that of estimating the Eckstein and Wolpin model: The stochastic process for
the exogenous state variables is estimated from the data. Then, following the
speciﬁcation of a distribution for the unobservables, the probability of observed
choices is constructed, which depends on the future and current utility gains from
this choice. As before, for each set of parameter values and at each value of the
s t a t ev a r i a b l e st h em o d e lh a st ob es o l v e da n dt h eo p t i m a lc h o i c ed e t e r m i n e d .
The probabilities at each data point are combined in the usual way to form the
sample likelihood function. However, the problem is more complicated because
of the many sources of uncertainty, originating from the large number of stochas-
tically evolving state variables. These components are critical additions because
they recognize explicitly that there are events such as the possibility of death or
t a s t es h i f t e rv a r i a b l e ss u c ha sh e a l t ht h a ta ﬀect behavior but are fundamentally
uncertain. Such uncertainty is very likely to aﬀect labor supply and retirement
behavior of individuals.
6.4. Estimation with Savings, Participation and Unobserved Hetero-
geneity
We conclude our chapter by a brief discussion of estimation of dynamic models
with savings in the absence of complete markets, which bring together the entire
set of issues we have identiﬁed as challenges in estimating labor supply models
110and takes us right against the research frontier in this ﬁeld.
6.4.1. Estimation with Complete Markets
Altug and Miller (1998) specify a model of consumption and labour supply,
where preferences are non-separable over time and where wages depend on past
labour supply (experience). In a departure from the earlier literature, savings are
explicitly taken into account as are aggregate shocks. Moreover, the estimation
methods proposed are relatively simple since they exploit a modiﬁed version of the
conditional choice probability estimator developed in Hotz and Miller (1993). The
key assumption that allows them to estimate such a complex model is that markets
are complete. They also assume that preferences for leisure and consumption are
additive. Finally the problem is simpliﬁed further by assuming that preference
shocks are independently and identically distributed over time (and individuals)
and there is no source of persistent heterogeneity in preferences.
The complete markets assumption allows them to express consumption allo-
cations as a function of a ﬁxed eﬀect and an aggregate time eﬀect. This solves
at one go the problem of dealing with aggregate shocks when the time period
is short (Chamberlain, 1984) and the problem of having to simulate alternative
consumption paths explicitly when solving the dynamic programming problem.
In Altug and Miller the complete markets assumption can be viewed as an
approximation that allows them to estimate a more general economic model than
the ones considered earlier in the literature. Indeed their model is particularly rich,
because it allows for endogenous human capital accumulation, for non-separable
preferences as well as savings. However, the complete markets assumption is
resoundingly rejected whenever it is tested (Cochrane, 1991 and Attanasio and
Davis, 1996). It is not known how much bias the assumption would introduce
in the parameter estimates. Nevertheless, the real empirical challenge is to relax
both the complete markets assumption and relax the structure of unobserved
heterogeneity. In the next section we review the issues surrounding this challenge.
1116.4.2. Estimation with Uninsurable idiosyncratic risk
We consider an economy where some idiosyncratic risk remains uninsurable.
However we assume that perfect credit markets are available.31 Consider a utility
function depending on hours of work hit,o np a r t i c i p a t i o npit (to reﬂect ﬁxed costs)
a n do nc o n s u m p t i o ncit.
Uit = U1(cit,h it,p it,f i|zit)+U2(hit,f i|zit)+γ(zit)pit+pitν
(1)
it +(1−pit)ν
(2)
it (6.29)
where zitaretaste shifter variables and where fi, ν
(1)
it and ν
(2)
it are heterogeneity
terms, the ﬁrst being time invariant. Assets accumulate according to the diﬀerence
equation
Ait+1 =( 1+rt)(Ait + withit − cit)
The terminal condition for assets is
AiT =0
where T is the last period of the planning horizon. We do not discuss retirement
explicitly. However, early retirement can be induced by the availability of pensions
later in life, the accumulation of private assets, by aspects of the welfare system
such as easily available disability insurance and/or by a decline in wages at an
older age.
We assume wages take the form
lnwit = d
e
t + κi + ζ
ed0
xit + eit
where de
t is the log price of human capital for education group e, xit denotes
observable characteristics, some of which may be common with xit, κi is a ﬁxed
eﬀect and eit is an iid shock with a known distribution, say normal.32
Suppose the function U1 in 6.29 is non-additive in participation p,hours h
and consumption c with no components that are additive in p or h.I n t h i s
31Some may view this as a contradiction. However, given uncertainty, most individuals will
typically not want much uncolateralised borrowing, making the modelling of LCs probably
redundant for all practical purposes. This may be why many tests for Liquidty Constraints fail
to reject the null of no constraints.
32Richer stochastic structures are in principle possible, but they do increase the state space
substantially.
112case it is possible to estimate U1 and U2 based on the conditional Euler equation
for consumption and on the within period labour supply decision as discussed
earlier, subject to being able to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. However, the
parameter γ cannot be identiﬁed in this way. This missing component will be
key to simulating counterfactual employment, hours and consumption paths for
individuals. Despite the relative simplicity of preferences and the wage function,
both of which exclude intertemporal dependencies, the estimation of all relevant
parameters requires the full solution of the dynamic optimisation problem: the
probability of working is a function of the utility gain from doing so. To compute
this utility gain one must know the consumption in the counterfactual state. With
incomplete markets and idiosyncratic shocks this is not as straightforward as in
the Altug and Miller case. We outline a possible approach.
We start by simplifying the model and assume a constant interest rate rt =
r. Next specify the conditional distribution governing the evolution of all other
state variables, i.e. gs(Sit|Sit−1,...,St−p),w h e r eS includes all stochastically time
varying in x and zt a k e nt ob ee x o g e n o u s .I ng e n e r a lgs can be estimated separately
and we can condition on it during estimation of the rest of the model.
In general heterogeneity in the wage rate κi will be correlated with the hetero-
geneity in preferences fi. This implies that wages are endogenous for both labor
supply and consumption and this reﬂects the idea that unobserved productivity
and the tastes for work are related. A simplifying assumption could be made
reducing the dimension of heterogeneity, i.e. fi ∝ κi.
In this model assets are the only endogenous state variable, which in princi-
ple should include all sources of household wealth, including housing and pension
wealth. This causes a very serious measurement problem. Leaving this aside,
given suitable data the model is solved numerically to obtain the value of con-
sumption conditional on the person’s labour market state. Denote the optimal
solutions as follows; workers : c
(1)
it = c
(1)
t (wit,A it|Sit,f i,p it =1 ) , non-workers c
(0)
it =
c
(0)
t (Ait|Sit,f i,p it =0 )and h
(1)
it = ht(wit,A it|Sit,f i,p it =1 ) . In general there will
be no closed form solutions to these functions and they will need to be computed
numerically during estimation. To compute these policy functions we need to solve
for the future optimal policies. One approach, for this ﬁnite horizon problem is
to use backwards induction. Starting from some terminal period, the optimal
policies are evaluated for all possible values of the state variables backwards up
113until the current period. At his point we have all the ingredients to evaluate th
probability of work, including c(1) and c(0) and the future values conditional on
current actions1 (EV
(1)
it+1) and not working (EV
(0)
it+1).T h ec u r r e n tv a l u eo fw o r k i n g
a n dn o tw o r k i n gi st h e ng i v e nb y
V
(1)
it = U(c
(1)
it ,h
(1)
it ,p it =1 ,f i)+ν
(1)
it + βEtV
(1)
it+1
V
(0)
it = U(c
(0)
it ,h it =0 ,p it =0 ,f i)+ν
(0)
it + βEtV
(0)
it+1
which now allows us to specify the probability of working as
Pr(pit =1 |Ait,S it,f i)=Pr(ν
(1)
it − ν
(0)
it >U
(0)
it − U
(1)
it + β
h
EtV
(0)
it+1 − EtV
(1)
it+1
i
The consumption and labour supply as derived above are deterministic given the
ﬁxed eﬀect fi. The reason for this is that the time varying heterogeneity terms
v(1) and v(0) do not aﬀect the marginal utility of hours (given participation) or
consumption. One simple way to enrich the stochastic speciﬁcation is to allow
for measurement error in consumption and hours. This will induce a density of
observed hours mh among workers and observed consumption m
(1)
c for workers and
m
(0)
c for nonworkers.Thus the likelihood conditional on the heterogeneity term is
L =
QN
i=1
QTi
t=1{
h
m
(1)
h m
(1)
c g(wit|κi,S it)Pr(pit =1 |wit,A it,S it,f i)
ipit
hR h
m
(0)
c g(wit|fi,S it)(1− Pr(pit =1 |wit,A it,S it,f i))
i
dwit
i1−pit
}
QN
i=1
QTi
t=1 Lit(fi)
where g(·) is the density of wages, N is the number of individuals and Ti is the
number of time periods over which individual i is observed and Lit(fi) is the
likelihood contribution for individual i. The stochastic dependence between the
various elements in the likelihood is driven by the unobserved component fi,w h i c h
needs to be integrated out. .
Allowing for persistent unobserved heterogeneity is complicated by the fact
that at any point in time fi will be correlated with: these are the outcome of
past decisions, themselves a function of fi.Thus in a panel of individual data the
114initial value of assets cannot be taken as exogenous in general. To solve this
problem we need to specify a model for the initial value (Ai0), conditional on a
set of variables assumed themselves to be exogenous. Denote the distribution of
initial assets by gA(Ai0|ζi,z it) where zit are a set of instruments explaining initial
assets, which are excludable from the participation probability. Finding such
instruments is not straightforward. One possibility could be to use random shocks
that aﬀected wealth at some point, but did not change preferences, such as, for
example, parental health. The unobserved variables ζi and fi may be correlated,
which is the source of endogeneity of initial assets. If these are exogenous, fi and
ζi would be independent of each other.33
Given a model for initial assets and using a discrete mixture as an approxi-
mation to the distribution of the pair (fi,ζi) (see Heckman and Singer, 1983) the
likelihood function now becomes
L =
N Y
i=1
K X
k=1
S X
s=1
(
prksgA(Ai0|ζs,z it)
Ti Y
t=1
Lit(fk)
)
where K and S are the number of points of support for the distribution of fi and ζi
respectively and prks is the probability mass at a point of the (fi,ζi) distribution.
The computational burden in these models arises from having to solve the
model at each iteration and each individual type (deﬁned by the observable and
unobservable characteristics) for all values of the state variables. If these are
continuous (such as assets) they need to be discretised.
Macroeconomic shocks
The model allows for macroeconomic shocks through wages. In its simplest
form there is just one type of human capital and the time eﬀect on the wage reﬂects
its value relative to the consumption good. In a richer setting there are diﬀerent
types of human capital with relative prices that vary. To allow for macro-shocks in
the model we require a model that predicts forward prices as a function of current
observables. In principle, this process will have to be estimated simultaneously
with the model, because of the changes in labour force composition over time,
which the model accounts for.
33See Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997), for applications in dy-
namic transition models.
1156.4.3. Why allow for savings
Allowing for savings is complicated both computationally and empirically. Allow-
ing for a linear utility in consumption would eliminate the complications. So why
should we get into all this trouble? The answer lies in the fact that individuals
are risk averse and risk in not fully insurable. Modelling savings in this context
is important for understanding a number of issues, including self-insurance for
events such unemployment (Low 1999) and more importantly pensions and re-
tirement. For example, to understand the policy impact of changes in pension
arrangements we need to understand how such policies interact with savings. The
extent to which public policies crowd out private savings can only be studied in a
model that accounts for both. Similar issues will arise when studying the impact
of policies such as taxes and tax credits. The complete labour supply eﬀect can-
not be understood if we do not know how savings behaviour will be aﬀected. On
the other hand, there are many questions relating to whether our fully rational
forward looking model is a good enough representation of reality. Ignoring the
issue is, however, not the way forward.
7. Summary and Conclusions
The study of labour supply is valuable from a number of perspectives. The
analysis of the impact of taxes and beneﬁts is perhaps the best established mo-
tivation. Within this ﬁe l dw ea r ec o n c e r n e dw i t ht h ei m p a c to ft a x e so ne ﬀort
as well as the role of taxes and beneﬁts in aﬀecting education decisions; in this
latter case labour supply is seen as an alternative to school or training for younger
individuals. From a more dynamic perspective, focus recently has also shifted to
labour supply as a way of responding to uncertainty and mitigating the amount of
saving as well a for understanding the evolution of consumption over the life-cycle:
without allowing for changes in labour supply, it is very diﬃcult to rationalize the
observed behaviour of consumption. Finally, the relationship of consumption and
labour supply is critical for understanding issues to do with optimal taxes and
the design of beneﬁts - in work beneﬁts in particular. For all the above reason, it
is clearly important to understand the way labour supply is determined and how
this relates to intertemporal considerations, such as savings
116This chapter outlines a number of approaches to the study of labour supply
beginning with the original static models and ending with dynamic ones that allow
for savings and possibly intertemporal non-separabilities. Along the way we have
discussed incorporating taxes and allowing for non-convex budget sets and the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity. Allowing for the latter has proved par-
ticularly important empirically for estimating reliable models that are capable of
ﬁtting the data and accounting for the large persistence in labour supply patterns.
Empirically labour supply analysis poses signiﬁcant challenges not only because
of the non-convexities but also because of the endogeneity of the main variables
whose eﬀect we are attempting to measure. High eﬀort people, are likely to have
invested more in human capital and thus have higher wages. They also accumu-
late more wealth making asset income potentially endogenous as well. Adding
dynamics and allowing for non-convexities in the budget sets compounds the dif-
ﬁculties. We have attempted to provide a ﬂavour of these diﬃculties and point to
solutions. However, it is clear that there is more to be done. One relatively new
and important area of research which we did not touch upon is modelling the en-
tire career, starting with education choice and continuing with labour supply over
the life-cycle. This is likely to be of key importance for understanding the longer
term impact of public policy: programmes, such as tax credits, that encourage
labour supply may well discourage education. Trading oﬀ these two margins of
adjustment is important and requires reliable models for both. Thus consider-
ing the dynamics of labour supply and developing reliable modeling methods will
continue to be of key importance for policy purposes.
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8. Appendix
This appendix reviews general formulations for likelihood functions applicable to
econometric models involving any combination of ﬁve types of endogenous vari-
ables: (1) discrete, (2) continuous, (3) censored, (4) truncated and (5) continu-
ous/discrete. The subsequent discussion opens with an overview of the statistical
framework considered here. It next considers increasingly complex variants of
this framework, starting with models incorporating just discrete variables, adding
in continuous variables, and then including endogenous variables of a combined
continuous-discrete character. The analysis proceeds to cover speciﬁcations ap-
propriate when one does not observe all states of the world but instead only knows
whether various combination of states has occurred. The concluding subsection
presents alternative representations of likelihood functions commonly found in the
literature comparable to the speciﬁcations presented here, as well as presenting
simple extensions of speciﬁcations that allow for dependence on exogenous vari-
ables.
1298.1. Overview of Statistical Framework
The basic idea at the foundation of econometric models characterizing distri-
butions of discrete-continuous variables relies on the notion that all endogenous
quantities depend on the values of an underlying set of continuously-distributed
random variables. Specify these underlying variables by the vector U, assumed to
include r linearly-independent components. This rx1 vector possesses the joint
density function:
ϕ(U) for U ∈ Ω (A.1)
where the set Ω designates the sample space or domain of the random variables
U.
In this model, m states of the world can occur. The discrete random variable
δi signiﬁes whether state i happens, with δi =1indicating realization of state
i and δi =0implying that some state other than i occurred. The value of δi
depends on where U falls in its sample space; speciﬁcally,
δi =
½
1
0
if U ∈ Ωi
otherwise (A.2)
where the set Ωi represents a nontrivial subset of the entire sample space Ω.
Without loss of generality, assume that the sets Ωi for i =1 ,...,m are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive, meaning
m S
i=1
Ωi = Ω and the sets Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅ for i 6= j
(i.e., the sets Ωi and Ωj are disjoint).
In association with state i, there exists ni continuously distributed random
variables designated Yji,j=1 ,...,ni. The following equations determine the
values of these continuous variables:
Yji = gji(U) .( A . 3 )
Stacking these individual random variables into a vector yields
Yi =
⎛
⎜
⎝
Y1i
. . .
Ynii
⎞
⎟
⎠ =
⎛
⎜
⎝
g1i
. . .
gnii
⎞
⎟
⎠ = gi . (A.4)
130To avoid introduction of redundant or ill-deﬁned Yji’s, assume there exists an
inverse of gi such that
U(i) = g
−1
i (Yi,U i) (A.5)
for some subvector U(i) comprised of any ni components of U.34 The subvector
Ui includes those elements of U not included in U(i).D e s i g n a t e Φi as the domain
of (Yi,U i) and Θi as the domain of Yi .
Another interesting class of random variables consists of quantities that take a
ﬁxed single value in some states and a continuous set of values in others. Denote
these discrete/continuous variables as Zji,w i t ht h ei n d e xi signalling the state
realized and j =1 ,...,ki signifying the particular Z realized in this state. The
value of Zji follows a rule of the form:
Zji =
½
Yji
Z∗
ji
for j ∈ Kci
for j ∈ Kdi
(A.6)
where the set Kci indexes those Zji taking the form of a continuous variable in
state i, and the set Kdi identiﬁes those Zji equaling a constant value Z∗
ji in state
i.D e ﬁne Zi as the vector containing the Zji j =1 ,...,k i as elements analogous
to Yi speciﬁed in (A.4).
Finally, form all the unique variables appearing in any of the Yi’s into the
vector Y , assumed to be of dimension nx1, and all the variables making up the
Zi’s into the vector Z, assumed to be of dimension kx1. For any event δi =1 ,Y
consists of two sets of components: the vector Yi incorporating all the continuous
random variables registering in state i,a n dY(i) made up of all other continuous
variables unobserved in this state but seen in some other state j 6= i. Similarly,
Z consists of the vector Zi and Z(i) deﬁned analogously. In some states i,a l lo f
the elements of Y and Z may be observed, and in others none may be.
The subsequent discussion characterizes formulations of conditional and un-
conditional likelihood functions associated with Y , Z and combinations of the δi’s.
34“Assuming existence of the inverse of gi in () is not as restrictive as one might ﬁrst surmise.
If an inverse does not exist on set Φi , then one can replace Φi with a further segment of this
set inverses deﬁned on each of these smaller sets. The subsequent analysis can then be carried
out for this expanded decomposition of Φ.”
131As brieﬂy noted at the end of this appendix, one can readily introduce the pres-
ence of exogenous variables both in specifying the distribution of U and in deﬁning
the regions of deﬁnition of δi. An exogenous variable in this analysis must be
observed in all states; otherwise, this variable must be include as a component of
Y or Z.
8.2. Discrete Variables: All and Combinations of States
Initially consider empirical frameworks in which one observes only discrete
variables whose outcomes register the realization of m distinct regimes determined
b yt h er e l a t i v ev a l u e so fU.
A common formulation speciﬁes that a researcher sees exactly which state m
occurs, implying that one observes all individual δi, i =1 ,...,m.F r o m ( A . 2 ) w e
see that the probability that δi =1equals:
P (δi =1 ) = P (U ∈ Ωi) (A.7)
=
Z
···
Z
Ωi
ϕ(U)dU
≡
Z
Ωi
ϕ(U)dU .
The notation
R
···
R
Ωi denotes integration over the set Ωi, which the third line
of this equation expresses in the shorthand notation
R
Ωi. The joint distribution
of the δi’s takes the form:
P (δ1,...,δm)=
m Y
i =1
[P(δi =1 ) ]
δi (A.8)
=
Y
i∈M
[P(δi =1 ) ]
δi
In the second line of this equation, the notation M = {i : i =1 ,...,m} refers to
the set of all possible states i.
132In other formulations, a researcher does not observe or chooses to ignore each
state individually. Instead, one accounts for only whether some combination of
states has been realized. More speciﬁcally, suppose one knows that at least one
δi =1when i ∈ Mt ⊂ M , but one does not account for which particular δi in
this group actually occurred. So,
if i ∈ Mt ,t h e n δt ≡
X
i∈Mt
δi =1 ; otherwise, δt =0.( A . 9 )
The sets Mt, t =1 ,...,τ, are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (i.e.,
τ S
t=1
Mi = M
and Mt ∩ Mj = ∅ for t 6= j). The probability of the occurrence of group state t
equals
P
¡
δt =1
¢
=
X
i∈Mt
P (δi =1 ) .( A . 1 0 )
The joint distribution of the δt’s takes the form:
P
¡
δ1,...,δτ
¢
=
Y
t∈T
£
P(δt =1 )
¤δt (A.11)
where the notation T = {t : t =1 ,...,τ} refers to the set of all possible "group"
states t.
8.3. Continuous Variables: All States Observed
Consider those models in which one observes each individual δi along with
vectors Yi of continuously distributed random variables for states i ∈ My ⊆ M
. Conditional on occurrence of a state, the components of Yi may either be
truncated or censored. The truncated elements of Yi refer to those that lie in a
strict subset of their overall domain given realization of the selection mechanism
U ∈ Ωi (or, equivalently, (Yi,U i) ∈ Φi ). The censored elements consist of those
that instead range over their entire domain. The set Θ =
m S
i=1
Θi deﬁnes the sample
space of Y .S o , i f Yi includes truncated components, then Θi ⊂ Θ.
133The ﬁrst step in formulating speciﬁcations for the distributions of the Yi’s
involves recognizing that the density of underlying random variables U conditional
on the event δi =1takes the form:
ϕ(U | δi =1 )=
ϕ(U)
P (δi =1 )
(A.12)
where relationship (A.7) gives the formula for P (δi =1 ) . An alternative expres-
sion (A.7) is given by:
P (δi =1 ) = P (U ∈ Ωi) (A.13)
= P ((Yi,U i) ∈ Φi)
=
Z
Φi
hi (Yi,U i) dYidUi
where the set Φ =
n S
i=1
Φi deﬁnes the domain of (Y,U1,...Un).
Application of a conventional change-in-variables formula exploiting relations
(A.3) and (A.5) yields the following speciﬁcation for the density of Yi conditional
on δi:
f (Yi | δi =1 )=
R
Φi|Yi
hi (Yi,U i)dUi
P (δi =1 )
for Yi ∈ Θi (A.14)
where
hi (Yi,U i)=Ji ϕ
¡
g
−1
i (Yi,U i),U i
¢
with Ji =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂g
−1
i
∂Y
0
i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+
,( A . 1 5 )
and the notation
R
Φi|Yi
denotes integration of Ui over the set
Φi|Yi = {Ui :( Yi,U i) ∈ Φi} .( A . 1 6 )
The term Ji in (A.*) represents the Jacobian of the transformation associated with
(A.5) (i.e., Ji is the absolute value of the determinant of the matrix of partial
derivatives
∂g−1
i
∂Y
0
i
). One can express the domain of Yi as
Θi = Θi· Yi =
©
Yi : Ui ∈ Φi|Yi
ª
,( A . 1 7 )
134where the notation Θi· Yi simply signiﬁes that this set is a suspace of Yi.
A compact expression for the conditional density of Y is
f (Y | δi ,i ∈ My)=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | δi =1 ) ]
δi (A.18)
where as deﬁned above My designates the set of states in which one observes at
least one element of Y . An alternative representation for this conditional density
takes the form:
f (Y | δ1,...,δm)=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | δi =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Mc
y
[1]
δi ,( A . 1 9 )
where the set Mc
y denotes the complement of My with respect to M. Realizations
of i ∈ Mc
y mean that all elements of Y are either undeﬁned or unobserved.
The joint density of Y and δ1,...,δm is the product of the conditional density
of Y given by (A.19) and the joint probability of δ1,...,δm given by (A.8) yielding:
f (Y,δ1,...,δm)=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | δi =1 ) P(δi =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Mc
y
[P(δi =1 ) ]
δi(A.20)
=
Y
i∈My
"Z
Φi|Yi
hi (Yi,U i)dUi
#δi Y
i∈Mc
y
∙Z
Ωi
ϕ(U)dU
¸δi
.
The second line of this expression follows by substituting relationships from (A.7)
and (A.14).
8.4. Discrete/Continuous Variables: All States Observed
Consider models in which one observes individual δi along with the vectors
Zi comprised of discrete/continuous random variables for states i ∈ Mz ⊆ M.
The components included in Zi are either distributed continuously or equal to
constants according to the following rule:
Zi =
µ
Zci
Zdi
¶
=
µ
Yi
Z∗
di
¶
for i ∈ Mz .( A . 2 1 )
135Inspection of (A.6) reveals that those individual Zji for j ∈ Kci make up the
elements of the vector Zci;a n dt h o s eZji for j ∈ Kdi form the vector Zdi.T h e
set Mz comprises all states in which any component of Z is realized.
For states i ∈ My, one can express the distribution of Zi conditional on δi =1
as:
f(Zi | δi =1 ) = f(Zci,Z di | δi =1 ) (A.22)
= f(Zci | Zdi ,δ i =1 )P (Zdi | δi =1 )
= f(Yi | Z
∗
di ,δ i =1 )
where the third line follows from
P (Zdi = Z
∗
di | δi =1 )=1 .( A . 2 3 )
Formally, the argument Z∗
di in f(Yi | Z∗
di ,δ i =1 ) is redundant since the event
δi =1already implies Zdi = Z∗
di; the argument is included merely to remind the
reader that the density appearing the last row of (A.22) typically depends on Z∗
di.
A compact expression for the conditional density of Z is
f (Z | δi ,i ∈ Mz)=
Y
i∈My
[ f (Yi | Z
∗
di ,δ i =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Md
[1]
δi .( A . 2 4 )
Realizations of i ∈ My mean that some of the elements of Zi are continuously dis-
tributed, whereas occurrence of i ∈ Md imply that all elements of Zi are discrete.
One can write an alternative representation for this conditional density as:
f (Z | δ1,...,δm)=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | Z
∗
di ,δ i =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Md
[1]
δi Y
i∈Mu
[1]
δi (A.25)
=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | Z
∗
di ,δ i =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Md∪Myu
[1]
δi .
Realizations of i ∈ Mu mean that all components of Z are either undeﬁned or
unknown.
136The joint density of Z and δ1,...,δm is the product of the conditional density
of Z given by (A.25) and the joint probability of δ1,...,δm given by (A.8) yielding:
f (Z,δ1,...,δm)=
Y
i∈My
[f (Yi | Z
∗
di ,δ i =1 ) P(δi =1 ) ]
δi Y
i∈Md∪Mu
[P(δi =1 ) ]
δi (A.26)
=
Y
i∈My
"Z
Φi|Yi Z∗
di
hi (Yi,U i)dUi
#δi Y
i∈Md∪Mu
∙Z
Ωi
ϕ(U)dU
¸δi
.
The second line of this expression follows by substituting relationships from (A.7)
and (A.14), where the notation Φi|Yi Z∗
di still refers to the set Φi|Yi deﬁned by
(A.16) with emphasis added to indicate that this set also depends on Z∗
di.
8.5. Discrete/Continuous Variables: Combinations of States
An important category of models involves characterizing the distribution of
continuous and discrete/continuous variables when one either observes or chooses
to distinguish the occurrence of groups rather than individual states. Deﬁne the
relevant groups of states by the δt’s speciﬁed in (A.9) for t ∈ T as outlined in
Section A.2.
Consider the distribution of the continuous random variable
Yt =
X
i∈Mt
δiYi .( A . 2 7 )
Relation (A.27) implicitly assumes that each Yi is deﬁned and of comparable
dimension for i ∈ Mt. Application of the law of iterated expectations yields the
following density for Yt conditional on δt =1 :
f
¡
Yt | δt =1
¢
=
X
i∈Mt
f
¡
Yt | δi =1 ,δt =1
¢
P
¡
δi =1| δt =1
¢
(A.28)
=
X
i∈Mt
f (Yt | δi =1 ) P
¡
δi =1| δt =1
¢
=
X
i∈Mt
f (Yt | δi =1 )
P (δi =1 )
P
¡
δt =1
¢
137The latter two lines of this relationship follow from the assumptions that the
individual states δi =1for i ∈ Mt making up the event δt =1are mutually
exhaustive and exclusive.
Discrete/continuous variables are realized according to the following rule:
Zt =
µ
Zct
Zdt
¶
=
µ
Yt
Z∗
dt
¶
for t ∈ Tz .( A . 2 8 )
The set Tz = Ty∪ Td comprises all group states in which any component of Z
is realized. The set Ty includes those group states t in which Zt incorporates
the continuously-distributed vector Yt speciﬁed by (A.27); and the set Td includes
those group states wherein all the components of Zt equals constant values.35
For group states t ∈ Tc, the distribution of Zt conditional on δt =1takes the
form:
f(Zt | δt =1 ) = f(Zct,Z dt | δt =1 ) (A.29)
= f(Zct | Zdt , δt =1 )P
¡
Zdt | δt =1
¢
= f(Yi | Z
∗
dt , δt =1 ) ,
where this latter expression exploits the relationship:
P
¡
Zdt = Z
∗
dt | δt =1
¢
=1 for t ∈ Td .( A . 3 0 )
Analogous to (A.25), a compact expression for the conditional density of Z is
f
¡
Z | δ1,...,δτ
¢
=
Y
t∈Ty
£
f
¡
Yt | Z
∗
dt , δt =1
¢¤δt Y
t∈Td∪Tu
[1]
δt (A.31)
where the set Tu includes those state groups in which no Zjt are either undeﬁned
or unknown.
35“For notational simplicity, the speciﬁcation of the values of Zt when t ∈ Td presumes that
Z∗
t is common across the individual states i ∈ Mt making up group state t. One can instead
replace the common value Z∗
t by a set {Z∗
t } consisting of several discrete values at the expense
of introducing some complexity in specifying likelihood functions.”
138Multiplying the conditional density (A.25) by the joint probability of the events
δ1,...,δτ given by (A.8) generates the following joint density for Z and the δt’s:
f
¡
Z,δ1,...,δτ
¢
=
Y
t∈Ty
£
f
¡
Yt | Z
∗
dt , δt =1
¢
P(δt =1 )
¤δt Y
t∈Td∪Tu
£
P(δt =1 )
¤δt (A.32)
=
Y
t∈Ty
"
X
i∈Mt
Z
Φi|Yt Z∗
dt
hi (Yt,U i) dUi
#δt Y
t∈Td∪Tu
"
X
i∈Mt
Z
Ωi
ϕ(U)dU
#δt
The second line of this expression follows from substitution of relationships from
(A.7), (A.10), (A.14), and (A.28).
8.6. Accounting for Unobserved and Exogenous Variables
Speciﬁcation (A.32) presents a general formulation for likelihood functions
incorporating discrete, continuous and discrete/continuous variables. One often
sees alternative representations of this speciﬁc a t i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r et h a tm a ya t
ﬁrst not appear as a special case of (A.32).
One such representation deﬁnes a set of continuous or discrete/continuous
variables Z that are then presumed to be unobserved and, therefore, must be
eliminated as arguments of the f ’s in (A.32). In particular, suppose Z consists
of two components Z
0
t =( Z
0
1t ,Z
0
2t) where the variables Z
0
1t are observed and
those included in Z
0
2t are not. Correspondingly, decompose Y
0
t =( Y
0
1t ,Y
0
2t) and
Z
0
dt =( Z
0
1dt ,Z
0
2dt), with the random variables Y
0
2t and Z
0
2dt unobserved.
Integrating (or summing) the joint likelihood function (A.32) over Z
0
2t produces
the marginal for Z
0
1t. This exercise yields:
f
¡
Z1,δ1,...,δτ
¢
=
Y
t∈Ty
Z
Θt· Y2t
f(Y1t,Y 2t | Z
∗
dt,δt =1 ) dY2t P(δt =1 )
δt
Y
t∈Td∪Tu
£
P(δt =1 )
¤δt (A.33)
=
Y
t∈Ty
f(Y1t | Z
∗
d1t,δt =1 )P(δt =1 )
δt
Y
t∈Td∪Tu
£
P(δt =1 )
¤δt .
The second line of this expression exploits the relationship:
Z
Θt· Y2t
f (Y1t,Y 2t | Z
∗
dt,δt =1 ) dZ2t =
Z
Θt· Y2t
f(Y2t | Y1t ,Z
∗
dt,δt =1 ) dY2t f(Y1t | Z
∗
dt,δt =1 )
= f(Y1t | Z
∗
dt,δt =1 ) ,
139which follows since Θt· Y2t constitutes the domain of Y2t given the event δt =1 .
Clearly, the second expression in (A.33) is a special case of (A.32). This merely
reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a ta nu n o b s e r v e dY2t has been reinterpreted as a component of
the Ui’s implicit in (A.32). The variables making up Ui in a state i (or t)m a yb e
observed as a Yj in some other state.
Finally, throughout the above discussion one can readily interpret the distri-
bution of U as being conditional on a set of exogenous variables X,a sw e l la s
deﬁne the regions of deﬁnition of δi to depend on X (s o ,Ωi = Ωi (X) ). To
be deemed exogenous, each component of X must be observed in all states; oth-
erwise, this variable must be treated as a component of Y or Z in the previous
analysis. Modifying the above formula to admit exogenous X merely involves
adding X as an argument of f (·) and interpreting the sample subspaces Ωi, Φi|Yi
,a n dΘi as functions of X.
140